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My central aims here are (1) to explicate and defend the claim made by Hegel and other 
post-Kantians that there is a contradiction at the heart of Kant’s theoretical philosophy, and (2) to 
provide insight into the nature of Hegel’s system by seeing how it is formed in response to this 
real problem in Kant. Kant is committed to a real contradiction, I claim, with his appeal to 
affection by the thing in itself. This appeal amounts to the claim that our reception of empirical 
content is unconditioned by the understanding’s activity. The claim that contradicts this emerges 
in Kant’s clearest explanation of how the categories make experience possible. We can see that 
they do so, he argues, by seeing that our reception of empirical content is conditioned by the 
understanding’s activity. Kant’s followers J.S. Beck and Fichte champion Kant’s latter thought. I 
claim that their readings are true of Kant’s best thought, even though Kant rejects them. He only 
rejects their interpretations because he cannot abandon the former thought. But Beck and Fichte 
see, as Kant does not, that a commitment to thing-in-itself affection in light of Kant’s 
explanation of how the categories make experience possible would constitute what Hegel later 
calls “a self-contradictory ambiguity.” Hegel’s critique of Kant’s “standpoint of finitude” 
diagnoses why Kant is led to affirm both of these incompatible thoughts. The philosophical 
motivation behind the shape Hegel’s system takes comes to light through an examination of this 
diagnosis.  
     HEGEL’S CRITIQUE OF KANT’S STANDPOINT OF FINITUDE 
Daniel Addison, PhD 
University of Pittsburgh, 2013
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1.0  THE CRITIQUE’S CONTRADICTION AS THE KEY TO POST-KANTIANISM: 
REVERSING LONGUENESSE’S ANSWER TO “KANT ODER HEGEL?”  
                     
This idealism therefore becomes the same kind of self-contradictory ambiguity as 
Skepticism… it fails equally with Skepticism to bring together its contradictory thoughts of pure 
consciousness being all reality, while the extraneous impulse or sensations and ideas are equally 
reality. … It is involved in a direct contradiction; it asserts essence to be a duality of opposed 
factors, the unity of apperception and equally a Thing; whether the Thing is called an extraneous 
impulse, or an empirical or sensuous entity, or a Thing-in-itself, it still remains the same, i.e. 
extraneous to that unity.           - Hegel, 1807: 144
1
  
  
 
 
 
 This thing in itself was therefore the point of departure beyond which Kant’s 
Critique of Pure Reason could never move, and because of which it had to fail as an independent 
science. Right from the start one urged it to altogether discard this thing in itself… Kant 
appeared ambivalent… statements are contradicted by others… Kant, therefore, remained 
bogged down in what was for him an insurmountable contradiction.      
                  - Schelling, 1841: 123-4 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1
 In all quotes, italics indicate emphasis in the original, emboldened emphasis is my own.  
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Thesis statement: There is a contradiction between the Transcendental Analytic and the 
Transcendental Aesthetic of the Critique of Pure Reason. In the Analytic, Kant explains how the 
categories can be conditions of the possibility of experience. In the B Deduction, he does so via 
what is in effect an appeal to  
 
 
(P1): Our reception of empirical content is conditioned by the understanding’s activity.    
 
But (a) Kant is committed to affection by the thing in itself, and (b) such affection is 
equivalent to 
 
~ (P1): Our reception of empirical content is unconditioned by the understanding’s 
activity.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 3 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
Kant’s master thought in the Critique of Pure Reason is that the categories “are conditions of the 
possibility of experience, and are thus also valid a priori of all objects of experience.”2 I’m 
concerned in this paper with three things. First, the fundamental agreement between the readings 
of this master thought given on the one hand by J.S. Beck and Fichte in the 1790s, and those 
given by Schelling and Hegel after 1799 on the other. They agree that in the B Deduction Kant 
effects the proof for the quoted thesis by articulating there a concept of sensibility issuing in (P1) 
above.  
Second, the fundamental difference between the Beck-Fichte reading of the Critique’s 
theory of sensibility as a whole, and the Schelling-Hegel reading of the same. The difference is 
that Beck and Fichte assume that the theory of sensibility yielded by the B Deduction coheres 
with the theory of sensibility given in the Aesthetic. This assumption impels them to deny Kant’s 
commitment to affection by the thing in itself. They see, and Schelling and Hegel think that they 
are right to see, that such affection would amount to ~(P1). Kant’s 1799 rejection of Beck and 
Fichte thus impels Schelling and Hegel to abandon the assumption of the Critique’s coherence.  
Third, the difference between Longuenesse’s response to this 1799 event and Hegel’s 
(§3.3). Longuenesse holds that the Critique coheres, that Kant is committed to (P1), and 
committed to affection by the thing in itself. To deny Kant’s commitment to ~(P1), she must thus 
deny (b), that affection by the thing in itself is equivalent to our reception of empirical content 
                                                 
2
 B161. Translations from the Critique are from the Guyer / Wood edition. 
 4 
being unconditioned by the understanding’s activity.3 I will argue that this is implausible, and 
amounts to solipsism (§3.2).  
Throughout, “is coherent” means, “does not suffer a real contradiction.”  
 
1.1.1 The new problem of affection as the key to post-Kantianism 
A proof that even the friends of the Critique don’t know what they are about is that they 
don’t know where they ought to locate the object that produces sensation.  
          - Beck to Kant, 6.17.1794. Zweig, 1999: 480 
 
Kant opens the Critique speaking of “objects that stimulate our senses and in part themselves 
produce representations, in part bring the activity of our understanding into motion.” (B1) It is, 
as Beck reports, “certainly important to a great many” post-Kantians, whether Kant means the 
“object” spoken of here to be an appearance or a thing in itself. (Zweig, 1999: 513) Beck and 
Fichte stake their fates on the claim that Kant means an appearance to be the affecting object. 
They do so, because they see that the Critique would be subject to a real contradiction if 
Kant intends the affecting object to be a thing in itself. The contradiction that they see the 
Critique in danger of is that between (P1) and ~(P1) of my thesis statement. It is Beck and Fichte 
who offer the formulation of “the problem of affection” I give there. In the two major sections of 
this paper (§2, §3), I will argue, in turn, that Kant does in the Critique commit himself to both 
(P1) and ~(P1).  
                                                 
3
 See (1998) Kant and the Capacity to Judge (KCJ), pp.299-300.  
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Beck and Fichte are defenders of the Critique’s coherence.4 The value of their work for 
critics of the latter like myself, however, is that it allows a formulation of the problem of 
affection that renders useless the Kantian’s appeal to the usual “escape clause.”5 This latter is the 
appeal to Kant’s entitlement to “think” the causal influence of the thing in itself. It accompanies 
the concession to the post-Kantian objector that Kant is not entitled to “know” either the thing in 
itself or this relation of affection thought to hold between it and the subject. An escape cannot be 
made through this appeal, however, if Kant’s master thought indeed involves an appeal to (P1), 
and yet his appeal to thing-in-itself affection indeed implies ~(P1). That contradiction is real. 
Beck and Fichte stand in thorough agreement with Jacobi’s claim that one is “unable to 
stay within” the Critique’s system with “the presupposition” of affection by the thing in itself. In 
bringing new clarity to the problem, they strengthen the force of that claim. They differ, 
however, in that Jacobi had also insisted that one “could not enter the system” without this 
presupposition.
6
 Jacobi, G. Schulze (“Aenesidemus”) and Maimon all claim the Critique’s 
incoherence, citing its appeal to affection by the thing in itself. Beck and Fichte defend the 
Critique’s coherence by denying that Kant ever made the presupposition of thing-in-itself 
affection. Appropriately, they attempt to justify this denial by offering interpretations of B1 - the 
system’s entry point. Kant talks there of “objects that stimulate our senses.”  “What this term 
                                                 
4
 Throughout, I’m speaking only of pre-1799 Beck and Fichte. In 1800, Fichte no longer counts himself 
or “Prof. Beck, author of the “Standpoint Theory,” among the members of the Kantian school, just as 
Kant too distinguishes himself from this author,” and from Fichte himself. (Fichte, 1994: 189n) 
5
 Van Cleve (1999), Problems from Kant, p.137.  
6
 From Jacobi’s 1787 “On Transcendental Idealism,” an Appendix to David Hume über den Glauben, 
oder Idealismus und Realismus. Ein Gespräch, selection translated in Sasson, 2000: 173. 
 6 
signifies for Kant,” Fichte insists and Beck with him, is not, as Jacobi thought, a thing in itself, 
but rather an appearance.
7
  
Kant, however, accuses Beck’s reading of amounting to “an exegesis that would explain 
away sensibility.”8 Similarly, in the “Declaration concerning Fichte’s Wissenschaftslehre” of 
August 7, 1799, Kant insists that “the Critique is to be taken literally in what it says about 
sensibility” in the same sentence in which he rejects “the standpoint (of Beck or of Fichte)” 
(Zweig, 1999: 560). These rejections, in conjunction with Kant’s endorsement of J. Schulze in 
1797, confirm Kant’s commitment to affection by the thing in itself.9 They show how important 
it is to Kant to hold on to a conception of sensibility that suffers affection by the thing in itself.  
Now, Schelling and Hegel agree with Beck and Fichte on the following: Kant’s B 
Deduction explanation of how the categories make experience possible is incompatible with the 
idea that we are affected by a thing in itself.
10
 Because of this agreement, Kant’s rejection of 
                                                 
7
 See Fichte’s 1797 “Second Introduction to the Wissenschaftslehre”, in Fichte, 1994: 72-3, and Fichte, 
1988: 420.  
See J.S. Beck’s 1796 The Standpoint from which the Critical Philosophy is to be Judged, in di Giovanni 
and Harris, 2000: 204-49, especially p.230, and Zweig, 1999: 513, and also 480, 514-5, and 518.  
8
 See Beck’s letter to Kant of 7.20.1797 in Zweig, 1999: 514.  
9
 Kant answers his question, “which one of the disputants has really interpreted at least the main points of 
my system in the way I want them to be interpreted?” in the “Open Declaration” to Schlettwein of 
5.29.1797. Schlettwein had specifically asked whether “Reinhold, Fichte, Beck, or someone else was the 
correct interpreter.” (Zweig, 1999: 510-1. Fichte notes Kant’s endorsement in §6 of the Second 
Introduction, complaining of J. Schulze, “Over and over again, he expresses his agreement with Herr 
Eberhard’s assertion that the objective ground of appearances lies in something that is a thing in itself.” 
(Fichte, 1994: 65) (See next note.) 
10
 We’ll see in §3.2 that the goal of §6 of Fichte’s Second Introduction is to defend his claim that Kant is 
only committed to (P1). Its point, that is, is to deny Kant’s commitment to thing-in-itself affection and 
(equivalently for Fichte) ~(P1). Hegel takes Fichte’s (P1)-defending reading as true to the text of Kant’s 
Deduction. This is shown especially by how Hegel opens the Preface to The Difference between Fichte’s 
and Schelling’s Systems of Philosophy : “In the principle of the deduction of the categories Kant’s 
philosophy is authentic idealism; and it is this principle that Fichte extracted in a purer, stricter form.” 
(Hegel, 1801: 79) And “This principle is most definitely articulated in [Kant’s transcendental] deduction.” 
(80) Cf. pp.69, 74, 120-2 of Hegel’s 1802 Faith and Knowledge. These are texts written when allied with 
Schelling. And see especially the words “more consistent” at p.27 of the 1812/16 Science of Logic: “In its 
more consistent form, transcendental idealism did recognize the nothingness of the spectral thing-in-itself, 
 7 
Beck and Fichte impels Schelling and Hegel to turn resolutely critical of Kant’s thinking. We 
need to examine and evaluate this agreement, then, to evaluate this critical turn against Kant. 
We’ll find the justification for Hegel’s critique of Kant in this agreement. Longuenesse, we’ll 
see, has missed it.  
Fichte, and especially Beck, find the key to Kant’s explanation of how the categories 
make experience possible in the theory of sensibility yielded by the B Deduction.  The key 
component of this reading, we’ll see in §2.1, is the following thesis about the Aesthetic’s forms 
of intuition: they can only be the forms of intuition they are in the Aesthetic, forms capable of 
receiving empirical manifolds, through a unity supplied by the understanding’s activity.11  The 
Critique’s critics hold that the Aesthetic presents us with the contradictory of this claim: that our 
forms of intuition receive the “content” or “matter” of empirical cognition prior to the activity of 
the understanding through which experience is made possible.  
Beck’s Standpoint aims to show the Critique’s critics that it is not contradictory. Its big 
idea is to begin with the theory of sensibility presented in the Deduction and only then go on to 
explain the doctrine of the Aesthetic. (Zweig, 1999: 480) The Critique only appears 
contradictory to its critics, Beck contends, because its method of presentation is the reverse of 
this order. (Beck, 1796: especially 219 and 236, also pp.209, 226, 231)  
                                                                                                                                                             
this abstract shadow divorced from all content left over by critical philosophy, and its goal was to destroy 
it completely.”  
11
 See here especially what Beck says about space at BKH, pp.220-1, 225, 236. Cf. the phrase Beck uses 
as he explains to Kant his answer to Jacobi’s question (which object affects us?) at C, p.513, 
“determinations which I receive by means of the original activity of the understanding.” See Fichte, IW, 
p.73, and §2 of his (1795) “Outline of the Distinctive Character of the Wissenschaftslehre,” where 
“sensation has been deduced as an action of the I,” in EPW, p.252. See also the deduction of space and 
time there. Hegel agrees with Beck and Fichte that Kant himself affirms this about his forms of intuition. 
This is patent at FK, pp. 69, 74, 120-2. 
 8 
Beck’s mistake, however, and Fichte’s too, is to assume that the Aesthetic has to be 
consistent with what they find Kant doing in the Deduction.  
 
We must agree, therefore, that it is not prior to the synthesis, but in it, that space is a 
‘manifold of homogeneous parts’… That this exegesis is in conformity with the intention of the 
Critique as set out in the Transcendental Aesthetic – of this we cannot be more firmly convinced. 
                (Beck, 1796: 236) 
 
Beck and Fichte are right to agree with Jacobi’s claim that the Critique’s affecting object 
cannot be a thing in itself. Assuming the Critique’s coherence, they make the mistake of 
inferring that its affecting object is not a thing in itself. After falling from his favor (Zweig, 
1999: 515), Beck pleads to Kant,  
 
It never occurred to me to try to construct an exegesis that would explain away 
sensibility. As I said, I could not close my eyes to the light I glimpsed when the idea came to me, 
to start from the standpoint of the categories and to connect what you are especially concerned 
with in your Transcendental Aesthetic (space and time) with the categories. Herr Reinhold has 
corrected you, when you said: Space is an a priori intuition; his expert opinion was that you 
ought rather to have said, “The representation of space is an intuition.” But I show him that space 
itself is a pure intuition, that is, the original synthesis of the understanding on which objective 
connecting… rests.                  (Zweig, 1999: 514; cf. Beck, 1796: 236) 
 
The incompatibility between the concept of sensibility yielded by the Deduction, and the 
concept of a sensibility that would be affected by the thing in itself, is quite clear to Beck and 
Fichte. So much so, that they find the idea that Kant assumed thing-in-itself affection quite 
impossible to believe. If he did, Fichte bemoans, “then Kant would be in utter contradiction with 
himself, and this would be obvious to everyone.” Giving his opinion of Reinhold’s suggestion 
that “Kant had given even a hint that he posited the origin of external sensation in something-in-
itself distinct from the I,” Fichte responds, “I consider this to be impossible; it contradicts Kant’s 
whole system at every single point, as well as contradicting the clear declarations which he has 
 9 
repeated a hundred times.”12 And, in the process of his eleven page proof that Kant is not 
committed to thing-in-itself affection in §6 of the Second Introduction itself, 
 
Until such time as Kant explicitly declares, in so many words, that he derives sensation 
from an impression produced by the thing in itself, or, to employ his own terminology, that 
sensations have to be accounted for within philosophy by appealing to a transcendental object 
that exists in itself outside us, I will continue to refuse to believe what these interpreters tell us 
about Kant. But if he does make such a declaration, then I would sooner take the Critique of Pure 
Reason to be the product of a most remarkable accident than the work of a human mind.
13
  
 
But of course, such a declaration was forthcoming. It is precisely what turns Schelling 
and Hegel resolutely against Kantianism. For they agree with Beck and Fichte on the 
incompatibility the latter two perceive: Kant explains how the categories make experience 
possible through a certain conception of sensibility. The forms of intuition pertaining to this 
sensibility require the understanding’s activity to be what they are. This sensibility is thus 
incompatible with any concept of sensibility that would suffer affection by a thing in itself. This 
is so, because the reception of empirical content by the forms of intuition pertaining to the latter 
sensibility would be unconditioned by the understanding’s activity. (They agree to the gloss on 
what thing-in-itself affection amounts to in (b) of my thesis statement above.)  
Since Schelling and Hegel agree with Beck and Fichte on this, they see Kant’s rejection 
of Beck and Fichte as confirmation of Jacobi’s, G. Schulze’s and Maimon’s view that the 
Critique suffers real contradiction. Their reading of the Critique after 1799 is then guided by the 
                                                 
12
 From Fichte’s letter to Reinhold of 7.4.1797, announcing his Second Introduction. (Fichte, 1988: 420) 
As we’ll see in §3.2, the occasion for the Second Introduction is Reinhold’s challenge to Fichte’s claim 
that Kant’s and Fichte’s systems are identical. The “fundamental difference” between them, Reinhold 
claims, is Kant’s commitment to thing-in-itself affection. (Fichte, 1994: 64-5) 
13
 Fichte, 1994: 71. Compare all of pp.65-76. Contrast the quoted text to the post-1799 text of Hegel’s, 
Hegel, 1802: 74: “with respect to sensations and their empirical reality nothing remains but to think that 
sensation comes from the things in themselves.” 
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following question, at once critical and diagnostic: “How is a real contradiction at the heart of 
the Critique to be explained?” (See my epigraphs.)  
 My thesis is that Schelling and Hegel were right to take this lesson from Kant’s rejection 
of Beck and Fichte. My goal is to motivate once more their question for the Critique by bringing 
the assumption of its coherence into question.  
In taking this view, I’m aiming at a thorough reversal of Longuenesse’s position on the 
question, “Kant oder Hegel?” My engagement with and critique of her reading of Kant will be 
central here. She holds that the Critique coheres, that we should reject Hegel’s critique of Kant’s 
“standpoint of finitude,” and that we should rather “retreat once and for all into the Analytic of 
all three Critiques.”14 As we’ll see, I’m in fundamental agreement with her reading of the 
Critique’s Analytic. My claim, however, is that this true reading fails to cohere with the features 
of Kant’s theory of sensibility required for thing-in-itself affection. Hegel’s critique of Kant is 
predicated on the claim that Kant’s commitment to affection by the thing in itself leads him into 
contradiction. Because, as we’ll see, Longuenesse fails to see anything worth criticizing in this 
commitment of Kant’s, she fails to comprehend the motivation for Hegel’s critique. She thus 
misses its nature, its force, and its necessity. My focus on the fate of Beck and Fichte’s readings 
is designed to illuminate all three.  
                                                 
14
 Longuenesse, “Point of View of Man or Knowledge of God”, in Longuenesse, 2007: 189. In both this 
paper and “Hegel on Kant on Judgment,” also in Longuenesse, 2007, she considers, but finds “every 
reason to doubt” Hegel’s critique of Kant, along with his “efforts to provide a justification for the 
transition from the standpoint of finite consciousness to the standpoint of the absolute” (2007: 217, cf. 
191).  
 11 
1.1.2 The Critique’s Contradiction 
The interpretations of Kant given by Beck and Fichte are relevantly like the modern 
interpretations given by Longuenesse and McDowell.15 The likeness between Fichte’s and 
Longuenesse’s readings has not been lost on Longuenesse’s critics. They infer from this likeness 
that Kant would reject Longuenesse’s reading, and for the same reason that he rejected 
Fichte’s.16 In §3.1, I’ll argue that this argument is sound. I contend, however, that the 
significance of its conclusion should be reversed: we should not return to the concept of 
sensibility Kant holds on to in rejecting the reading of the Deduction Longuenesse shares with 
Fichte. This is the sensibility needed for receiving content from a thing in itself, a concept of 
sensibility contradicting the concept of sensibility yielded by the B Deduction. Rather, Kant’s 
reason for rejecting these readings, I say, marks the point at which a thorough critique of the 
Critique should ensue. In §3.2, I’ll be quite concerned to distinguish the likeness of 
Longuenesse’s reading to Beck’s and Fichte’s from the crucial sense in which they’re unlike. 
She retains, while they, to their great credit, expel, the existence of the thing in itself (see §2.4).  
What Beck’s, Fichte’s, Longuenesse’s and McDowell’s interpretations all share is as 
follows. They all share a certain reading of how Kant in the B Deduction works out his thesis 
that the categories, the forms of unity supplied by the activity of the understanding, “are 
                                                 
15
 Longuenesse remarks on how her reading aligns with McDowell’s view in her 2005 Kant and the 
Human Standpoint, pp.38n.30, 141n.41. On p.38 she claims that “Kant was right to insist on this 
distinction [between receptivity and spontaneity], and… one of the benefits of my interpretation is its 
making clearer how Kant could remain true to this distinction while radically challenging what we have 
come to call, after Sellars, ‘the Myth of the Given.’” I’ll be challenging both parts of this statement, in 
§2.2 and §3.2 respectively. I incline more towards Sellars’ view that Kant is “certainly not” free of 
Mythical Givenness. (Sellars, 1956: §1) 
16
 See Allison, 2000: 75-6; Sedwick, 2000: 89-90; Fichant, 1997: 24, n.11; and, at least hinting at the 
same argument, Pippin, 1997: 322-3. For Longuenesse’s attempt to preempt the strike, see Longuenesse, 
1998: 300. For her denials of the likeness, see Longuenesse, 2005: 6, 37-8, 65-6.  
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conditions of the possibility of experience, and are thus also valid a priori of all objects of 
experience.”17 They all find Kant arguing, not only that these forms of unity condition the 
empirical content given through sensibility, but something further. They all find him arguing 
there that these forms of unity must condition the very getting of empirical content as it is given 
through sensibility, or the very receiving of that content. Kant shows that the categories are 
universally and necessarily valid for all that comes before the senses, they claim, by showing 
them to be conditions of the possibility of the reception of empirical manifolds. This shared 
thesis is (P1) from my opening statement of the contradiction.  
 
(P1): The understanding’s activity conditions our reception of empirical content.18    
 
 I agree with these four interpreters that Kant’s master thought requires, and that he 
himself affirms, (P1). As I stated in opening, my thesis is that Kant is committed to the real 
contradiction between (P1) and ~(P1) below. I hold that (a) he is committed to affection by the 
thing in itself, and that (b) such affection is equivalent to 
 
~ (P1): Our reception of empirical content is unconditioned by the understanding’s activity.  
                                                 
17
 These words at B161 close the third paragraph, and with it the first partition of §26. This section, and 
indeed this paragraph and its footnote (B160n), anchors these four interpretations. See especially 
Longuenesse, 1998: 9, ch.8; McDowell, 2009a: 28, n.10. 
18
 Beck, Fichte, and Longuenesse all find Kant arguing for the following thesis: the understanding’s 
activity supplies the unity that conditions the reception of empirical content. (By “activity” I refer always 
to the “transcendental synthesis” of Kant’s Critique; the claim of these interpreters, then, is that Kant’s 
transcendental activity conditions or makes possible empirical passivity. It is all to the good if the reader 
exclaims, “I don’t know what that means!”: determining its meaning yielded post-Kantian philosophy. If 
Hegel is right, Kant didn’t fully grasp its meaning either.) McDowell recommends a conception of 
experience which involves a passive actualization of the understanding’s unity in sensibility. Since he 
aligns this thought with his reading of Hegel’s critique of Kant, however, this doesn’t mark a 
disagreement with the former three with regard to Kant’s view. Hence the wording here in P1. In any 
case, our concern from here on out will only be with the former three. 
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I’ll first sketch the justification for finding Kant committing himself to (P1) in his 
argument for the B Deduction’s conclusion. I’ll be extremely brief here, though I realize most 
Kantians deny that Kant is committed to (P1), and hold him to only be committed to ~(P1). My 
focus in this paper, however, is my quarrel with Beck, Fichte, and Longuenesse. These three take 
Kant to be committed to (P1) only. My main target of course is what is shared by both “(P1)-
only” and “~(P1) only” parties: the thought that the Critique coheres.  
More traditional, anti-Fichtean Kantians might bid me adieu at this point. If they do read 
on to §3.1, however, they’ll see that I at least agree with Longuenesse’s critics on one point: 
Kant does reject Fichte’s reading, and would reject Longuenesse’s, because he is committed to 
~(P1), which both Fichte and Longuenesse deny (Fichte, 1994: §6; Longuenesse, 1998: 299).  
1.2 THE ACTUALITY AND SUPERIORITY OF KANT’S COMMITMENT TO (P1): 
THE SPECULATIVE AND REFLECTIVE SYLLOGISMS (1.2.1-2), HEGEL’S 
CRITIQUE OF KANT AS EXPLAINING KANT’S COMMITMENT TO THE LATTER 
(1.2.3), AND THE PROGRESS BEYOND KANT MADE BY BECK AND FICHTE (1.2.4) 
1.2.1 The speculative syllogism 
The four listed interpreters and I essentially see (P1) as the conclusion of the following two-
premise argument. I call it “the speculative syllogism,” and present it symbolically below.  
Its first, uncontroversial premise is the thesis of the Aesthetic: space and time, as a priori 
forms of sensible intuition lying in the subject, are conditions of the possibility of the reception 
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of empirical manifolds. Read “>” for this syllogism as “is a condition of the possibility of.” (1s): 
(FI   >  REM). 
The second premise presents our controversial reading of the synthesis speciosa or 
synthesis of the transcendental imagination of §24. Kant argues here as follows. Because there 
are a priori forms of sensible intuition, this synthesis, which “is still an exercise of spontaneity,” 
can “determine the form of sense a priori.” This a priori “effect of the understanding on 
sensibility” must be read, we claim, as asserting the following thesis:  this synthesis of the 
understanding is a condition of the forms of intuition being what they are in the Aesthetic, 
namely, conditions of the possibility of the reception of empirical manifolds. (2s): (SU  >  FI).   
(P1) follows as the conclusion of these two premises: (SU > FI), and (FI > REM), 
therefore (SU > REM): “a synthesis of the understanding is a condition of the possibility of the 
reception of empirical manifolds.” Equivalently, “the understanding’s activity conditions the 
reception of empirical content.” I’ll note the controversy over the claim that Kant himself draws 
this same conclusion in his §26 in a moment.  
 
The speculative syllogism 
(1s)       FI    >  REM  (Transcendental Aesthetic)  
(2s)           SU  >   FI       (§24’s “effect of the understanding on sensibility”) 
( P1)     SU  >   REM       (§26.3, B160n’s “formal intuition” = Aesthetic’s FOI) 
 
This, then, is how we see the Deduction as discharging its task. The principle of Kant’s 
transcendental deductions generally is this: a representation (here, the category) can only be 
shown to be a priori, or equivalently, universally and necessarily valid of a set of objects (here, 
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appearances), on the following condition. The former has to be a condition of the possibility of 
the latter (see A92-4/B124-7). Other readings let the empirical manifolds be received in the form 
of intuition (e.g.) space prior to the understanding’s activity. Below, I’ll be agreeing that, and 
explaining why, this too has to be Kant’s view (§2.2 and §2.3 respectively). But the four listed 
interpreters and I find Kant himself thinking something different and incompatible with this in 
the B Deduction. We above saw Beck insist that “it is not prior to the synthesis, but in it, that 
space is a ‘manifold of homogeneous parts.’” (Beck, 1796: 236) We find Kant here proving the 
categories valid for “everything that may ever come before our senses” (B160) through the thesis 
that the understanding’s activity is a condition of empirical manifolds themselves coming before 
the senses – through (P1), the conclusion of the speculative syllogism. Thus, as Longuenesse 
puts it, “anything given in space and time, just by being given in space and time, stands under 
the unity of apperception and thus the categories.” (Longuenesse, 1998: 37; cf. 33) 
 Kant himself very much appears to be thinking exactly those three steps of the 
speculative syllogism in the first three sentences of the third paragraph of §26. He notes that “the 
synthesis of the apprehension of the manifold of appearance,” which is the synthesis through 
which perception becomes possible, “must always be in agreement with” the form of intuition 
time. Here, he nods to the Aesthetic’s thesis (1s). He now moves to the controversial second step 
(2s), bringing our attention to the unity that the form of intuition, as presented in the Aesthetic, 
possesses.  
 
But space and time are represented a priori not merely as forms of sensible intuition, but 
also as intuitions themselves (which contain a manifold), and thus with the determination of 
the unity of this manifold in them (see the Transcendental Aesthetic).  
  
 16 
 Here is attached the famous footnote, discussed below. In the main text, he 
follows through to our conclusion: Since (1s) our reception of empirical manifolds is conditioned 
by the form of intuition, and (2s) this form of intuition has a unity that only the understanding 
can provide, (P1) that unity is “already given a priori, along with (not in) these intuitions, as 
condition of the synthesis of all apprehension.”  
 Now my thesis is as follows. There is so much controversy over whether or not to 
ascribe (2s) and (P1) to Kant, because the text is objectively ambiguous. The text is ambiguous, I 
claim, because, as well as needing these two theses to complete his Deduction, Kant also needs 
their negations. He needs their negations to keep in place his original way of distinguishing 
sensibility and the understanding, receptivity and spontaneity – the distinction, indeed, that lies at 
the heart of his critique of rationalism.
19
 
1.2.2 The reflective syllogism 
 Both cannot be thought together in one and the same conception of sensibility.  
  Kant, On a Discovery, 8:219  
 
For ~(P1) and ~(2s), the negations of the speculative theses (P1) and (2s), the “>” should be read 
as “is prior to and independent of.” The “>” of the speculative syllogism above should also be 
read as “is prior to,” though there “is prior to” equates to “is a condition of the possibility of.” 
                                                 
19
 At (Pippin, 1997: 322), Pippin worries that Longuenesse’s reading of the Deduction “threatens to 
collapse” this distinction. I say that it does, but that this reading is true, both of Kant’s text, and of his 
“speculative” intention. With Hegel, I distinguish the latter from Kant’s “reflective” intention. (See 
especially the Preface to the Difference essay.) Justification for such a distinction can be found at 
A314/B370 and A834/B862. (See below in the text.) 
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The “is prior to” of the second thesis and conclusion of the reflective syllogism do not. This 
syllogism shares its first premise with the speculative syllogism above. Its second premise is 
~(P1), and its conclusion ~(2s).   
 
The reflective syllogism     
 
(1s)       FI   >  REM   (Transcendental Aesthetic)                    
~(P1)       REM  >  SU  (Affection by the thing in itself [T.I.I.]. This thesis is required by the  
assumption of the “original separation” of the T.I.I. from the subject (“finitude”): see §2.3.)   
~(2s)       /FI   >  SU     (Concept of sensibility required for ~(P1). The need for it is expressed 
at B145.) 
 
First, Kant needs, I claim, ~(P1) (REM > SU): “our reception of the empirical manifold 
must be prior to and independent of the synthesis of the understanding.” This is equivalent to our 
original ~(P1): “our reception of empirical content is unconditioned by the understanding’s 
activity.” With most post-Kantians, I hold that this is equivalent to Kant’s thought that we are 
affected by the thing in itself. We’ll see in §3.2 that Longuenesse does not agree to my equation 
between thing-in-itself affection and “our reception of empirical content is unconditioned by the 
understanding’s activity” (~(P1)). I think that that denial is extremely implausible. By the time 
we get there, I hope you’ll agree. (This is a denial of (b) in my thesis statement.) I don’t discuss 
“double affection” here, but my attitude towards it is the same.  
Why Kant needs ~(P1), I’ll explain in §2.3. Since he needs it, he also needs ~(2s). This is 
a concept of a form of intuition that does not cohere with the speculative concept of the same, 
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(2s) (SU > FI). This speculative claim was our reading of the synthesis speciosa of §24 above, 
the claim that this synthesis is a condition of the form of intuition being what it is in the 
Aesthetic, namely, a condition of the possibility of the reception of empirical manifolds. He 
needs that not to be true of his form of intuition, however, for it to be able to receive the “matter” 
or “content” from the thing in itself prior to and independently of the understanding’s synthesis. 
This reflective syllogism employs the same first premise as the one appearing in the speculative 
syllogism above, the thesis of the Aesthetic, (1s) (FI > REM). Combined with ~(P1) (REM > 
SU), we get the reflective syllogism’s conclusion, ~(2s): (FI > SU): “the pure form of intuition 
must be receptive of the content of empirical cognition prior to and independently of the 
synthesis of the understanding.” In the context of a certain assumption explained in §2.3, he 
needs the manifold to be given by the thing in itself, and in the form of intuition that appears in 
the reflective syllogism, to avoid solipsism.  
He gives voice to this need at B145. Speaking of the pure form of sensible intuition, he 
insists that “the manifold for intuition must already be given prior to the synthesis of the 
understanding and independently from it,” for otherwise, we’d be “think[ing] of an 
understanding that itself intuited.”  
It is because of his adherence to ~(2s) that he rejects Beck, the great champion of (2s): 
Kant accuses Beck of endorsing the view that we have a faculty of intellectual intuition (which 
Beck denies).
20
 
                                                 
20
 It is J. Schulze who accuses Beck of this, but Kant agrees with the charge. Beck:  “if I wanted to get a 
little bit angry with Herr Schulze, I would say that I have more right to accuse him of thinking he has an 
intellectual intuition than he has to make this accusation against me.” (Zweig, 1999: 513) Cf. p.514: “It 
never entered my mind to say that the understanding creates the object: a piece of naked nonsense! How 
can Herr Schulze be so unfriendly as to charge me with this?” I quote and defend the statements in Beck’s 
Standpoint that J. Schulze and Kant took for “the understanding produces objects” (Zweig, 1999: 518) in 
§2.4.  
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In closing §2.1, I claimed that Kant needs ~(2s) (FI > SU) because his original 
distinguishing of sensibility from the understanding relies on it. Confirmation for this claim 
comes in the fact that Kant sees Beck’s championing of (Kant’s own) (2s) (SU > FI) as 
undercutting this distinction. Kant’s letter is missing, but we have Beck’s response. “Pained 
indeed by the thought that I have fallen from your favor” (520), Beck tries to counter Kant’s 
reasons for rejection. 
 
I believe I have given an accurate exposition of the Critique and therefore do not regard 
myself as deviating from it – for nothing concerns me more than to distinguish sensibility (the 
faculty of being affected by objects) from the understanding (the faculty of thinking objects, 
relating this subjective material of sensibility to objects).                   
(Zweig, 1999: 519) 
 
My claim, then, is that there are two senses of “form of intuition” in the Critique, and that 
they do not cohere. On one conception the form of intuition is what it is – that which, as the 
Aesthetic explains, conditions the reception of the “matter” or “content” of empirical cognition – 
prior to the understanding’s activity. On the other conception, the form of intuition is what it is 
only through the understanding’s activity. The former is the reflective, the latter the speculative 
concept of a form of intuition.  
The following table presents the reader with the two pairs of contradictory theses across 
from each other. Read “>” as “prior to” for explicit contradictions.   
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 Reflective syllogism    Speculative syllogism 
 
(1s)       FI   >  REM     (Trans. Aesthetic)         (1s)  FI > REM     (Trans. Aesthetic)              
~(P1)       REM  >  SU    (assumption of T.I.I.)  (2s)  SU > FI     (§24’s synthesis speciosa) 
~(2s)       /FI   >  SU       (B145)                 (P1) /SU > REM (§26.3, “formal int.”= FoI)  
 
 Now, I side with Longuenesse and Beck on the following. To understand §26, it is 
necessary to take Kant’s argument to be about the form of intuition of the Aesthetic, as the 
speculative syllogism has it. I agree, that is, that it is necessary to take the second half of the 
Deduction to call for a “rereading” of the Aesthetic’s theory of space and time (the forms of 
intuition).
21
 I thus agree with Longuenesse that the “formal intuition” of the footnote Kant adds 
after completing the argument must be equated with the Aesthetic’s “form of intuition.” In the 
note, he tells us that “the form of intuition merely gives the manifold, but the formal intuition 
gives unity of the representation.” This ununified “form of intuition” of B160n clearly can’t be 
the “form of intuition” of the Aesthetic, for it is obvious that the latter is a unified totality. We’ve 
noted what supports the equating of B160n’s “formal intuition” with the Aesthetic’s “form of 
intuition”: in the text of §26 itself to which the note attaches, Kant points us to the Aesthetic to 
confirm that space and time are given there “also as intuitions themselves… and thus with the 
determination of the unity of this manifold in them (see the Transcendental Aesthetic).” It is hard 
to see what work that “also” in the second sentence of the main text would be doing if the 
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 See Longuenesse, 1998: 12, 208, 213, 299, title of section 214-227. As noted in opening, a “rereading” 
of the Aesthetic on the basis of the Deduction is the very idea of Beck’s Standpoint.  
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“unity” it points to wasn’t supposed to be read back into the “forms of” intuition of the first 
sentence, and to lead us through to (P1) itself in the third.  
 But is it not odd that Kant adds this note, and uses “form of intuition” and the newly 
introduced “formal intuition” as he does here? Longuenesse, following Allison, is driven outside 
the Critique to answer the “new paradox” of what B160n’s “form of intuition” refers to. 
(Longuenesse, 1998: 217f.) Indeed, B160n’s “form of intuition” cannot be equated with the 
Aesthetic’s “form of intuition.” But wouldn’t Kant have assumed that his reader would take 
B160n’s “form of intuition” to refer to the “form of intuition” that they had been reading about 
all along in this book? 
 It is as if Kant’s intention is to claim that the speculative syllogism that he has just 
reasoned through in concluding §26 does not really involve a rereading of the Aesthetic’s “forms 
of intuition.” It is as if he is claiming that the argument only pertains to this newly coined 
“formal intuition,” and that the Aesthetic’s “form of intuition,” which now “merely gives the 
manifold,” is to be left alone - not re-read. It is as if he himself is worrying that such a 
“rereading” would amount to a “fundamental revision,” a “change in doctrine” or a “correction” 
of his theory of the forms of intuition as presented in the Aesthetic. Such is what Longuenesse’s 
critics Allison and Fichant take her “rereading” to amount to.22 Longuenesse wonders whether 
Kant intends something similar herself, before the assumption of the Critique’s coherence drives 
her outside the Critique. 
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 See Allison, 2004: 192 and n.67; Allison, 2000: 75-6; and Fichant, 1997. Longuenesse adamantly 
insists that what she calls for is a mere rereading, and is no way a revision or correction, at Longuenesse, 
2005: 6, 34 and 67. “What I think is that everything that was said in the Transcendental Aesthetic about 
the nature of space and time stands, but in brought into new light by the argument of the Deduction.” (34) 
 22 
If this analysis is correct, we should conclude that the space and time described in the 
Transcendental Aesthetic are products of the figurative synthesis of imagination, and as such are 
what Kant calls, in section 26, formal intuitions. Yet it might be objected that in the texts quoted 
here, Kant insists on the distinction between forms of intuition and formal intuitions. Only the 
second are “represented with the determination of the unity of [the] manifold,” only they are 
expressly related to figurative synthesis. Perhaps, then, we should rather conclude that the 
forms of intuition, which are the proper object of the Transcendental Aesthetic, are not 
related to synthesis speciosa. Only formal intuitions are…       (Longuenesse, 1998: 216) 
 
I agree with Longuenesse that Kant really “intends” us to equate B160n’s “formal 
intuition” with the Aesthetic’s “form of intuition,” and to find him asserting the speculative 
syllogism. I contend, however, that he also “intends” us to not equate those two, but to rather 
equate the “form of intuition” of B160n with the “form of intuition” of the Aesthetic. He needs 
us to not make the former equation, and make only the latter, to save his reflective syllogism - 
and his original distinction of sensibility from the understanding with it. It appears that Kant 
“sometimes spoke, or even thought, contrary to his own intention.” (A314/B370) We are forced, 
I think, to follow Hegel in distinguishing Kant’s speculative intentions from his reflective 
intentions (cf. n.19 above).  
The two theses of the reflective syllogism that Allison and Fichant are concerned to 
defend, ~(2s) and ~(P1), are then genuine theses of Kant’s. On this point we are in agreement, in 
shared opposition to Longuenesse. She denies that they are Kant’s thoughts, for she holds Kant 
committed to their two contradictories ((2s) and (P1)), and, like Beck and Fichte, holds that the 
Critique coheres.  
Of course, though I agree with Longuenesse’s critics here, we have quite different 
attitudes towards these two theses that we recognize, contra Longuenesse, as Kant’s thoughts. 
Allison writes, 
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I do not think that Longuenesse intends her revisionary account of space and time as a 
complete rejection of Kant’s theory of sensibility in the manner of post-Kantian idealism.23 
 
He is right about Longuenesse. Noting this suggestion of Allison’s, and a similar one 
made by Sedgwick (Sedgwick, 2000: 89-90), as she brings her response to them both to a close, 
she writes,  
 
The German Idealists… (especially Hegel) chastised Kant for remaining adamant in 
distinguishing receptivity (passivity) and spontaneity (activity) in our cognitive capacities. As for 
me, my view is that Kant was right to insist on this distinction, and I do not think anything in my 
reading of the Critique leads to a loosening of it in any way.        (Longuenesse, 2005: 38) 
 
Here she annexes a note which reads “On this point, see my [Point of View of Man and 
Knowledge of God]”; I noted above that she there rejects Hegel’s critique of Kant.  
My goal is to show that this “complete rejection of Kant’s theory of sensibility” by the 
post-Kantians was done, first, to remove the contradiction at the heart of the Critique, and 
second, for the sake of Kant’s better theory of sensibility. The essence of the latter is the 
conception of the form of intuition conditioned by the synthesis speciosa: the form of intuition of 
the speculative syllogism presented in the second half of the B Deduction. Beck and Fichte 
understood that Kantian conception of sensibility better than Kant understood it himself. Kant 
needs the concept of sensibility Allison and Fichant would have us return to, the one articulated 
around ~(P1), only because he assumes affection by a thing in itself. They would have us follow 
through on Kant’s reflective intention. I follow Beck, Fichte and Hegel in following through on 
the Critique’s own speculative intention. I agree with Allison, Fichant, and Sedgwick that 
Longuenesse is doing the same, and indeed in a way that undercuts the original way Kant 
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 Allison, 2000: 76. Longuenesse adamantly denies both the likeness of her reading to Fichte’s, and the 
suggestion that her reading undercuts Kant’s original understanding-sensibility distinction, in 2005: 6, 37-
8, 65-6. Cf. 1998: 300. 
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conceives “the radical distinction between sensibility, endowed with form specific to it, and the 
understanding” (KHS, p.66) - against her protests to the contrary. Unlike any of them, I think 
that such undercutting is philosophically progressive, and a service to Kant’s best intentions.  
 
1.2.3 Hegel’s Critique of Kant’s Standpoint of Finitude: a very brief sketch 
The question must be yours, sir, when [J. Schulze] asks, quite justifiably, in this 
connection, “What ‘sensation’ can mean, if there is no such thing as sensibility, I fail to 
understand.”          - Beck to Kant, 6.24.1797, Zweig, 1999: 517-8 
 
Why is Kant committed to the thesis that our reception of empirical content is unconditioned by 
the understanding’s activity (~(P1))? Hegel’s critique of Kant’s standpoint of finitude claims 
that, at the very base of his thinking, Kant has assumed an original separation of the real object 
from the subject. “The subject” referred to here is the transcendental subject to whose sensible 
and intellectual forms presented nature conforms. This conformity of nature to the subject’s 
forms is what Kant expresses by likening transcendental idealism to the hypothesis of 
Copernicus (Bxvi). According to Kant, only transcendental idealism can explain how synthetic a 
priori judgments can be possible. According to this doctrine, the objects of our experience, the 
appearances that conform to our forms, only exist as they conform to our forms in relation to the 
subject. They do not exist in this way, that is, as they are independently of this relation, or: as 
they are in themselves.
24
 
By “assumed an original separation,” I mean precisely this: Kant has assumed of the real 
object, which he thinks of as a thing in itself, that its distinction or separation from the subject is 
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 On this conformity and this consequence of it, see e.g. A114, A125, B164, and A505-7/B534-5. 
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already in place, prior to the transcendental activity of this subject. Now, with that assumption in 
place, Kant has to insist that the “matter” or “content” of empirical cognition is given by this 
thing in itself, independently of the understanding’s activity, to prevent the conformity of the 
appearing objects to the subject’s forms from entailing solipsism. It is, that is, because Kant has 
assumed – or, better, imagined – a thing existing in itself and standing over against the subject 
prior to its transcendental activity, that he has to posit the subject as originally passive in relation 
to this imagined object.
25
 By “originally passive” I mean again passive prior to the 
transcendental activity. He has to assume that we are originally passive in relation to these 
objects he has imagined the existence of (the relation of affection), in order to prevent us from 
being completely cut off from these objects he has imagined the existence of (to avoid 
solipsism).  
 
The I of the I think is absolute qua subject, just as the thing in itself beyond the subject is 
absolute.               (Hegel, 1802: 75) 
 
Because of this assumption, he is compelled to thwart the expression of his own 
speculative syllogism. A fair number of post-Kantians recognized fairly soon that, for Kant’s 
master thought to work, the reception of the matter of empirical cognition had to be conditioned 
by the forms supplied by the understanding’s activity, as the speculative syllogism has it. 
(Longuenesse recognizes it at 1998: 299.) But Kant’s assumption of original separation prevents 
him from accepting that fact about his own thought. Because the assumption of original 
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 See here Hegel’s “simple remark” against “the so-called thing in itself” at (1812/16: 16), and his jibe 
that “the impossibility of an answer is thoughtlessly implanted in the question” (“what the thing in itself 
is”) on p.94. 
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separation stays in place till the end, he is unable to recognize, and compelled to reject, those 
who rightly infer the conformity of the matter to the form. (But see n.31 below.)  
The problem is that his position requires the matter to conform, and to not conform, to the 
form. It must conform for the master thought to work. It must not because, with the original 
separation in place, its conforming – the master thought being carried through - entails solipsism 
(cf. Hegel, 1802: 92-3). Instead of acknowledging the problem, he is forever appealing quite 
unhelpfully to the supposed difference in origin between the form of empirical cognition and its 
matter. Thus, for instance, he writes to Beck in 1792,  
 
Eberhard’s and Garve’s opinion that Berkeleyan Idealism is identical to Critical 
Idealism… does not deserve the slightest bit of attention. For I speak of ideality in reference to 
the form of representation while they construe it as ideality with respect to the matter, i.e., 
ideality of the object and its existence itself.
26
 
 
When Kant responds to Eberhard himself in 1790, he agrees with the latter that things in 
themselves are the source of the matter of sensibility. Eberhard had found the Critique implying 
otherwise. Here, Kant gives the following quite awful fudge.  
The Critique… says the objects as things in themselves give the matter to empirical 
intuition (they contain the ground by which to determine the faculty of representation in 
accordance with its sensibility), but they are not the matter thereof.    (On a Discovery, 8:215) 
 
It is because Kant assumes the original separation of the thing in itself from the subject, 
then, that he needs ~(P1), “our reception of empirical manifolds is unconditioned by the 
understanding’s activity,” which I say is equivalent to the relation of affection to this thing in 
itself. For the same reason he needs the reflective concept of the form of intuition that can 
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 Zweig, 1999: 445. Beck, who was quite concerned with how to properly distinguish Kant’s position 
from Berkeley’s, found this suggestion unhelpful. For his more subtle account of the distinction, see 
Beck, 1796: 207, 229, 237. 
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receive that manifold, ~(2s), “the form of intuition must be capable of receiving a manifold [from 
the thing in itself] prior to and independently of the understanding’s activity.” Without these 
theses, he thinks, we’d be “intellectually intuiting,” or committing ourselves to the idea that the 
understanding creates the object.   
  
This thing in itself was therefore the point of departure beyond which Kant’s Critique of 
Pure Reason could never move, and because of which it had to fail as an independent science. 
          (Schelling, 1841: 123; our second epigraph) 
 
1.2.4 The Progress beyond Kant made by Beck and Fichte 
One ought not to define “intuition,” in the Transcendental Aesthetic, as a representation 
immediately related to an object or as a representation that arises when the mind is affected by 
the object. For not until the Transcendental Logic can it be shown how we arrive at objective 
representation.  
      - Beck to Kant, 5.31.1792, Zweig, 1999: 414. Cf. 
396 
 
Kant’s failure to understand Beck and Fichte’s readings, like their failure to understand his 
unwillingness to endorse their readings, entirely derives from the following fact. Beck and Fichte 
have abandoned Kant’s assumption of original separation, but have failed to make explicit to 
Kant the fact that they have done so. Assuming Kant’s coherence, they deny that he explains our 
acquisition of empirical content through thing-in-itself affection. This historical error makes 
them blind to the fact that Kant has assumed the existence of an object prior to the subject’s 
transcendental activity. This blindness is patent in the way they defend the coherence of Kant’s 
own presentation of transcendental idealism. The centerpiece of these defenses is their denials 
that Kant has assumed such an original separation.  
 28 
 
Let me take this opportunity to state this point quite clearly and simply: The essence of 
transcendental idealism as such, and, more specifically, the essence of transcendental idealism as 
presented in the Wissenschaftslehre, is that the concept of existence is by no means considered to 
be a primary and original concept, but is treated purely as a derivative one, indeed, as a concept 
derived through its opposition to activity, and hence, as a merely negative concept.   
          (Fichte, 1994: 84)  
 
Appearances are the objects of cognition that affect us, and produce sensations in us. No 
thought is to be given in this connection to things in themselves; and anyone who construes the 
Critique’s assertion that objects affect us to mean ‘things in themselves’ proves thereby that he 
has not attained to the standpoint from which this Critique is to be judged.    
               (Beck, 1796: 230) 
 
It may be difficult to grasp… for the categories of relation just expounded concern the 
existence of things, and it would seem that to posit this existence as a whole in the original 
synthesis and recognition of the understanding, as we have just done, is a typically idealistic 
move.                (Beck, 1796: 228)  
 
These statements are not solipsistic. For Beck and Fichte, there is nothing more real, or 
otherwise real, than that which is sensibly presentable to us through the aesthetic function of the 
categories. Having abandoned the assumption of the existence of the thing in itself, they are not, 
as Kant is, stuck in the “self-contradictory ambiguity” that “fails… to bring together its 
contradictory thoughts of pure consciousness being all reality, while the extraneous impulse or 
sensations and ideas are equally reality.” (Hegel, 1807: 144)  
Because Kant reads “activity” in their statements from the point of view of his original 
separation, however, they strike him as solipsistic. He reads their deductions of existence from 
the understanding’s activity from the point of view of an understanding originally cut off from 
real objects. He proves himself unable to unimagine what they expel under force of logical 
necessity. This change in sense “activity” undergoes as it moves from Kant’s mouth to Beck’s 
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and Fichte’s doesn’t make them bad Kantians. It just makes them, as Hegel said, “more 
consistent” ones (1812/16: 27, quoted in n.10 above). 
In the next section, I’ll argue for Kant’s commitment to ~(P1) against the specific ways 
of denying it of Beck, Fichte, and Longuenesse. To begin, I’ll spell out the argument against 
Longuenesse’s reading based on its likeness to Fichte’s that Longuenesse’s critics gesture at 
(§3.1). Secondly, I’ll champion Beck and Fichte’s rejection of the thing in itself over 
Longuenesse’s retaining of it (§3.2). And lastly, I’ll make plain the fundamental difference 
between Hegel’s response to Kant’s 1799 rejection of Beck and Fichte, and Longuenesse’s 
(§3.3).  
 
1.3 IN DEFENSE OF ASCRIBING ~(P1) TO KANT: OPPOSING THE ASSUMPTION 
OF THE CRITIQUE’S COHERENCE SHARED BY LONGUENESSE’S CRITICS, BECK 
AND FICHTE, AND LONGUENESSE 
1.3.1 Longuenesse’s critics 
I hold that Kant does reject Beck’s and Fichte’s readings, and would reject Longuenesse’s 
reading, because he is in fact committed to ~(P1). Here, I agree with the thought Longuenesse’s 
critics appeal to in accusing her of Fichteanism (see n.17). We’ve noted that Longuenesse 
adamantly denies any relevant likeness to Fichte Longuenesse, 2005: 6, 37-8, 65-6). 
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Longuenesse’s critics 
(Prem1) Longuenesse’s reading is like Fichte’s in that they both affirm (P1) and deny ~(P1).  
(Prem2) Kant rejects Fichte’s reading because Fichte affirms (P1) and denies ~(P1).  
(Conc) Kant would reject Longuenesse’s reading.  
 
The argument, I believe, is sound. It is strengthened, note first, by replacing “Fichte” in 
both premises with “Beck,” Kant’s other definitively rejected pupil. The “likeness” between 
Beck and Longuenesse is much more palpable. With regard to the evaluation of “Kant would 
reject Longuenesse for the same reasons he rejects x,” it helps, first, that we have the extensive 
Kant-Beck correspondence presenting these reasons. We have to be slightly more “speculative” 
with regard to Kant’s reasons for rejecting Fichte, which gives Longuenesse more wiggle room. 
Second, it helps that, unlike Fichte, Beck focuses on the explication of Kant’s texts.  
We noted in §2.2 the major similarity in those explications: Beck and Longuenesse both 
champion (2s). This is the claim, which we say is Kant’s, that the understanding’s activity is a 
condition of the form of intuition conditioning the reception of empirical content. Both thus take 
the Deduction as calling for a “re-reading” of the Aesthetic’s doctrine of space and time. I argued 
in §2.2 that Kant rejects Beck because Kant adheres to ~(2s), the reflective concept of the form 
of intuition needed to receive empirical content from a thing in itself. Too clear an expression of 
Kant’s own (2s) undercuts his original way of distinguishing sensibility from the understanding. 
Thus he rejects Beck. He would reject Longuenesse for the same reason.  
Let’s turn, however, to the argument of Longuenesse’s critics as it stands. The first 
premise is true of Longuenesse: the central thesis of KCJ, as I read it, is that the Deduction 
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affirms the speculative syllogism, and with it (P1).
27
 Her denial of ~(P1) can be found at 
Longuenesse, 1998: 299.  
And what is stated in the first premise is certainly right about Fichte’s reading of Kant. 
Fichte gives his “proof” that his philosophy “is in complete accord with Kant’s and is nothing 
other than Kantianism properly understood” in §6 of his Second Introduction. The proof 
responds to Reinhold’s challenge to Fichte’s claim that the two systems are identical. There is, 
Reinhold claims, a “fundamental difference” between the two. It is true of Kant’s system, 
Reinhold contends, but not of Fichte’s, that  
 
with respect to [experience’s] empirical content, by means of which it possesses 
objective reality, it must be grounded within the I by something different from the I.
28
  
 
This “something different” is of course the thing in itself. Reinhold’s claim contra Fichte 
here is that Kant explains our reception of empirical content through affection by the thing in 
itself, whilst it is central to Fichte’s Wissenschaftslehre to utterly oppose this thought, which it 
equates with “dogmatism,”  and rather explain the empirical content given in sensation through 
the I’s activity.29  
The “fundamental difference” Reinhold claims, then, is this. Kant’s system, since it posits 
thing-in-itself affection, is only committed to ~(P1), whilst the Wissenschaftslehre is only 
committed to (P1).  
                                                 
27
 This is compatible with expressions of its central thesis that reference the “clue” or the table of 
judgments. For Beck’s reference to the same, see Zweig, 1999: 438.  
28
 Fichte quotes Reinhold’s  1797 Selected Miscellaneous Writings, Vol. 2, pp.341-2, here at Fichte, 1994: 
65. 
29
 See Fichte, 1988: 252, “sensation has been deduced as an action of the I,” and 411, “Kant clings to the 
view that the manifold of experience is something given – god knows how and why. But I 
straightforwardly maintain that even this manifold is produced by us through our creative faculty.”  
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And indeed, Fichte sets out to prove precisely that Kant’s system, like the 
Wissenschaftslehre, is only committed to (P1). He spends eleven pages trying to prove that the 
answer to the following “purely historical” question is “no”.  
 
The (purely historical) question is this: Did Kant really base the empirical content of 
experience upon something distinct from the I?  
I am quite well aware that this is how Kant has been understood by every “Kantian,” with 
the sole exception of Herr Beck, whose book dealing with the subject, the Only Possible 
Standpoint, appeared after the publication of the Wissenschaftslehre. This is also the way in 
which Kant is understood by the interpreter who has recently been authorized by Kant himself, 
viz., Herr Schulz, whom I mention in this context only for this reason. Over and over again, he 
expresses his agreement with Herr Eberhard’s assertion that the objective ground of appearances 
lies in something that is a thing in itself and that it is only for this reason that phenomena are 
bene fundata [well grounded].       (Fichte, 1994: 65)  
 
The first premise, then, which determines the likeness of Longuenesse’s reading and 
Fichte’s, is true: Fichte and Longuenesse both hold Kant to be committed to (P1), and they both 
hold him to not be committed to ~(P1).  
The second premise is also likely true: Kant rejects Fichte’s reading because Fichte 
affirms Kant’s commitment to (P1) and denies Kant’s commitment to ~(P1). As I mentioned, 
though, we’re forced to be a little speculative on this “because”. It was Fichte’s opinion, for what 
it’s worth, that what Kant had read before rejecting him was precisely this Second Introduction.30 
So it’s likely, at least, that Kant read, or otherwise heard about, Fichte’s long and vigorous denial 
of Kant’s commitment to ~(P1), and was compelled to affirm the difference between that 
presentation of him and his actual view.  
I think, then, that the conclusion is true, as is the following expansion of it: Kant would 
reject Longuenesse’s reading, because Longuenesse (like Fichte) denies Kant’s commitment to 
~(P1). This shows that Kant is indeed committed to ~(P1).  
                                                 
30
 Zweig, 1999: 561, n.2 to Kant’s 8.7.1799 “Declaration concerning Fichte’s Wissenschaftslehre.”   
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Now, what Longuenesse’s critics really want, of course, is, “Kant is only committed to 
~(P1).” This I will not give them. In conjunction with the just expanded conclusion, I hold the 
following. Longuenesse’s reading of Kant’s explanation, in the B Deduction, of how the 
categories make experience possible, is true of Kant’s text. She is right to find the key to that 
explanation in Kant’s assertion of (P1).  
Her critics and I agree, then, to (Prem1) below. We disagree, however, in that I deny the 
Critique’s coherence (Prem2). I thus deny their inference to the conclusion that Kant is not also 
committed to (P1). It is with that conclusion that they judge Longuenesse’s reading false of 
Kant’s text.  
 
Longuenesse’s critics 
(Prem1)  Kant is committed to ~(P1).     (b/c he rejects the ~(P1)-denying Fichte, Longuenesse.)   
(Prem2)  The Critique coheres.  
(Conc)   Kant is not committed to (P1).  (Longuenesse contends that he is; her reading is 
false.)  
 
In summary, then, my view is this: Kant would reject Longuenesse’s reading, because he 
is committed to ~(P1) which she denies, and yet she is right to find Kant affirming (P1) in the B 
Deduction.  
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1.3.2 Opposing Beck’s, Fichte’s, and Longuenesse’s denials of ~(P1): the unlikeness of 
Longuenesse and Fichte (and Beck) 
I turn now to a defense of my thesis that Kant is committed to ~(P1) against the specific ways in 
which Beck, Fichte, and Longuenesse claim that he is not so committed. I am faced with a 
significant difference, however, between Beck and Fichte’s denial of Kant’s commitment to 
~(P1) on the one hand, and Longuenesse’s on the other. My goal now is to begin to reverse 
Longuenesse’s judgment on the “Kant oder Hegel?” question by criticizing her way of denying 
Kant’s commitment to ~(P1).   
Beck’s and Fichte’s denials come by way of denying Kant’s commitment to affection by 
the thing in itself. They agree with my gloss in (b) of my thesis statement: if Kant is committed 
to affection by the thing in itself, then this commitment is equivalent to ~(P1). Beck and Fichte 
agree with their predecessors Jacobi, G. Schulze and Maimon, as well as their successors 
Schelling and Hegel, on the following proposition. Longuenesse stands with Kant in opposition 
to it.  
 
P2: If Kant holds that the object affecting us is a thing in itself, then the Critique suffers 
real contradiction. 
 
Beck and Fichte differ from the other five who agree to (P2), only in that they deny the 
antecedent. This is a significant difference: their interpretations essentially are denials of (P2)’s 
antecedent. They both hitch their fates to the claim that Kant always intended the affecting object 
to be an appearance. But there are no greater champions of the truth of (P2) itself than Beck and 
Fichte.  
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It is their gallant attempts to defend the Critique’s coherence against claims to the 
contrary, in fact, that force the contradiction in (P2)’s consequent to full light. The “to (P1) or ~ 
to (P1)” formulation of the problem of affection I’ve been working with throughout is theirs. As 
I noted in §1.1, this formulation of the problem renders useless the Kantian’s appeal to the usual 
“escape clause.”  
It is easy to refute Beck and Fichte’s arguments against Kant’s commitment to ~(P1) 
though, for, with regard to the issue in question (the Critique’s coherence), they are utterly 
circular. They amount to  
 
Beck-Fichte 
(Prem1)  Kant is committed to (P1) (Transcendental Deduction) 
(Prem2)  The Critique coheres  (Assumption) 
(Conc)    Kant is not committed to ~(P1), which is equivalent to affection by the thing in itself. 
  
The reader is encouraged to examine pp.65-76 of the Second Introduction in Fichte, 
1994, and Fichte, 1988: 420, to see that this is true of Fichte. Beck’s Standpoint too fits the form; 
its attempt to refute the charge that “the Critique argues circularly,” is likewise circular. (Zweig, 
1999: 480) 
The reader is asked to note that the shared “Beck-Fichte” form is essentially the argument 
of Longuenesse’s critics “flipped”: ignore, perhaps, the gloss in the conclusion. Move the 
negation sign in the conclusion of “Beck-Fichte” to the (P1) of (Prem1) and you have 
“Longuenesse’s critics.” It is that around which these opposing arguments flip that is my target: 
the shared “(Prem2) The Critique coheres.”  
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Longuenesse’s critics     Beck-Fichte 
(Prem1)  Kant is committed to ~(P1).  (Prem1) Kant is committed to (P1). 
(Prem2)  The Critique coheres.    (Prem2) The Critique coheres. 
(Conc)   Kant is not committed to (P1).              (Conc)       Kant is not committed to ~(P1). 
 
Now come back to considering the gloss in the Beck-Fichte conclusion: “Kant is not 
committed to ~(P1), which is equivalent to affection by the thing in itself.” Against this 
conclusion, Kant’s 1799 rejection of Beck and Fichte, like his 1797 endorsement of J. Schulze, 
confirms his commitment to affection by the thing in itself. Longuenesse accepts this 
commitment of Kant’s (Longuenesse, 1998: 22n.11, 218n.12, 300). The fundamental error of her 
work on both Kant and Hegel, I claim, is that she fails to turn critical of it. She is historically 
right to accept Kant’s commitment to thing-in-itself affection. Beck and Fichte are historically 
wrong to deny it. But they are philosophically right to agree with Jacobi that one is “unable to 
stay within” the Critique’s system with “the presupposition” of affection by the thing in itself 
(Sassen, 2000: 173). She, like Kant, is philosophically wrong to disagree with this.  
Longuenesse ascribes (P1) to Kant, holds that the Critique coheres, and thus denies his 
commitment to ~(P1) (Longuenesse, 1998: 299). She thus shares the Beck-Fichte argument just 
presented, with the very crucial difference that the highlighted gloss on ~(P1) in the conclusion is 
not available to her. By failing to turn critical of Kant’s thought of thing-in-itself affection, she 
has to retain what Beck and Fichte, to their great credit, expunge from transcendental idealism. 
In their quest to make the Critique cohere, they purge from Kant’s master thought thing-in-itself 
affection. They negate that affection along with their negation of ~(P1): the highlighted gloss in 
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their (Conc) above not available to Longuenesse. In their interpretations of Kant, they make the 
philosophically progressive historical error of purging from transcendental idealism the existence 
of the thing in itself (§2.4).  
But Longuenesse does not follow them in this advance. Unlike Beck and Fichte, she 
accepts Kant’s commitment to affection by the thing in itself. And she finds no problem with it. 
She thus has to deny Kant’s commitment to ~(P1) otherwise than by denying his commitment to 
affection by the thing in itself. She is compelled, then, to deny (b) above: she denies that Kant’s 
commitment to thing-in-itself affection is equivalent to our reception of empirical content being 
unconditioned by the understanding’s activity (299-300). She must deny this equation, for she 
accepts the left side to be Kant’s commitment (thing-in-itself affection), but to preserve Kant’s 
coherence must deny that the latter is (~(P1)).  
Surely, however, the denial of this equation is extremely implausible. Her critics accuse 
her of being Fichtean. In being like Fichte in endorsing (P1) over ~(P1), yet unlike Fichte in 
retaining the existence of the thing in itself, her view is unstable: she is not Fichtean enough. She 
takes Kant’s view to be that things in themselves exist prior to our transcendental activity, affect 
us, yet supply neither the form, nor the matter, nor the content of empirical cognition. She 
endorses this view, but I contend that it clearly amounts to solipsism. 
In the Aesthetic, Kant writes, “That in the appearance which corresponds to sensation I 
term its matter.” (A20/B34) “Rereading” this text in accordance with the speculative syllogism, 
Longuenesse correctly infers that “we now have to admit that even the matter of appearances, 
that which “corresponds to sensation,” depends on a synthesis of imagination.” (Longuenesse, 
1998: 299) She pre-empts the anti-Fichtean Kantians, who will take this to imply “Fichtean and 
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Hegelian idealism” and the disappearance of “the distinction between receptivity and 
spontaneity,” through the following (300).  
 
“Sensation” is defined as “the effect of an object on the capacity of representation, 
insofar as we are affected by it.” The most plausible way of interpreting the notion of 
“affection,” in these initial paragraphs of the Critique, is to understand it as the affection of the 
representational capacities by a thing in itself, that is, by something external to our 
representational capacities (something that functions as an “added condition” to our 
representational capacities in the grounding of representations). [Note: “On this point I agree 
with Allison.”] Sensation so considered is strictly given, in no way a product of synthesis.  
 
She is right that “the most plausible way of interpreting the notion of ‘affection,’ in these 
initial paragraphs of the Critique, is to understand it as the affection of the representational 
capacities by a thing in itself.” She is right that understanding this affection as giving us the 
matter of empirical cognition unconditioned by the understanding’s activity cannot cohere with 
Kant’s master thought. But she is wrong to think that that gloss doesn’t present exactly what 
Kant is thinking for thing-in-itself affection.  
As we saw in §2.3, it is Kant’s assumption of the original separation of the thing in itself 
from the subject that leads him to assume affection by it: “sensation… is strictly given, in no way 
a product of synthesis.” We also saw, however, that he has to think that affection as giving us the 
matter of empirical cognition to avoid solipsism. The way he distinguishes himself from the 
solipsist Berkeley confirms this (Pro. 4:289, 4:374). We also saw that Beck and Fichte avoid 
solipsism in their clear-headed presentations of the speculative syllogism by expelling the thing 
in itself (§2.4). For them, there are no objects other than those presented sensibly through the 
understanding’s activity. But Longuenesse, we see, affirms the speculative syllogism, leaving the 
assumption of original separation in place.  
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This is solipsism. There are the really real objects, the things in themselves forever 
beyond our ken, and then there’s the form, the matter, and the content of our empirical cognition 
on the other side. The view is thoroughly ensconced in the self-contradictory ambiguity that fails 
to bring together its contradictory thoughts of pure consciousness being all reality, while the 
extraneous impulse or sensations and ideas are equally reality. 
1.3.3 Longuenesse oder Hegel? 
The fact that Longuenesse fails to see anything worth criticizing in Kant’s commitment to thing-
in-itself affection is quite significant for her reading of the period as a whole. As I noted in §1.1, 
she holds that the Critique coheres, that we should reject Hegel’s critique of Kant’s standpoint of 
finitude, and that we should rather “retreat once and for all into the Analytic of all three 
Critiques.” (Longuenesse, 2007: 189) Now, Hegel agrees with Beck, Fichte and Longuenesse 
that Kant’s master thought requires (P1) (see n.10 above). But note now the significant parting of 
the ways at this point. 
Hegel agrees with Beck and Fichte et al. on (P2): if Kant is committed to thing-in-itself 
affection, then the Critique suffers real contradiction. He also agrees with those two that it would 
suffer this contradiction because thing-in-itself affection amounts to ~(P1), which contradicts the 
master thought: he agrees to (b). Longuenesse disagrees, we’ve seen, with both thoughts. Now, 
because of these disagreements, Longuenesse and Hegel take Kant’s 1799 rejection of Beck and 
Fichte in very different ways. Longuenesse, recall, shares the following argument with Beck and 
Fichte, the “flip” of her Kantian opponents’ argument. 
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Longuenesse 
(Prem1) Kant is committed to (P1). (Transcendental Deduction)   
(Prem2) The Critique coheres.     
(Conc) Kant is not committed to ~(P1). 
 
 Kant’s 1799 rejection confirms his commitment to thing-in-itself affection. Longuenesse 
registers this. Discussing how the post-Kantians faced the problem of the “apparent incoherence” 
of “Kant’s talk of things in themselves,” she writes, 
 
There is no doubt that Kant himself never gave up this presupposition, even if the 
conclusions of the Transcendental Analytic [(P1)?] doom any characterization of the relation 
between the object “considered in itself” and our representational capacities to remain 
problematic.
31
      
 
 Call Kant’s reaffirmation of his commitment to thing-in-itself affection in the face of the 
post-Kantians’ problems with it “1799”. 1799 doesn’t impel Longuenesse to question the 
Critique’s coherence (Prem2). It, with (Prem1), remains in place for her. She thus retains the 
conclusion held in place by those premises: she retains her opposition to the idea that Kant is 
also committed to ~(P1). She is thus led to the denial of (b) which I argued in §3.2 leads to 
solipsism: things in themselves exist, affect us, but supply neither the matter nor the content of 
our empirical cognition.  
                                                 
31
 Longuenesse, 1998: 22n.11. Her “no doubt” is not perfectly true. In the Opus Postumum, as B. 
Tuschling reports, “Kant, following Solomon Maimon, Fichte, and, above all, Beck, was engaged in 
deducing the object from the activities of the subject – if not, indeed, from an “original representing” 
(ursprünglichen Vorstellen) by the subject, and this not only with respect to the intuitive and intellectual 
forms of space, time, and categories, but also with respect to the rational form of existence per se. Thus 
Kant accepts some of the criticism of his successors.” Tuschling suggests that Kant was confronted by, 
but failed to solve, the unpleasant dilemma of whether or not to “deny altogether the possibility that 
things in themselves affect the self.” (Tuschling, 1989: 215) 
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Contrast Hegel’s reaction. Unlike Longuenesse, he agrees with Beck and Fichte on what 
thing-in-itself affection amounts to: ~(P1), our reception of empirical content being 
unconditioned by the understanding’s activity. Kant’s confirmed commitment to this affection 
thus doesn’t impel him to think that this affection can be made to cohere with the master thought. 
It rather appears to him as confirmation of Kant’s actual commitment to the contradictory of the 
Deduction’s thought. Hegel’s reading of the Critique, especially after 1799, is guided then by 
this critical-diagnostic question: “How is the existence of a real contradiction at the heart of the 
Critique to be explained?” (See my epigraphs. Schelling, I believe, takes the same lesson from 
1799. See n.10.) The crucial difference between Hegel’s reception of 1799 and Longuenesse’s, 
then, comes in the highlighted (Prem2) below. (And, of course, in the conclusion.)  
 
Hegel 
(Prem1) Kant is committed to (P1). (Transcendental Deduction)  
(Prem 2) Beck and Fichte are right that thing-in-itself affection = ~(P1). Thus, such 
affection doesn’t cohere with the Deduction.  
(Prem3) 1799: Kant is committed to thing-in-itself affection. 
(Conc)   The Critique suffers contradiction. 
 
At Longuenesse 2005: 33n.24, Longuenesse cites Hegel’s FK in her list of 
“predecessors” - a list to which Beck should rightly be added. The difference between her 
reading, however, which maintains the coherence between the Analytic and the Aesthetic, and 
Hegel’s, which abandons it, is visible in the emboldened words below.  
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Reason is nothing else but the identity of heterogeneous elements… One can glimpse this 
Idea through the shallowness of the deduction of the categories. With respect to space and time 
one can glimpse it, too, though not where it should be, in the transcendental exposition of these 
forms, but later on, in the deduction of the categories, where the original synthetic unity of 
apperception finally comes to the fore. Here, the original synthetic unity of apperception is 
recognized also as the principle of the figurative synthesis, i.e., of the forms of intuition [(2s) 
(SU > FI)]; space and time are themselves conceived as synthetic unities, and spontaneity, the 
absolute synthetic activity of the productive imagination, is conceived as the principle of the very 
sensibility which was previously characterized only as receptivity.  
  (Hegel, 1802: 69-70; cf.74) 
 
Longuenesse, we’ve seen, registers that there’s a critique here, but rejects it 
(Longuenesse, 2005: 38, quoted on p.18 above). But the problem of affection doesn’t appear 
when she evaluates Hegel’s critique. Since nothing like (Prem2) appears in her analysis, she 
simply bypasses the actual justification Hegel has for his critique. Unlike Longuenesse, I think 
that more insight into the Critique can be had by asking Hegel’s question of it than by assuming 
its coherence. My presentation of the conflicting speculative and reflective syllogisms presented 
in §2.1 and §2.2 above is an attempt to illustrate this.  
Longuenesse would derive an advantage from accepting Kant’s commitment to ~(P1) and 
thus the Critique’s contradiction. If she could accept the fact that Kant’s commitment to thing-in-
itself affection is worth criticizing, she could concede to Allison, Sedgwick and Fichant that she 
abandons or “revises” part of Kant’s theory of sensibility, without having to concede either that 
she gets Kant’s master thought wrong, or that she doesn’t preserve everything worth preserving. 
She’d be entitled to say that what she revises is a concept of sensibility of Kant’s which 
contradicts Kant’s own better concept of sensibility. She could say that it is in the name of Kant’s 
own speculative intention that she abandons the sensibility Kant needs to think of as receiving 
empirical content from a thing in itself, unconditioned by the understanding’s activity. Since she 
denies ~(P1), it is anyway true that what is “strictly given, in no way a product of synthesis,” is 
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for her Kant “discarded as something useless.” (Longuenesse, 1998: 300, and Hegel, criticizing 
Kant, at 1812/16: 518) Recognizing and not criticizing thing-in-itself affection thus does nothing 
for her – except, perhaps, appease anti-Fichtean Kantians (see Longuenesse, 1998: 299-300; 
Longuenesse, 2005: 6, 37-8, 65-6). And the cost of endorsing the preservation of the thing in 
itself’s existence in this half-way Fichteanism, I’ve claimed, is that her view is “forever sliding 
into psychological idealism” or solipsism (Hegel, 1802: 76; cf. 1812/16: 520).  
 
1.4 CONCLUDING REMARKS: THE CRITIQUE’S INCOHERENCE AS THE KEY 
TO POST-KANTIANISM 
Longuenesse is compelled to deny the likeness of her reading to Fichte’s, because she agrees 
with her critics on the following thought: if she indeed is, as they charge, “drawing Kant too 
close toward Fichtean and Hegelian idealism,” then she must be wrong about Kant, for “no one 
will grant [this] in good faith to be true to Kant’s intention.” (Longuenesse, 1998: 300) 
Sedgwick is right to “suspect that she agrees with me that the attempt to narrow the gap between 
Kant and the latter idealists… rests upon a misunderstanding of Kant.” (Sedgwick, 2000: 90) But 
must it? Are Fichte and Hegel’s positions not predicated on having properly understood Kant?  
What is shared between Longuenesse and her critics here is the assumption that the 
Critique presents a coherent position on sensibility. It is the very same assumption that spelt 
tragedy for Beck and Fichte, and constitutes the central error in their readings of the Critique. 
1799 impels Schelling and Hegel to abandon the assumption. The overarching difference 
between the Schelling-Hegel and the Beck-Fichte stages of German Idealist readings of the 
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Critique, in fact, is precisely that the former abandons the latter’s assumption of the book’s 
coherence. 
Thus do they ask their question for the Critique: how is a real contradiction at its heart to 
be explained? Hegel’s critique of Kant, I contend, answers this question well. It explains how 
Kant came to be committed to incompatible conceptions of sensibility. We saw in §1.1 how 
adamantly Fichte adheres to the impossibility of what Hegel tries to explain. (Fichte, 1994: 71; 
Fichte, 1988: 420)  
Before such insights as Schelling and Hegel claim in answer to their question for the 
Critique can be heard, however, the following must be recognized. To consider even the 
possibility of what they say about the Critique being true, the assumption of its coherence must 
at least be questioned. (See my epigraphs.) 
If the Critique coheres, post-Kantianism is ill-motivated. If, in the other hand, Kant 
“sometimes spoke, or even thought, contrary to his own intention,” then the post-Kantian 
developments of his thought could merely be responses to the need to liberate the best of “Kant’s 
intentions.” This holds also for the resolutely critical readings of Schelling and Hegel. It is 
possible, furthermore, that they actually come, with ever deepening insight, to “understand him 
better than he understood himself.”32 The “gap” between Kant and his successors would then 
rest, not upon a misunderstanding of Kant, but rather on them managing “to peel off the shell 
that keeps the inner inspiration from seeing daylight.”33  
                                                 
32
 Kant, A314/B370, and Longuenesse, 1998: 300, quoted above. Cf. A834/B862.  
33
 From Schelling and Hegel’s 1802 “Introduction to the Critical Journal”, in di Giovanni and Harris, 
2000: 278 (speaking of Kant), and Sedgwick, 2000: 90, quoted above. 
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I have endeavored to bring the assumption of the Critique’s coherence into question. In 
doing so, I hope to have motivated this picture of post-Kantian idealism as progressing in its 
articulation of the Critique’s best thought. The shell must be seen, and removed once more.34 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
34
 My method of seeking entry into post-Kantianism by uncovering the Critique’s incoherence stands 
opposed to the entry into the same that Paul Franks announces on p.6 of his otherwise excellent (2005) All 
or Nothing. 
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2.0         HEGEL’S CRITIQUE OF KANT’S STANDPOINT OF FINITUDE 
2.1 AGAINST THE DOGMA OF KANT’S COHERENCE 
The unified totalities space and time are sensible conditions on our knowledge, are forms of our 
sensible intuition. Kant presents this thesis in the Aesthetic, but there is controversy amongst 
interpreters of Kant with regard to how he intends this thesis to be understood. Allison and 
Pippin, for instance, take this to be a doctrine completed in the Aesthetic, and relied upon in the 
Deduction.35 Longuenesse, McDowell and Waxman, by contrast, take the Deduction to be most 
                                                 
35
 Two especially clear expressions of Allison’s commitment to this thesis are: (1) at Allison, 2004: n.66 
to p.191, he uses the completeness of the Aesthetic as the premise through which to refute an objector’s 
critique of his 1st edition reading; (2) Speaking of Longuenesse’s ‘re-reading’ thesis (discussed below), 
Allison consistently calls it a ‘revision’ thesis, despite Longuenesse’s correction of this characterization. 
See Allison, 2000: 73. Despite Longuenesse in her accompanying response correcting this 
mischaracterization (Longuenesse, 2000), he insists on her interpretation ascribing to Kant a 
“fundamental revision” of his Aesthetic at Allison, 2004: 192. See also 114, 191-2. 
 In his Hegel’s Idealism, Pippin can be found following Allison here in his sharing the thought that, if 
Kant in the second half of the Deduction “extends” the intellectual conditions on thinking an object into 
the conditions on manifolds even being given (the proper topic of the Aesthetic), then Kant’s system 
collapses, it undercutting “his strict distinction between intuition and understanding” (Pippin, 1989: 30). 
Notice him also writing in his review of Longuenesse’s book, “According to Longuenesse, after the 
second half of the B Deduction, Kant had “radicalized” his deductive procedure far more than has been 
realized, completely reinterpreting “the manner in which things are given to us” (235), and so had 
engineered a major reconstruction of the “Transcendental Aesthetic” itself (as Kant seems to imply in 
several famous footnotes.) Any such claim about an intellectual “generation” (242) of space and time 
“and thereby the form of appearances” and so forth must be presented very carefully. It threatens to 
collapse the understanding-sensibility distinction...” (Pippin, 1997: 322). Throughout, all emboldened 
emphasis is my own, whereas italics indicate emphasis in the original.  
In being a defender of Kant against post-Kantian criticisms generally, and through his rejection of 
Longuenesse’s interpretation in particular, Allison can be seen to think the shared ‘re-reading  revision 
 collapse’ thought false. Pippin, however, as an endorser of Hegel’s critique of Kant, thinks it true 
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essentially a “re-reading” of this thesis of the Aesthetic, whereby the understanding’s role in 
making space and time possible as forms of sensible intuition is made explicit.36 We can put the 
question separating them thus: does Kant affirm or deny that a synthesis of the understanding is 
required to yield space and time as forms of our sensible intuition?   
 The answer, I claim, is both. The problem is that there are two sequences of thought in 
Kant’s mind that not only interfere with each other but that, when made explicit, can be seen to 
directly contradict each other, affirming in turn that the form of intuition is given both prior and 
posterior to a synthesis of the understanding. We’ll call these, respectively, Kant’s ‘reflective’ 
and ‘speculative’ sequences of thought. The ambiguities throughout the Critique and in the 
Deduction in particular that give rise to the interpretive controversy attest to the unresolved 
tension between them in Kant’s thinking. Now instead of “following [the] more or less standard 
practice among Anglo-American interpreters [… of] develop[ing], on the author’s behalf, the 
most philosophically powerful arguments and considerations compatible with their texts,”37 
where this commits us to seeking and finding the coherence of the author’s thinking – the above 
mentioned authors, in taking Kant’s intention to be found on one side of the ambiguity 
exclusively, so adhere
38
 - instead of fighting “passage against passage merely, and word against 
                                                                                                                                                             
(Pippin, 1989: 24-32). But it’s their sharing the hypothetical that puts them on one side of the either-or 
seesaw regarding Kant’s intentions that I wish to bring attention to and put into question here. It’s the fact 
that Pippin adopts this ‘Aesthetic Complete’ dogma from Allison that accounts for his taking as Hegel’s 
target the supposed “Kantian reliance on pure intuitions” (Pippin, 1989: 25) in the Deduction.  
36
 The term is Longuenesse’s: see Longuenesse, 1998: 208, 213, 299, title of section 214-227; ‘new 
reading’, p.9. See McDowell, 2009a: 28, n.10; at 73 he claims that “The B Deduction is framed to avoid a 
certain objection” and “Kant organizes the B Deduction so as to forestall this objection”, the objection 
basically being that the Aesthetic is complete in accounting for objects being available to outer sense. See 
also Waxman, 1991.  
37
 This is how Paul Franks expresses a principle he adheres to at Franks, 2005: 6. 
38
 Pippin does see Kant as arguing against himself in the second half of the B Deduction, but this ‘re-
reading’ is a mere aberration from what he takes to be Kant’s singular, reflective (see below) intention. 
Against this, Longuenesse and McDowell are clearly right that the ‘re-reading’ of the Aesthetic is central 
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word,”39 what needs to be comprehended is that there are reasons for Kant both to affirm that a 
synthesis of the understanding is required for space and time to be forms of sensible intuition, 
and reasons for him to deny it. I claim that Hegel, who everywhere in his discussion of Kant 
affirms the contradictory nature of Kant’s thinking, comprehended and explained these opposing 
reasons in Kant’s thinking.40 One’s understanding of the coherence of the B Deduction greatly 
increases, I claim, once one abandons the dogma of the coherence of the B Deduction. In the 
following text from the Introduction to the Critical Journal, I take Hegel to be demanding that we 
abandon the dogma of Kant’s coherence, and replace it with the task of distinguishing Kant’s 
opposing sequences of thought.   
 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
to Kant’s intention in the Deduction, and thus the thought behind it also constitutes a central intention of 
Kant’s.   
39
 Fichte, 1982: 59.    
40
 I claim that speculative Kant speaks and thinks contrary to reflective Kant’s intentions, and vice versa. 
Here’s a sample of the evidence that Hegel sees things so: Hegel and Schelling, 1802: 278 and 280-1, 
where Hegel asks how “the Critical Philosophy... can be preserved and made valid [by itself] in spite of 
its own better knowledge and the Idea of Philosophy that floats before its mind?”; “On the Relation of 
Skepticism to Philosophy”, Hegel, 1802a: 352: “It is the spirit of the Kantian philosophy to be conscious 
of this supreme Idea, but to set to work expressly to root it out again. Thus we can distinguish two types 
of spirit that become visible in the Kantian philosophy, one being that of the philosophy which is 
continually ruined by the system, the other that of the system which aims to do the Idea of Reason to 
death”. From Faith and Knowledge , Hegel, 1802: 78:  “it is for the sake of dear mankind and its 
cognitive faculty, that Kant so little esteems his thought that [...]”, 89: “it is [Kant] himself who 
establishes the opposite experience of thinking a nondiscursive intellect. He himself shows that his 
cognitive faculty is aware [...] also of reason and the In-itself [...] In the experience of his thinking he 
finds both thoughts. However, in choosing between the two his nature despised the necessity of thinking 
the Rational”; 92: “the highest Idea is corrupted with full consciousness, while reflection and finite 
cognition are exalted above it”. From Science of Logic, Hegel, 1812/16: 592: “It will always stand out a 
marvel how the Kantian philosophy recognized the relation of thought to sensuous reality, beyond which 
it did not advance, as only a relative relation of mere Appearance, and perfectly well recognized and 
enunciated a higher unity of both in the Idea in general and, for example, in the Idea of an intuitive 
understanding, and yet stopped short at this relative relation and the assertion that the Notion is and 
remains utterly separate from reality - thus asserting as truth what it declared to be finite cognition, and 
denouncing as an unjustified extravagance and a figment of thought what it recognized as truth and of 
which it established the specific notion.” Cf. §§238-9 from the Phenomenology of Spirit, quoted below.  
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The genuinely scientific concern here is to peel off the shell that keeps the inner 
aspiration from seeing daylight […] Here [where “it is evident that the Idea of philosophy has 
been more clearly cognized”], what matters is not to set the Idea of philosophy off in relief, but 
to uncover the nooks and crannies that subjectivity makes use of in order to escape from 
philosophy, and to make the weakness, for which any limitation offers a secure foothold, visible 
both on its own account and with respect to the Idea of philosophy qua associated with a 
subjectivity.              (Hegel and Schelling, 1802: 278)  
 
Understanding the details of this feature of Hegel’s reception of Kant is the key to 
appreciating how it might be possible to “use Kant against Kant,” and how a system which 
affirms, explicitly against Kant’s claims to the contrary, the Idea - the derivation of the content 
of thought from its form - might yet have a just claim to be genuinely Kantian. The basic 
contours of Hegel’s system, we’ll see in closing, can be understood by seeing how Hegel 
develops and resolves this contradiction in Kant.  
 So what are these opposing sequences of thought? The first, the ‘speculative’ sequence of 
thought, derives from the problem the Deduction is set to resolve: showing the categories valid 
for “all that can come before our senses”.41 The second, the ‘reflective’ sequence of thought, 
derives from an orienting thought of Kant’s that Hegel takes aim at: that the categories / unity of 
cognition / forms of thought come from the finite subject, the subject already conceived of as 
distinguished from and in relation to a world of objects, the subject conceived as in a passive 
relation to objects prior to the activity through which the categories / unity of cognition 
originate. 
 We will present these two sequences in turn, but the following observation needs to be 
made before presenting the interpretation of the speculative sequence. There are two features of 
the interpretation that, said together, sound almost nonsensical: the interpretation claims to be 
                                                 
41
 B145, B160. References to the Critique of Pure Reason are to the standard A and B pagination of the 
first (1781) and second (1787) editions, respectively. Translations are from Guyer and Wood, 1998. 
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true of Kant’s thought – to be, as it were, the true interpretation of the central thoughts Kant 
expresses in the Deduction – and to be expressed in such a way that, were Kant to see them 
expressed as such, he might not be able to sanction them as his own thoughts. Behind the 
incredulity this conjunction might inspire, however, is the dogma that thoughts must be most 
clearly understood by the one expressing them; that the understanding of a proposition or 
sequence of thought could not possibly be trumped by a subsequent interpreter. Now notice that 
Kant introduces his Dialectic by claiming that the thoughts to be presented there are a better 
interpretation of Plato’s own thoughts than Plato himself was privy to. In making this claim he 
affirms that it is “not at all unusual” to find the just mentioned dogma falsified.  
 
I note only that when we compare the thoughts that an author expresses about a subject, 
in ordinary speech as well as in writings, it is not at all unusual to find that we understand him 
better than he understood himself, since he may not have determined his concept sufficiently and 
hence sometimes spoke, or even thought, contrary to his own intention.
42
 
 
Now Hegel of course claims that his interpretation of Kant is an instance of the type of 
interpretive event to the possibility and commonality of which Kant here attests. But further, 
Kant’s brief account of how such an interpretive event is possible fits this case: Kant himself, 
Hegel claims, has not determined his highest concept, the principle of the unity of apperception, 
sufficiently: he has failed to realize that a consequence of the claim that “the unity of 
consciousness is that which alone constitutes the relation of representations to an object, thus 
their objective validity [their truth]”43 is that the affirmation that “the manifold for intuition must 
                                                 
42
 A314/B370. Compare Hegel’s remark, directed specifically at Kant, concerning “the confusion into which 
formalism falls whenever it sets out to explain something and which makes it say the opposite of what it intends” 
(1812/16: 594).  
43
 B137, in §17 of the Deduction, entitled, “The principle of the synthetic unity of apperception is the supreme 
principle of all use of the understanding”. This is the third sentence of Hegel’s three sentence long quote from Kant 
at 1812/16: 584, in “The Notion in General,” the opening chapter of Book III of the Science of Logic. Hegel refers 
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already be given prior to the synthesis of understanding and independently from it,”44 where this 
has the character of a necessary thought, i.e. is claimed to be a true representation of the way 
things are, cannot, given that what it asserts directly contradicts the stated principle, be such. 
Hegel sees that Kant failed to realize what Fichte realized – though in 1797 Fichte denies that 
Kant failed to realize it - that Kant’s (merely apparent?) positing of a thing in itself as the ground 
of our sensations is something rendered not possibly true by the principle that all possible truth is 
known through the unity of consciousness.
45
 But as we’ll see when the reflective sequence of 
thought is presented, in taking the categories to arise from the finite I, or from “the point of view 
of man,” Kant has no alternative but to affirm these propositions which directly contradict his 
speculative sequence of thought.
46
 Due to this conflicting sequence of thought, the influence of 
                                                                                                                                                             
back to his quoting of the text at p.590, claiming - against what he takes to be Kant’s understanding of his own 
proposition - that “Here, therefore, the objectivity of thought is specifically enunciated, an identity of Notion and 
thing, which is truth.”  
44
 B145.  
45
 “So long, therefore, as Kant does not expressly declare in so many words, that he derives sensation 
from an impression given by the thing-in-itself... for so long I shall decline to believe what his expositors 
have to tell of him.” (Fichte, 1982: 58) It is likely that Hegel is responding directly to this text at 1802b, 
74: “[W]ith respect to sensations and their empirical reality nothing remains but to think that sensation 
comes from the things in themselves. […]” Fichte’s denial of Kant’s commitment to affection by a thing 
in itself fundamentally animates his dialectic of the finite and infinite I. “Insofar as the self is restricted by 
the not-self, it is finite; in itself, however, as posited through its own absolute activity, it is infinite. These 
two, its infinity and its finitude, are to be reconciled.” (Fichte, 1982: 137) Fichte’s distinguishing here of 
what he seeks to reconcile importantly prefigures Hegel’s distinguishing of Kant’s reflective and 
speculative syllogisms.  
46
 Longuenesse structures her researches into German Idealism generally (inc. Kant) by framing the ‘Kant 
or Hegel’ question, ‘Point of View of man or Knowledge of God?’ (see esp. preface to 2005; preface to 
2007:  xviii-xix; titles of part II and ch.5 of 2007; closing remarks of ch.6 of 2007: 217); the title of 2005 
comes from A26/B42: “We can accordingly speak of space, extended beings, and so on, only from the 
human standpoint,” the question’s second disjunct from Hegel’s “ever-renewed insistence that he means 
to reinstate metaphysics as knowledge of God” (2007: 190). She concludes her article that takes this 
question as its title by expressing her view that, while “Hegel is right in seeing a tension within Kant’s 
philosophy between “point of view of man” and striving towards knowledge of God,” the better path is “a 
resolution symmetrically opposed to the one Hegel is attempting: a systematic development of the “point 
of view of man” ” (2007: 191). Similarly, she closes ch.6 by throwing doubts on the plausibility of 
Hegel’s adopting “as the building block for the reconstruction of [his] metaphysics a concept “I” inherited 
from Kant, but which for Kant… [was that] of a finite consciousness. Whether it was at all possible to 
abandon this “human standpoint” to which Kant rigorously limited himself, precisely in those parts of his 
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which upon the speculative Hegel seeks to remove in his system, Kant ‘spoke, and even thought, 
contrary to his own intention’ (the intention of showing the categories as valid for all that can 
come before the senses), and his system suffered the fate of suffering from the “self-
contradictory ambiguity… [that] fails… to bring together its contradictory thoughts of pure 
consciousness being all reality, while the extraneous impulse or sensations and ideas are equally 
reality”.47  
 
When reading the presentation of the speculative sequence, then, assent should be 
withheld from thoughts that may arise of the form ‘this can’t be what Kant means because…’, 
for if the reason for doubt is captured in the subsequent presentation of Kant’s reflective 
sequence of thought – for example, if the reason is ‘…because of what Kant says at B129 and 
B145’ - then my view is: yes, Kant does think this other thing that prevents him assenting to the 
speculative thoughts as presented in this form, but those thoughts contradict what the speculative 
thoughts either express or require. And instead of attempting to make cohere sequences of 
thought which cannot be made to cohere, what’s needed here “is to peel off the shell that keeps 
the inner aspiration from seeing daylight.”48 Attesting to the truth of Sellars’ judgment that Kant 
is “certainly not”49 free of it, we’ll see this shell (the reflective sequence) to be of a piece with 
Mythical Givenness. The desirability of abandoning it can then be more readily appreciated, and 
                                                                                                                                                             
system which Hegel professed to admire the most […] one has every reason to doubt. Despite his 
efforts to provide a justification, for the transition from the standpoint of finite consciousness to the 
standpoint of the absolute, I suggest one can hail only as a strange and grandiose philosophical novel 
Hegel’s presentation […]” (2007: 217). The present paper attempts to reverse this decision by making 
clear Hegel’s case that it is necessary to abandon ‘the point of view of man’ in the way Kant understands 
this if we are to hold on to the speculative sequence of thought of Kant, of which part III of 
Longuenesse’s KCJ is the most rigorously worked out account.   
47
 Hegel, 1807: §238.  
48
 Hegel and Schelling, 1802: 278.   
49
 Sellars, 1997: §1. 
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the claim to the Kantian origins of Hegel’s Idea (which is in many ways manifestly un-Kantian) 
will be put in starker relief.  
2.2 THE SPECULATIVE SYLLOGISM 
Here [in the Transcendental Deduction] the original synthetic unity of apperception is 
recognized also as the principle of the figurative synthesis, i.e. of the forms of intuition; space 
and time are themselves conceived as synthetic unities, and spontaneity, the absolute synthetic 
activity of the productive imagination, is conceived as the principle of the very sensibility which 
was previously characterizes only as sensibility.       - Hegel, Faith and Knowledge, pp.68-9.  
 
In §13 and §14 of the Critique Kant tells us that the only way a representation can be shown to 
be necessarily and universally (equivalently, a priori) valid for a set of items is for the former to 
be revealed as a condition of the possibility of the latter. The transcendental deduction of space 
and time – their being revealed as necessarily and universally valid of all possible appearances – 
was thus performed in the Aesthetic by showing them to be conditions of the possibility of things 
even appearing.
50
 The corresponding “principle toward which the entire investigation [the 
Deduction] must be directed” is for the categories to be revealed as a priori conditions of the 
possibility of experience.
51
  
What this principle in truth means, I claim, is that the categories are conditions of the 
possibility of the mere reception of empirical manifolds. (It is largely for the sake of this 
interpretation of the principle that the above preamble was necessary.) The truth of the 
interpretation is revealed, I claim, by the theses ((2s) and (Cs) in the table below) Kant uses as 
                                                 
50
 A89/B121-2; A93/B125. 
51
 A94/B127.  
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means to the end of proving this principle, this proof being completed at the end of the first 
partition of §26, which ends at B161 with “… the categories are conditions of the possibility of 
experience, and are thus also valid a priori of all objects of experience.” The central texts relied 
upon in demonstrating that Kant actually thinks these theses and uses them in his argument are 
some of the key claims from §24, the first three sentences of the third paragraph of §26 (the 
paragraph which concludes the proof with the just quoted words), and the attached note at 
B160n.  
We can represent the speculative syllogism concluding in the interpretation of the 
principle quoted thus: (1) The form of intuition is prior to the relation of passivity, this latter 
being the relation between the finite I and the independent object whereby the former is passive 
and through which empirical manifolds are received. This is the thesis of the Aesthetic, the thesis 
well illuminated by Daniel Warren in his article “Kant and the Apriority of Space”, and the 
thesis the interpretive controversy over which we mentioned in opening. We can represent it 
symbolically thus: (1r/s) FI >  P, where ‘>’ can be read as ‘prior to’ or, for this sequence of 
thought, ‘makes possible’. The ‘r/s’ subscript indicates the fact that this thesis, as we’ll see, is 
likewise the first premise of the reflective sequence of thought. Only steps (2) and (3) are 
exclusive to the speculative sequence. They concern the ‘re-reading’ or revisiting of the first 
thesis and, as they explicitly contradict the latter two steps of the reflective, are not ascribed to 
Kant without controversy.  
(2) A synthesis of the understanding is required for the forms of intuition to be forms of 
intuition, for the sensibility they realize to be a stem of the cognitive faculty. This is the 
“possible and necessary a priori”52 synthesis speciosa of §24, the transcendental synthesis prior 
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 B151.  
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to experience and making it possible, the first “effect of the understanding on sensibility,”53 
which is “the ground of all the others” or (equivalently) that whereby “the understanding 
determines sensibility”.54 That this synthesis makes possible the form of intuition which in turn 
makes the relation of passivity possible is indicated by Kant saying that through it alone the 
categories “acquire objective reality, i.e. application to objects that can be given to us in 
intuition”55 – the tense here, and in Kant saying that through this synthesis the understanding “is 
capable of itself determining sensibility inwardly with regard to the manifold that may be given 
to it in accordance with the form of intuition”56 indicates the crucial moment of the claim, that 
this synthesis is prior to the relation of passivity, prior to and condition of the possibility of the 
reception of empirical manifolds. Indeed at B154 he says that apperception and its synthetic 
unity “applies, prior to all sensible intuition of objects in general”. Symbolically, we represent 
this thesis (2s) SU > FI. My claim here that (2s) is a true interpretation of Kant’s thought is 
buttressed by the role it plays as middle term in facilitating the conclusion of the speculative 
syllogism, (Cs): / SU > P.  
Kant proves the categories valid for all that come before our senses through this 
conclusion (Cs) and the means to it (2s) in the third paragraph of §26, the argument of which 
runs thus:
57
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 B152.  
54
 B160n.  
55
 B151. 
56
 B153. 
57
 I suggest that Kant’s meaning and intention in the third paragraph is more apparent if we at first forget 
the existence of B160n, especially the claim there that “the form of intuition merely gives the manifold”. 
The note of course was written after, and my claim will be that it was inspired by Kant’s own perception 
of the fact that the propositions he needs to affirm here to compete the deduction ((2s) SU > FI and (Cs) 
SU > P) contradict those he needs to affirm due to his having assumed the standpoint of the finite I ((2r) P 
> SU and (Cr) FI > SU). See p.16 below 
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The synthesis of apprehension must be in agreement with the form of intuition, time. 
Time is also a pure intuition, thus contains its unity (see the Aesthetic). Synthetic unity is given 
with this (the pure intuition) and thus also given as the condition of all synthesis of 
apprehension. This synthetic unity can only be that prescribed by the categories to a given 
intuition in general, only applied to our sensible intuition. 
For the Deduction to work, I submit, Kant needs the “also” to be read backwards, as it 
were. Consider the move from pure intuitions having their unity to this unity being given as the 
condition of all synthesis of apprehension. This move is only useful in the proof if it connects 
with the synthesis of apprehension mentioned in the first sentence. There, it was said to be in 
agreement with the form of intuition. So he does want to say what the proof demands, that this 
synthetic unity is indeed given along with the form of intuition. That requires the “also” being 
read backwards, and that requires the claim that a form of intuition (something which precedes 
and conditions all that could possibly come before our senses) only is a form of intuition through 
a synthesis of the understanding. It also requires, of course, “the form of intuition merely gives 
the manifold” being false. 
This line of thought can be connected with the formulaic presentation thus: The form of 
intuition is the condition of the relation of passivity, the relation through which things “come 
before our senses” (1r/s) FI > P. To show the validity of the forms of combination (the 
categories) for this relation of passivity, then, the synthetic unity that can only come through a 
synthesis and that guarantees conformity to the forms of combination needs to be ‘given along 
with’58 this condition for the relation of passivity, the form of intuition. (He needs (2s) SU > FI 
for (Cs) SU > P, this last being that through which the categories’ validity can be known.) Now 
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 See B161. 
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the proof that Kant thinks and affirms these two formulas comes from the ‘also’ of the first 
sentence: the same time (FI) that’s by (1r/s) the condition of the relation of passivity is also the 
time which possesses its unity only through a synthesis. (This time of (1r/s) requires as condition 
of the possibility of it as the FI prior to P the sequence inclusive of (2s) and issuing in the 
conclusion (Cs). Thus: the ‘re-reading’ or (better here) ‘supplement’ of (1r/s).) 
Now the crucial moment of this ‘re-reading’ or speculative interpretation of Kant as 
Longuenesse and McDowell present it is to basically equate the ‘formal intuition’ of B160n, the 
space and time that, in possessing their unity, “presuppose a synthesis” through which alone they 
“are first given as intuitions,” with the Aesthetic’s ‘forms of intuition’.59 McDowell and 
Longuenesse see Kant in the final throes of the B Deduction basically arguing thus: things can 
only come before the senses through the form of intuition. The form of intuition has a unity, and 
that unity must come from a synthesis of the understanding. There is thus a priority of the 
synthesis of the understanding to the priority of the form of intuition to the relation of passivity, 
and this is what explains the conformity of all that may be given through the form of intuition to 
the categories: things (manifolds, objects) can only be given through the unity of the form of 
intuition, and since this unity was bestowed by the understanding, these given things must 
conform to the understanding’s unity, and hence the categories. It is clear that this is equivalent 
to finding Kant thinking the speculative syllogism as here presented: (1r/s) FI > P, (2s) SU > FI, 
/(Cs) SU > P. Such interpreters see Kant finding the solution to the problem of the validity of 
the categories for all that can come before the senses through the claim that the understanding’s 
form is already involved in the deliverances of sensibility (that given through the relation of 
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 See Longuenesse, 1998: 214-227, esp. pp. 218-19. Longuenesse speaks of an ‘equation’ at 1998: 219, 
219, 223, 225. Compare McDowell, 2009a: 28, n.10. 
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passivity). It is no coincidence that this reading is championed by interpreters deeply sensitive to 
the problem of Mythical Givenness.
60
  
But if this is Kant’s thought, why doesn’t he clearly affirm that the Aesthetic’s forms of 
intuition, to be forms of intuition, presuppose a synthesis, hence the involvement of spontaneity? 
Why is there enough ambiguity in the text to allow a defender of the reflective Kant like Henry 
Allison to deny this proposition?
61
 Most troublingly, why does Kant in this infamous footnote 
appear to deny this very proposition through which the validity of the categories is, by the light 
of McDowell, Longuenesse and the truth, revealed, by saying that this synthesis yields “formal 
intuition” (something new), which is here distinguished from ‘form of intuition’ through the 
former possessing and the latter supposedly lacking the understanding-bestowed unity?  
Longuenesse and Allison, defenders of speculative and reflective Kant respectively, are 
in agreement that Kant can’t “mean” by the ‘form of intuition’ of B160n the ‘form of intuition’ 
on display in the Aesthetic, for the latter plainly does possess unity, while the former is defined 
as that which lacks it. Both operating under the dogma of Kant’s coherence, they look outside the 
Critique for the clue to Kant’s reference here.62 But it’s Sellars who is closer to the truth here 
with his related claims that Kant is “certainly not” free of Mythical Givenness,63 that he is 
“fighting his way towards a clarity of structure which he never achieves,”64 and that he has 
mongrelly crossbred two to-be-distinguished sequences of thought into his notion of an 
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intuition.
65
 Our concern is with the mongrel crossbreeding in the notion of a form of intuition, 
and it’s because it has to do work for the opposing sequence of thought that Kant needs to (not 
only affirm but also) deny that a synthesis of the understanding is required to yield the form of 
intuition. It’s this sequence of thought that is centrally targeted by Hegel in his critique of Kant’s 
standpoint of finitude or “point of view of man”. It is now time to introduce this opposing 
sequence of thought.  
 
2.3 THE REFLECTIVE SYLLOGISM AND THE STANDPOINT OF FINITUDE 
We must not place Kant’s merit in this, that he put the forms, as expressed in the 
categories, into the human cognitive faculty.           - Hegel, Faith and Knowledge, p.79
66
 
 
Consider Stephen Engstrom’s defense of Kant in “Understanding and Sensibility” against  
 
discussions relating Kant to later idealists, and to Hegel in particular, that [claim that,] in 
depicting the human cognitive power as divided into two stems, with one of them, sensibility, 
having special forms of its own, Kant introduces into his account an unacceptable subjectivism, 
reflected in his claim that our cognition is of appearances, not things in themselves.
67
  
 
The reason Kant distinguishes sensibility from the understanding, Engstrom informs us, 
is to acknowledge the fact that in theoretical cognition the existence or actuality of the object we 
come to know is prior to, independent of and cause of our representation of the object. The 
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implication implicit in Engstrom’s paper is that, since this priority is in accordance with the 
facts, and this truth is the reason for Kant’s distinguishing sensibility from the understanding, it 
is a justified distinction, and Hegel’s critique of it is ill-motivated.  
This would be an appropriate response to the Hegelian critique of Kant, if Hegel was in 
agreement with Kant that the unity of consciousness from which the categories arise is that of the 
“finite thinking being”.68 As the non-metaphysical interpreters of Hegel basically do take this to 
be the case, this defense of Kant against the non-metaphysical Hegel is just.
69
 Hegel, however, is 
not in agreement with Kant on this point, and for this reason the true Hegel must be distinguished 
from the non-metaphysical Hegel. As Longuenesse attests,  
 
Kant and Hegel disagree in their answer to the question: what is the unity of 
apperception? For Kant, it is the unity of a finite consciousness […] For Hegel […] it is the same 
“reason,” or intuitive understanding, which Hegel found in Kant’s solution to the dialectics of 
aesthetic judgment. Now, to interpret the transcendental unity of apperception in these terms is to 
say that it is the source not only of the form but also of the matter of appearances.
70
  
 
Hegel’s rejection of the claim that a sensibility separated from the understanding provides 
the content or matter for cognition thus comes through his rejection of the claim that the unity of 
consciousness and hence the categories are to be ascribed to the finite I, a rejection he sees as 
necessary to the task of making sense of Kant. Citing the finitude of the finite I’s cognition 
against Hegel, as Engstrom does, begs the question, which is, ‘does Kant’s way of 
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acknowledging our finitude get it right?’71 Kant’s view, as Hegel sees it, is led by its “confusion” 
over how to acknowledge our finitude to “say the opposite of what it intends”:72 from its 
intention to place us finitely – wouldn’t this intention find satisfaction in the affirmation that we 
arise through nature, that nature is the condition of the possibility of our being? – it ends up 
positing the finite I as existing in itself prior to the existence of nature! Why is this implied by 
Kant’s view? Because Kant places the conditions of the possibility of nature in the cognitive 
faculty of the finitely placed I, and as Fichte observes, “the conditions for the possibility of a 
thing ought surely to precede the reality thereof”.73 
 But what do I mean when I say that Kant ascribes the categories to the finite I? What 
justice is there for this characterization, when the Deduction reveals the cognitive faculty as that 
through which nature becomes possible? And why would we want to abandon this standpoint, 
and ascend from the point of view of man to knowledge of God?  
 As Kant puts it at the end of the Deduction, the unity of consciousness / the categories 
make nature possible.
74
 Only so could they be revealed as valid for all of nature - could their 
universality and necessity, or equivalently their a priority, be shown, for this can only come 
through the categories preceding that of which they are valid in this very sense: making possible. 
Now of this very same understanding that makes nature possible Kant says, at B145, “the 
manifold for intuition must already be given prior to the synthesis of the understanding and 
independently of it”. It is this claim of Kant’s, that the understanding which makes nature 
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possible is that of the being that is originally not active but rather passive in its relation to the 
objects it comes to know, that we mean by saying Kant ascribes the categories to the finite I.  
 Kant’s claim at B145 that the manifolds must be given prior to and independently of the 
synthesis of the understanding is equivalent to the claim that the relation of passivity (the relation 
through which manifolds are received) must be prior to the synthesis of the understanding. This 
gives us the second premise of the reflective sequence of thought: (2r) P > SU. If the relation of 
passivity must occur prior to the synthesis of the understanding, then likewise the vehicle of this 
relation, the form of intuition, must be given prior to the synthesis of the understanding (as Kant 
anyway affirms with the opening words of the rewritten Deduction at B129). The symbolic 
expression of this, (Cr) FI > SU, can be seen to follow from the two premises of the reflective 
syllogism. This syllogism is laid beside its speculative counterpart below, so that the 
contradiction in Kant’s thinking can be intuited at a glance.  
 
           Reflective (r)         Speculative (s) 
 
1   FI   >  P   FI   >    P  
2   P    >  SU   SU  >   FI  
C         /FI   >  SU          /SU  >   P   
 
 (Cs), through which the validity of the categories is shown, contradicts the thought 
expressed at B145, (2r). The conclusion of the reflective sequence (Cr) contradicts (2s), the 
thesis discernible in §24 and the use of that section (see the reference to it in closing B160n) in 
the third paragraph of §26. It is the awareness of this latter contradiction that impels Kant to 
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write B160n, to affirm the speculative sequence for the newly coined ‘formal intuition’, and to 
claim that “the form of intuition merely gives the manifold”. It represents Kant’s attempt to save 
his reflective sequence of thought, a sequence of thought wrung from or expressing the thought 
orienting his entire project, that the categories arise from the finite I, in light of his 1787 
awareness that his speculative sequence of thought contradicts it. In the very moment in which 
“the principle basis for my system articulated in the Critique”75 is brought to completion, then, 
Kant is confronted with a plain contradiction in one of his central notions. B160n, in claiming 
that the speculative sequence applies to ‘formal intuition’ when, for the thoughts to make sense, 
it must have been thought and affirmed for ‘form of intuition’, represents nothing less than a rare 
moment of sophistry of this “great, grey mother of us all”.76  
2.4 APPEARANCES AND THINGS IN THEMSELVES 
In his defense of Kant against the Hegelian attack, Engstrom makes claims about Kant’s account 
of theoretical cognition that are directly opposed to Hegel’s own. “Nothing sullies its objectivity, 
or credentials as cognition,”77 writes Engstrom, whereas Hegel counters that, according to the 
definition of truth as the agreement of cognition and its object which Kant ‘grants and 
presupposes,’78 “the fundamental assertion of transcendental idealism, that reason as cognitive 
is incapable of apprehending things-in-themselves” is “an untrue conception,”79 that the claimed 
cognition the account is of is, by principles internal to the account, in fact not cognition. Crucial 
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to resolving this dispute of course is the truth regarding what Kant means (‘intends’) by saying 
that our knowledge is of mere appearances, and not of things in themselves. Engstrom claims,  
 
That Kant calls these objects [of our theoretical cognition] “mere appearances” indicates, 
not that they lack independence of our cognitive power in respect of form […] but that - in 
contrast to things known as they are in themselves by an intuiting intellect – they lack 
dependence of it in respect of existence. As he makes clear, they are the very objects we’ve all 
along taken ourselves to be able to know (A30/B45).
80
  
 
Neither the negative part of this claim (that in calling these objects appearances Kant 
doesn’t mean to affirm a lack of independence with respect to form) nor its positive part (that 
Kant means for appearances to lack dependence on the cognitive faculty with respect to 
existence) can, however, be maintained. In both versions of the Deduction Kant attempts to 
defuse the ‘strangeness’ of the doctrine presented there, that nature is made possible through the 
cognitive faculty, that the latter is the origin of the laws or combination to be found in nature, by 
affirming that these laws and appearances exist only in relation to the subject, not as they are 
independently of the subject (as they are in themselves).
81
 The point of Kant’s novel claim that 
the objects of our cognition are appearances and not things in themselves is precisely to deny that 
they exist independently of the cognitive faculty, for by his lights it’s precisely this thesis that’s 
required to explain the possibility of us having a certain kind of knowledge of them that must 
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precede being given these objects, a priori knowledge, e.g. in mathematics and pure natural 
science. The solution to the Antinomies, furthermore, is that the entities of the regresses, since 
mere appearances and not things in themselves, do not exist prior to the actual regress, and do 
not exist otherwise than through it, i.e., otherwise than through their relation to the human 
cognition that brings them to be. “Appearances in general are nothing outside our representation, 
which is just what we mean by their transcendental ideality” (A507/B535).  
If appearances lacked dependence on our cognition with respect to existence, they could 
be the kind of thing that could affect us. Kant would have then acknowledged the finite nature of 
our cognition, the fact that the object we come to know is prior to and cause of our representation 
of it, through the concept of appearance. Engstrom’s thinking that this identity between the 
objects that affect us and the objects we come to know holds for Kant’s thinking is apparent in 
the words emboldened below from his description of the two “opposite” directions of 
dependence at work in the Deduction.  
 
The Transcendental Deduction’s task [... is] explaining how the pure concepts can relate a 
priori to objects, notwithstanding that the latter exist independently of the actuality of our 
cognition (A85/B117). In the Transcendental Deduction, Kant relies on the Copernican 
proposition that the objects we can know must conform to our cognition to reconcile the a priori 
status of the pure concepts with the second condition [the priority of the existence of objects to 
the existence of our representations of them...] by explaining how the direction of dependence in 
respect of form can be the opposite of the direction of dependence in respect of existence 
(A92/B124-5).
82
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 But at Bxxvii, A251 and elsewhere, Kant affirms that, from the mere concept of 
appearance, we must posit a thing in itself as the ground of it.
83
 Kant’s official position has to be 
that the object to which we are originally in a passive relation, the object which, by B145, we are 
related to prior to the synthesis of the understanding, is the thing in itself. As B145 makes plain, 
Kant attempts to acknowledge our finitude by saying that the relation of passivity whereby a 
manifold is received from an independent object is prior to the synthesis through which the 
objects we thereby know (appearances) are cognized. The objects that are correspondingly 
thought to be active to this moment of the finite I’s passivity, since they are conceived as such 
prior to that moment of synthesis through which appearances (natural objects) become possible, 
cannot therefore themselves be appearances, and thus can only be things in themselves.  
Support for this claim comes from the fact that Kant endorsed Court Chaplain Schulz’s 
interpretation of his philosophy whilst rejecting the interpretations of J.S. Beck and Fichte 
(12:367-8 and 12:370-1; Zweig, pp.510-11 and 559-60). It was as fundamental to the 
interpretations of the latter two that the affecting object was an appearance as it was to Schulz 
that the affecting object was a thing in itself. Beck:  
 
If I were to give my judgment concerning this difficulty, which is certainly important to a 
great many people, and if I were to determine what your Critique actually means, when, on the 
first page of the introduction, it speaks of objects that affect the senses – whether it means by that 
things in themselves or appearances – I should answer that… the object that affects me must 
therefore be appearance and not thing in itself.
84
  
 
 Fichte comes to the same conclusion in his examination of Kant’s statements that 
“objects are given to us” (B33) and that “objects affecting our senses partly of themselves 
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produce representations…” (B1; Fichte, 1982: 58-60). In these pages from his Second 
Introduction, Fichte is explicitly engaging and contradicting “the commentator [that Kant] has 
recently endorsed, Herr Schulz,” who concedes “that the objective ground of appearances lies in 
something that is the thing-in-itself” (Fichte, 1982: 53). It is, I claim, because Beck denies that 
the affecting  object is a thing in itself, that Kant – under the influence, surely, of Schulz – takes 
Beck, against the latter’s protests, to both affirm intellectual intuition (12:166; Zweig, 1999: 513) 
and “to explain away sensibility” (12:167; Zweig, 1999: 514). Just as Kant takes Fichte’s system 
for an “attempt to cull a real object out of logic” (12:371; Zweig, 1999: 559), he accuses Beck of 
thinking “that the understanding creates the object” (12:168; Zweig, 1999: 514).  
Now Beck had twice pointed out to Kant that he ought not to have defined “intuition” in 
the Aesthetic as a representation related immediately to an object, given that the possibility of a 
representation’s relation to an object is not explained until the Analytic (at 11:311 and 11:338; 
Zweig, 1999: 396 and 414). To my mind, Kant never adequately acknowledges Beck’s point, and 
it is because Kant has, fundamentally and inconsistently, assumed the transcendental subject to 
stand in relation to objects prior to its activity, and because he hears Beck’s and Fichte’s claims 
in light of this assumption, that he can find nothing but absurdity in their denial of affection by a 
thing in itself. Kant’s endorsement of Schulz and rejection of Beck and Fichte shows that he 
rejects interpretations like Engstrom’s that take the affecting object to be an appearance.  
Jacobi’s influential expression of puzzlement about the critical philosophy, part of which 
reads that without the thing in itself he couldn’t enter into it, is thus just.  Since it is only through 
the concept of an unknowable thing in itself that Kant acknowledges the priority through which 
Engstrom attempts to defend Kant from Hegel’s ‘unacceptable subjectivism’ charge (the priority 
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of the existence of the object to our representation of it), the refutation of the charge fails, and 
Hegel’s claim that Kant leaves us with what is, by his own lights, an untrue cognition, stands.   
This criticism of Kant has obvious affinities with the old charge that Kant is close to 
Berkeley. Notice, however, that Kant first counters the accusation of Berkeleyanism in the 
Prolegomena not by affirming, as he would if Engstrom were right, that his appearances exist 
independently (“space and time, together with all that they contain, are not things nor qualities in 
themselves, but belong merely to the appearances of the latter: up to this point I am one in 
confession with the above idealists” [appendix, 4:374]), but rather by affirming his commitment 
to the thing in itself (“...Whereas I say, that things as objects of our senses existing outside us are 
given, but we know nothing of what they may be in themselves, knowing only their appearances, 
i.e., the representations which they cause in us by affecting our senses.” Remark II to §13, 
4:289). In the place where we would expect it most, then, Kant does not affirm but, in being “one 
in confession with” Berkeley, explicitly denies the negative part of Engstrom’s claim, that the 
existence of the appearances is prior to the existence of our representation. In claiming that 
appearances exist prior to our representations and cause them, Engstrom has turned appearances 
into things in themselves. 
    
 We can show that Kant must think a thing in itself at the other end of the relation of 
passivity from another angle. We have a priori knowledge of the natural (spatiotemporal) world. 
The necessity and universality characteristic of that knowledge is only possible, Kant thinks, if 
this knowledge precedes the objects that are given to us through sensibility. According to Kant, 
it further follows that the objects which are subject to this unity coming from the subject can 
exist with this unity only in cognition, only in relation to the subject; here he infers to a 
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proposition Hegel will deny: that they could not exist with this unity independently of their being 
in relation to the subject.
 85
  
Now this inference of Kant’s is revealing of his orienting assumption that the subject is 
already distinguished from its objects prior to the synthesis of the understanding: that first there 
is the relation of the subject to its objects, and then there is the synthesis through which a certain 
class of objects (appearances) become known, as is necessary for B145 to have meaning.
86
 It is 
this unthought (see sec.5 below) relation to an other that is targeted in Hegel’s charge against the 
‘finite’87 or ‘reflective’88 nature of Kant’s philosophy. We can thus say the following about 
Kant’s inference to the claim that the object can’t exist with the unity through which it is known 
independently of the event of cognition through which it is known: just as Kant’s reason for 
affirming this inference is based on this orienting assumption of the subject being distinguished 
from its object prior to the synthesis of the understanding, Hegel’s justification for denying this 
inference comes through his revealing the invalidity by Kant’s own lights of this orienting 
assumption, and his abandoning of it.   
It follows from Kant’s orienting assumption that the objects exist as they truly are prior 
to the synthesis of the understanding. To say that the unity through which objects are known 
doesn’t pertain to them independently of their being known is to say that the more the object 
conforms to the unity, the less true of the genuine object (the transcendentally real one, the thing 
in itself) it is. Now Kant’s speculative sequence of thought concludes with the thought that 
manifolds given through sensibility completely conform to the understanding’s unity. This 
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thought is required by the conjunction of two thoughts: the principle of transcendental 
deductions generally, that universal and necessary validity is only possible for a representation if 
it makes that of which it is thus valid possible, and the interpretation of Kant’s Copernican 
thought we’ve defended, that the understanding’s unity, in making space and time as forms of 
intuition possible, makes the reception of empirical manifolds possible. Now if Kant were to 
affirm that sequence of thought from the standpoint of his orienting assumption of finitude, he 
would be the horrible solipsist long forgotten commentaries accused him of being. It would mean 
that even the manifolds received by the already-distinguished-from-objects I, since received 
through a transcendentally subjectivizing unity, had nothing to do with those objects from which 
it was already distinguished, and from which it is supposed to be receiving some information.
89
 
This worry that the speculative sequence implies solipsism when affirmed from the standpoint of 
finitude is expressed by Kant when he tells us at B145 that the reason why the manifold must be 
given prior to and independently of the understanding - the reason for affirming that the content 
of cognition comes from a sensibility distinguished from the understanding - is that if this were 
not the case our knowledge would be intellectual intuition.  
 To avoid our cognition being completely unconnected from the objects it is supposed to 
be about, then, Kant absolutely requires the subject to be able to receive a manifold 
independently of its transcendentally subjectivizing unity. This manifold must thus come, 
through the relation of passivity posited as prior to the synthesis effecting that unity, from a 
thing in itself. Of course the speculative sequence affirms that the manifold is not received 
independently of cognition’s unity, which is why Hegel says, the emboldened ‘it’ being the 
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manifold said at B145 to be given independently of this unity, that “the understanding… lets it 
drop as something useless, but useless only for the notion”.90  
 It is clear from this why Kant must sophistically pretend that his speculative sequence of 
thought does not involve his notion of a form of intuition. Manifolds are given through the form 
of intuition, so if the former must be given prior to and independently of the synthesis of the 
understanding, so must the latter. (Here we simply express again the fact that (Cr) follows from 
(1r/s) and (2r).) It is to preserve the notion of the form of intuition as an organ that receives a 
manifold from a thing in itself that Kant says in B160n that it “merely gives the manifold,” for if 
this form of intuition was, as the speculative angel on his right shoulder has whispered to him, 
given through a synthesis of the understanding, it would, its opposing left-shoulder reflective 
devil counters, leave us cut off completely from the objects that exist prior to and independently 
of our representations of them. Being unwilling or unable to undertake the rethinking of the 
system acknowledgement of the contradiction would require, or perhaps just having “run out of 
time and patience,”91 Kant fudges the contradiction with the footnote. 
Sellars was hip to the fact that Kant thinks the relation of passivity as a relation to things 
in themselves,
92and as mentioned above, I’m also in agreement with him that Kant has mongrelly 
crossbred opposing sequences of thought into some of his central notions. To “peel off the shell 
that keeps the inner aspiration from seeing daylight,” we need, I suggest, to distinguish two 
senses of ‘form of intuition’: let the FOIts be that of which the speculative sequence is affirmed, 
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the form of intuition given through the synthesis speciosa, given through the re-reading or 
‘supplement’ of (1r/s) by (2s) and (Cs). The subscript expresses the fact that this is a form of 
intuition belonging to a transcendental sensibility. The presence of the FOIts and the speculative 
sequence of thought that leads to in Kant’s thinking attests to the truth of the ‘re-reading’ 
interpretation of Longuenesse and McDowell.   
 For the form of intuition that Kant needs to receive a manifold from a thing in itself prior 
to the synthesis of the understanding, I suggest the term FOIeo. Since the unity of cognition as 
Kant thinks it makes transcendentally subjective that which is subsumed under it, Kant casts his 
form of intuition as an organ ejected from this transcendentally subjectivizing unity of 
consciousness: eo = ejected organ. Kant’s reflective self needs this organ to receive a manifold 
from the thing in itself, even though his speculative self will let this manifold “drop as something 
useless”.93 The unity of this organ is thus not given through the understanding, only the unity of 
the FOIts is. As one is prior and one is posterior to the synthesis of the understanding, these 
concepts cannot be made to cohere. It would be equally appropriate to call the FOIeo a FOImg, 
for a Mythically Given manifold is all it yields. Its presence, and the reflective sequence of 
thought that leads to it in Kant’s thinking, attests to the truth of the ‘Aesthetic Complete’ 
interpretation of Allison and Pippin (which is indeed contradictory to the ‘re-reading’ 
interpretation), and also to the truth of Sellars’ claim that Kant is “certainly not” free of Mythical 
Givenness.
94
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Mythical Givenness problematic revealing master in affirming against him the dogma of Kant’s 
coherence.
95
 
2.5 HEGEL’S TARGET IS KANT’S UNTHOUGHT THOUGHT 
We can thus say the following about Kant’s original orienting assumption, his unjustified and not 
made explicit originating thought: to acknowledge the priority of the existence of the object to 
the existence of our representation of it he envisages the I of the supreme principle as already 
related to objects, already placed as finite, before the synthesis of the understanding, before the 
unity of consciousness is effected through its activity. Otherwise put, he conceives of the 
categories or unity of consciousness as arising through a subject which is conceived as already 
separated from, already opposed to objects. (This is equivalent to saying that the categories arise 
from the finite I, for as mentioned above it’s the unthought relation to an other that’s targeted in 
the charge of ‘finitude’.) This orienting thought however is a relating of the I to an object 
(objects), a relating that, according to §17 of the Deduction, is only possible through the unity of 
consciousness. It is a distinguishing of the I from its objects thought by Kant to pertain prior to 
that through which alone, by his own lights, all true distinguishing, and indeed all truth, can be 
grasped.
96
 In support of the Idea against Kant’s denial of it, Hegel writes, thinking only 
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 Most clearly in the Woodbridge Lectures (reprinted in McDowell, 2009a): see esp. the opening pages of 
the first and second lecture.  
96
 By ‘objective validity’ Kant either means ‘truth’ or ‘possible truth’. Thus at B137 Kant says that “the 
unity of consciousness is that which alone constitutes” the truth or possible truth of a representation or 
proposition; likewise in §19 Kant says that the “is” in a proposition indicates the cognition’s relation to 
the objective unity of apperception (the unity of consciousness). As Fichte says somewhere, propositions 
should be made to justify themselves, and it is plain that the ‘is’ in Kant’s orienting unthought thought, 
‘the manifold is given prior to the synthesis of the understanding and independently of it’ not only cannot 
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according to Kantian principles, “The demonstrated absoluteness of the Notion relatively to the 
material of experience… consists in this, that this material as it appears apart from and prior to 
the Notion has no truth.”97 J.S. Beck and Fichte are the first to begin to comprehend the fact that 
this distinguishing of the finite I from the objects independent of it (the ‘not-I’) must be derived 
from Kant’s “supreme principle”. Turning more resolutely critical, Hegel further comprehends 
Kant’s failure to think this distinguishing through his supreme principle. In line with my use of 
A314/B370 and the similar thoughts expressed by Hegel at 1812/16: 594 quoted above, then, I 
claim that Hegel’s critique of Kant’s standpoint of finitude is not a matter of opposing certain 
propositions to various explicitly held propositions of Kant, but is rather a critique of what’s 
unthought in Kant’s thinking, and I mean in particular his way of acknowledging our finitude 
being unthought in relation to his own supreme principle.
98
 This character of Hegel’s critique of 
Kant as a critique of an orienting unthought thought on Kant’s behalf is on display in the 
following passages:  
 
 
The critical philosophy…[claims] that we place our thoughts as a medium between 
ourselves and the objects, and that this medium instead of connecting us with the objects rather 
cuts us off from them. But this view can be countered by the simple observation that these very 
things which are supposed to stand beyond us and, at the other extreme, beyond the thoughts 
referring to them, are themselves figments of subjective thought, and as wholly indeterminate 
they are only a single thought-thing – the so-called thing-in-itself of empty abstraction.99 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
justify itself but by the above in conjunction with what it asserts in fact refutes itself. As Hegel says in a 
text quoted below, it is indeed a “simple observation” that refutes Kant’s standpoint. 
97
 Hegel, 1812/16: 591. Compare Hegel’s diagnosis of Kant’s ‘forgetful’ confusion concerning truth on 
p.593. 
98
 The term “unthought” comes from Heidegger, 2002: 36.  
99
 Hegel, 1812/16: 36.  
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It is the greatest inconsistency to admit, on the one hand, that the understanding knows 
only appearances, and to claim on the other hand that this knowledge is absolute, by such 
statements as: “Cognition can go no further”; “Here is the natural and absolute limit of human 
knowledge.”... It is thoughtless...100 
 
One reason we must abandon the ‘point of view of man,’ then, is that it leads, in Kant’s 
thinking at least, to a transgression of its own principles. What appears as “the point of view of 
man” in Kant’s thinking is itself refuted by his own “supreme principle of all use of the 
understanding”.101 But what is Hegel suggesting when he encourages us to move towards 
“knowledge of God,” and how might we justify such a move?   
2.6 KNOWLEDGE OF GOD 
“The Notion in General” introduces the ‘moving beyond’ Kant that Book III of the Science of 
Logic represents. It motivates this moving beyond through a dialectical engagement with Kant’s 
thinking, especially in the B Deduction. In this crucial chapter, Hegel explicitly takes on Kant’s 
thinking “as regards the relation of the understanding or the Notion to the stages presupposed by 
                                                 
100
 Hegel, 1817/27: §34, p.65.Cf. §74 of the Phenomenology: Kant’s “instrument” view “presupposes that 
cognition which, since it is excluded from the Absolute, is surely outside of the truth as well, is 
nevertheless true”. 
101
 Title of §17, which contains the texts (B136; B137) grounding Fichte’s and Hegel’s speculative 
interpretations: Fichte takes B136 (Fichte, 1982: 48), Hegel B137 (Hegel, 1812/16: 590) to already imply 
that the manifold is not given independently of and prior to the synthesis of the understanding. It should 
be noted that Longuenesse’s rejection of Hegel’s alternative, this “strange and grandiose philosophical 
novel” (Longuenesse, 2007: 217)  in favor of the ‘point of view of man,’ isn’t an endorsement of Kant’s 
view simpliciter - she finds Hegel’s perception of a ‘tension’ in Kant true: 2007: 191 - but is rather a 
defense of “the view that Kant’s critical philosophy offers the tools for a resolution symmetrically 
opposed to the one Hegel is attempting: a systematic development of the “point of view of man” which is 
quite different from the Lockean “empirical psychology” Hegel is accusing Kant’s transcendental 
philosophy of collapsing into” (191).  
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it,”102 and as I read it basically accuses Kant of a “misunderstanding”103 in the way he goes about 
acknowledging the priority of the existence of the object to the existence of our representation of 
it. Hegel views Kant’s claim (e.g. at B129, B145) that the manifold for intuition is given prior to 
and independently of the synthesis of the understanding as essentially suffering from the same 
category mistake that Kant, in motivating his own Transcendental Deduction, accused Locke and 
Hume of: to acknowledge the priority of the existence of the object to our representation of it, 
Kant holds that the manifold for intuition is given prior to that through which alone all truth is 
possible (the synthesis of the understanding; B137). In doing so, however, he has confused an 
issue concerning our acquisition of a representation with the issue of explaining that 
representation’s truth (its possible status as cognition).104 This is an important element of what I 
take to be Hegel’s meaning in the following text. 
 
A capital misunderstanding which prevails on this point is that the natural principle or 
the beginning which forms the starting point in the natural evolution or in the history of the 
developing individual, is regarded as the truth, and the first in the Notion. Now, in the order of 
nature, intuition or being are undoubtedly first, or are the condition for the Notion, but they are 
not on that account the absolutely unconditioned; on the contrary, their reality is sublated in the 
Notion and with it, too, the illusory show they possessed of being the conditioning reality.
105
 
 
I take the “undoubtedly” in this sentence to indicate Hegel’s acknowledgement of a truth 
behind Kant’s reason for claiming that the content or matter of cognition is given prior to the 
synthesis of the understanding. Yes, we are finite, acknowledges Hegel, and indeed, it is the 
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 Hegel, 1812/16: 586. The issue is of central concern from p.586-590.  
103
 Hegel, 1812/16: 588. Hegel’s target here is broader than just Kant, but definitely inclusive of Kant.  
104
 See CPR, A86-7/B118-9. 
105
 Hegel, 1812/16: 588. Cf. p.591: “the Notion has subjugated being and essence, which from other 
starting points include also feeling and intuition and representation, and which appeared as its 
antecedent conditions, and has proved itself to be their unconditioned ground.” What’s important here is 
Hegel’s relegating to the order of nature the priority which Kant thinks interferes with the priority of the 
understanding’s form to the objects known through it, the priority through which a priori truth (a priori 
cognition) is possible.   
 77 
priority of the existence of the object to the existence of our knowledge of it, and that our 
original relation to this object is one of passivity, that constitutes this finitude. But Hegel’s 
crucial move here is to relegate this priority to “the order of nature”.  
For Kant, the unity of consciousness makes nature possible. By B145, this same unity of 
consciousness must be given a manifold through a relation of passivity prior to its activity 
through which nature is made possible. The relation of passivity, as prior to that through which 
nature is made possible, is thus not natural. As the categories are only valid for natural events, 
however, this means that we cannot apply them to this relation, and cannot claim as knowledge, 
‘the independent object causes our representation,’ as of course we need to, and as is required to 
acknowledge our finitude. (Otherwise put: the problem of affection is real.)  
If we follow Hegel’s ascension in principle, however, and undergo with him “the 
transition from the standpoint of finite consciousness to the standpoint of the absolute,”106 this 
problem, and the problem of the contradiction between the speculative and the reflective 
sequences of thought that originates from Kant’s taking the categories / unity of consciousness to 
arise from a finite I, are dissolved. Like Hegel’s, Kant’s metaphysics of the categories is an 
account of the conditions of the possibility of nature, but unlike Hegel’s it is of the cognitive 
faculty of the finite I. Hegel’s, by contrast, is “prior to the creation of [both] nature and a finite 
mind”.107 His categories derive from the infinite I, the I which is not originally opposed to 
objects but is prior to the separation of the finite I from its object. For Hegel as for Kant, the 
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 This is how Longuenesse describes it before disparaging it at 2007: 217. 
107
 SL, p.50, changing Miller’s “before” to “prior”. I’m quoting here from the sentence Longuenesse cites 
(along with many others) at HCM, p.xviii as the central interpretive node for approaching the Science of 
Logic: “It can therefore be said that this content [the Science of Logic] is the exposition of God as he is in 
his eternal essence prior to the creation of nature and a finite mind.” 
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unity of consciousness (the Notion) / the categories make nature possible,
108
 but as this unity of 
consciousness is not that of the finite I, we can say for Hegel what we cannot say for Kant: 
nature makes the finite I possible; the entire being of the finite I on this view arises through 
nature and is thoroughly natural. In taking the unity of consciousness through which nature 
becomes possible as arising from the finite I, however, Kant by contrast must necessarily posit 
the finite I as a thing in itself existing prior to the event (the synthesis of the understanding) 
through which nature arises, for here the finite I’s cognitive faculty is the condition of the 
possibility of nature, and (again), as Fichte points out, “the conditions for the possibility of a 
thing ought surely to precede the reality thereof”.109 Here we have the unpalatable Kantian 
dualism: the split ‘I’ as necessarily posited, unknowable but thinkable as free thing in itself, and 
as unfree, knowable appearing I.  
The problem of affection is solved in Hegel’s philosophy in the following way. For 
Hegel, nature receives its categorical unity prior to the arising of the finite I. Thus, although he 
agrees with Kant that the finite I’s own activity is posterior to the passive relation of sensibility 
through which the priority of the existence of the object to the existence of our representation of 
it is acknowledged, this posteriority doesn’t imply for Hegel, as it does for Kant, either (1) that 
the relation of passivity is itself outside of nature, nor (2) that the relation cannot be known 
through the categories.
110
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 At the end of the Logic we read that the Idea “freely releases” itself to become “the externality of 
space and time existing absolutely on its own account without the moment of subjectivity” (1812/16: 
843).  
109Fichte, 1982: 64. As we’ve seen, Kant acknowledges the “quite contradictory and strange” (A114; cf. 
B164)  nature of the proposition that nature arises through the finite I, defusing the worry through the 
reminder that nature is merely the realm of that which only exists in relation to the subject (appearance) 
and not the world as it is in itself. 
110
 The claim, then, is that for Kant, the relation of the independent object to the finite I whereby the latter 
is passive, is not an event in nature, whilst Hegel, through his ascension in principle, has found a way to 
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The virtue of Hegel’s ascension in principle can be seen by coming at it through the more 
traditional angle of seeing it as improving on Kant’s “unacceptable subjectivism”111 by providing 
a more satisfying account of the objectivity of our knowledge. We’ve claimed, citing Bxxvii and 
A251, that Kant does posit things in themselves as existing, and shown why he must. We’ve 
further seen that, as a consequence of taking the unity of cognition to be contributed by the finite 
I (the I conceived as distinguished from its objects prior to the unity of cognition being effected), 
Kant infers that these objects do not possess the unity through which they’re known 
independently of their relation to the finite knowing subject. For Hegel, however, the infinite I 
gives rise to nature, and nature in turn gives rise to the finite I. Natural objects thus possess the 
categorical unity they derive from the infinite I prior to the arising of the finite I. Thus, when the 
finite I comes to know through this unity of cognition, it doesn’t violently subsume the object 
                                                                                                                                                             
conceive of it as natural. It is this italicized relation that’s of concern in McDowell’s work on how to 
conceive impressions. McDowell focuses  certain central problems of modern philosophy on this relation, 
explaining that, by thinking opposing thoughts of it, an antinomy is generated for it: the relation between 
the independent object and the finite I whereby the latter is passive, the relation whereby we enjoy 
impressions, is required, since it grounds knowledge, to be within the normative space of reasons, and yet 
it is also (often unthinkingly) thought to be a relation in (mere first) nature, thus subject to the realm of 
law and not possibly normative. I see Hegel as laboring against Kant for the sake of being able to 
conceive the relation whereby the finite I is passive in relation to its objects as a natural relation, as 
McDowell so labors (e.g. against Davidson). But there is a crucial difference in their projects, for Hegel 
does not wish, as McDowell does, to correct Kant’s deeply held intuition that the unity of cognition and 
of the sensible world arises through the activity of the ‘I’ of the supreme principle.  
Kant’s speculative sequence needs thought-like (categorical) unity to be in play in the relation of 
passivity; the “none other than”s of B144 and B161 assert this, but because (1) unity arises only through 
activity, (2) the finite I is passive in this relation, and (3) the activity through which the categories arise is 
that of the finite I (his primary unthought thought), Kant is barred from being able to conceive how the 
categories could be actualized in this relation. (Notice what Kant concedes [of the A Deduction] in the 
footnote in the preface of the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science, 4: 474: he has shown the that 
but not, he concedes, the how categories make experience possible.) Now whilst McDowell abandons (1), 
Hegel (for reasons also I think connected with his reception of Aristotle) adheres stringently to it. Instead 
he jettisons (3) and undertakes the ascension in principle. “We must not place Kant’s merit in this, that he 
put the forms, as expressed in the categories, into the human cognitive faculty.” (Hegel, 1802b: 79; cf. 72-
3) His view then is that nature arises and is maintained always through the activity of the infinite I, and 
this is his path to the right to say, as Kant couldn’t, ‘yes, the finite I’s passivity in the relation causing all 
the trouble negates the claim that it is active here, but since the activity through which nature arises is not 
that of the finite I, this relation is still natural, and categories, e.g. causation, may well be applied.’  
111
 Engstrom, 2006: 19. 
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under a unity alien to its existence prior to that cognition, but attains to a cognition that is in 
“agreement with its object”.112 Thus does Hegel’s philosophy “recompense nature for the 
mishandling that it suffered in Kant and Fichte’s systems.”113 
The infinite I is the I that is not finite. Kant’s I is, or ought be, that through which all true 
distinguishing is possible. It thus ought to be infinite, not related to any other prior to its activity 
but only so related through its own activity. If the forms of combination (the categories) are 
thought, as properly they should be, as belonging to this infinite I, they cannot be said to belong 
to the subject over the object, for there is no object ‘over,’ i.e. distinguished from the subject 
prior to this I’s activity. They are not ‘mere thought forms’114 but, as belonging to an ‘I’ prior to 
the distinguishing of the subject from its object (from being), ought rather be called ‘thought-
being forms’. If our category theory takes on this Hegelian perspective, which is made possible 
by abandoning the Kantian ‘point of view of man’ where this registers the standpoint of the finite 
I, then it will be possible to “equate the form of the world and the form of thought without 
representing reality as a shadow of something self-standingly subjective”.115 We should then be 
able to see the benefit, as Longuenesse couldn’t, of Hegel’s “paradoxical gesture of leaning on 
Kant’s “Copernican Revolution” in order to return to a philosophical project that seems to hark 
                                                 
112
 This is “the nominal definition of truth” which Kant grants and presupposes at A58/B82, only to forget 
it and define truth not as the agreement between two terms but as the content (merely one end of the 
agreement relation) by the end of the page (A58-9/B83). See Hegel, 1812/16: 593. For the ‘violence’ 
claim, see any of the texts where Hegel attacks Kant’s ‘instrument’ view of cognition, classically, 1807:  
§§73-4.  
113
 Hegel, 1801: 83. 
114
 ‘Mere forms of thought’ is a phrase often used by Kant, long before and also in the Critique, in the 
context of his critique of rationalism.  
115
 McDowell, “Conceptual Capacities in Perception”, in 2009a: 143. 
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back to that of that very rational metaphysics whose possibility Kant believed he had definitely 
eliminated.”116 
Finally, consider Hegel’s ordering in the Encyclopedia: (A) Science of Logic, (B) 
Philosophy of Nature, (C) Philosophy of Spirit. This ordering reflects what I pointed to earlier 
(p.4) as the fact that Hegel’s philosophy can be understood as ‘the developed contradiction’ of 
Kant (the contradiction between the reflective and speculative syllogisms we’ve laid out). 
Hegel’s philosophy takes this basic structural form through his removing from Kant’s best 
thoughts, those in the Deduction explaining the possibility of truth (the speculative sequence), 
the interfering acquisition-priority through which Kant misguidedly acknowledges our finitude. 
Hegel relegates this later to the natural relation that is posterior to, and hence cleared away from, 
the “derivation of the real, if we want to call it derivation,”117 of nature as it is in itself from the 
‘thought-being’ forms that constitute the essence both of nature and of finite I’s. The now 
hygienic sequence of thought reflected in the three stages of Hegel’s encyclopedia is: the 
categories make nature possible (science of logic  philosophy of nature), whilst nature in turn 
makes possible the finite I (philosophy of nature  philosophy of spirit). The finite I is now 
conceived as thoroughly natural; all of the finite I is conceived of as arising through nature; its 
natural being exhausts its being. Hegel thus achieves a more gratifying acknowledgement of our 
finitude than Kant: Kant places the finite I prior to nature, in that the cognitive faculty or unity of 
consciousness of the finite I’s transcendental (non-natural) self makes nature possible. Hegel, by 
contrast, places the finite I posterior to nature, in that for him - as, one hopes, for us - nature 
makes the finite I possible.  
 
                                                 
116
 Longuenesse, 2007: 217. 
117
 Hegel, 1812/16: 591. 
 82 
3.0       PROLEGOMENA TO THE ARGUMENT FOR THE EXISTENCE OF MAN: 
TOWARDS SATISFACTION OF THE CENTRAL CONDITION OF THE POSSIBILITY 
OF A HEGELIAN AGE OF (ANALYTIC?) PHILOSOPHY 
3.1 ON THE POSSIBILITY OF A HEGELIAN AGE OF ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY 
Bob Brandom has called for a Hegelian age of analytic philosophy,
118
 but there are reasons, one 
big reason in particular, to doubt its possibility. That big reason, the central, at least apparent 
contradiction between analytic and Hegelian Philosophy, is between the essential atheism of 
analytic philosophy on the one side, and Hegel’s “ever-renewed insistence that he means to 
reinstate metaphysics as knowledge of God” on the other.119 We shall consider this major 
stumbling block in the course of this essay, but its dissolution, necessary so that a Hegelian age 
of analytic philosophy may come to be, will only be undertaken in a future work, the 
forthcoming The Argument for the Existence of Man (AFTEM), for which this paper constitutes 
the Prolegomena. Here, we’ll examine and refute some candidate reasons for thinking that 
analytic and Hegelian philosophy can be brought into connection. In the process of doing so, and 
                                                 
118
 See Brandom, 2000: 32-3.   
119
 Longuenesse, 2007: 190. Compare Schopenhauer’s lyrical expression of the same, in the text from his On the 
Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason that he quotes in his own anonymous Review of the Work: “That 
a miserable fellow like Hegel, whose entire philosophy is nothing but a monstrous amplification of the ontological 
proof, should dare to defend this proof against Kant’s criticism of it, is an alliance of which the ontological proof 
itself, little as it knows of shame, might well feel ashamed.” (From the “Appendix” to Schopenhauer, 1819: 268)  
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for the sake of being able to properly distinguish between the so-called Humean, Kantian, and 
Hegelian ages of analytic philosophy, we’ll specify in the process the distinct essences of these 
three philosophical systems. 
There are considerations to be found in favor of the possibility of a Hegelian age of 
analytic philosophy, and before proceeding to the deeper problem standing in the way of such a 
thing, with these we shall begin. From its origin in its opposition to both British Hegelianism and 
Heideggerian ontology on, analytic philosophy has been essentially “anti-metaphysical”, or more 
determinately “anti-ontological”. With these terms we refer primarily to analytic philosophy’s 
positing itself as posterior to natural science, by which I mean the following: the truth about 
nature is the business of the natural sciences. Philosophy may do many things, some of which 
will be drawing upon and even clarifying the results of the natural sciences, but to challenge 
natural science about nature is verboten.
120
 Natural science is responsible for ontology. 
                                                 
120
 The sense here defined for “posterior” and with it “prior” will be in play throughout the essay. The move to the 
Kantian age of analytic philosophy, as we’ll see when examining Kant’s thesis that the unity necessary for the 
subject’s self-consciousness makes (scientific too) experience, or equivalently nature, possible, already negates this 
priority at least semi-essential to analytic philosophy. Now in arriving at “a philosophy that will recompense nature 
for the mishandling that it suffered in Kant’s and Fichte’s systems” (Hegel, 1801: 83), Hegel negates Kant’s anti-
naturalism (the nature of which will be displayed along with his (Kant’s) conception of nature). In negating Kant’s 
negation of the priority of natural science to ontology as understood by analytic philosophy, Hegel’s philosophy 
affirms again what Kant denied, the coincidence of nature and being. Our question concerning the possibility of a 
Hegelian age of analytic philosophy then becomes: is the sense in which Hegel affirms nature to coincide with being 
compatible with analytic philosophy, or does it destroy its essence?  
 On our way to the contradiction announced in opening we’ll be suggesting that analytic philosophy might 
perhaps be essentially Humean. This will be the case if the priority of the natural sciences to philosophy concerning 
the truth about nature is constitutive of analytic philosophy’s essence, for an authentically (merely) Kantian age 
already properly negates, and an authentically Hegelian one would thoroughly destroy this priority. Our question 
then is whether an analytic philosophy of this new (Hegelian) naturalism, freed and thoroughly distinguished from 
the system of analytic philosophy articulated through the specified priority, is possible.  
Brandom and his Hegel’s affirmation that we must ‘distinguish the alethic modal vocabularies from the 
deontic normative vocabularies’, however, is an affirmation of this priority of natural science to philosophy. 
Assuming Brandom’s Hegel endorses Brandom’s moves in the game of giving and asking for reasons, Brandom’s 
Hegel’s philosophy doesn’t thoroughly destroy but rather solidifies this priority relation, for when the (by our to-be-
revealed lights) more authentically Kantian and Hegelian Sellars spoke against this (dare I say it) dogma, for 
example by challenging quantum physicists concerning the nature of time, Brandom judges him “crazy”, and not 
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Philosophy, therefore, is not. Let us call analytic philosophy’s ceding the truth about nature to 
the natural sciences analytic naturalism, and the conception of nature it operates with analytic 
nature.
121
 It is, perhaps, the fourth dogma of empiricism. We shall meet alternatives to this brand 
of naturalism as we move along.  
 
There is no clear line between philosophy and science. Where there are no fixed 
boundaries, only the timid never risk trespass.          (Davidson, 2001a: 251) 
 
This dogma that nature is what the natural sciences tell us it is is at least semi-essential to 
analytic philosophy. This is revealed by the fact that what we’ve just determined as “analytic 
naturalism” appears within analytic philosophy in the main merely as “naturalism”. That the 
abbreviation is not merely verbal, but that, rather, its roots go deep, is revealed in the following 
circumstance: It is central to John McDowell’s philosophy to attach the dogma in question. This 
philosophy, however, appears to many within analytic philosophy as little more than a 
proposition known already to be false. Thus, despite his everywhere affirming and explaining his 
commitment to naturalism, resistance to his philosophy is articulated around the thought that it 
constitutes a “supernaturalism”. Now, the thought that nature is all there is, the unequivocal 
commitment to explain and comprehend thought as a natural phenomenon, and with these the 
inference from supernaturalism to falsity, we may leave in place. The inference from analytic 
                                                                                                                                                             
because of the details of the account, but precisely because it takes the form of a philosopher’s challenge to natural 
science concerning ontology. It is a problem then for Brandom that “In philosophy,” according to the Hegel to 
whom his account answers, “the actual and the temporal as such disappear” (Hegel, 1802: 66). In leaving this at-
least-semi-essential-to-analytic-philosophy priority in place, in philosophizing through it rather than, as McDowell 
does, against it (see text below), Brandom’s Hegel is determined as belonging to the Humean age of Analytic 
philosophy, the nature of which shall be explained soon.  
121
 This is the conception of nature the “bald naturalism” appearing in Mind and World works with.  
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naturalism to the falsity of McDowell’s philosophy, however, is purely dogmatic.122 One 
wonders whether, when McDowell dares to affirm an ontological proposition contra the natural 
sciences - “there are colors” - Brandom doesn’t secretly think him crazy too (see n.2 above).123  
If the priority relation affirmed by analytic naturalism is essential to analytic philosophy, 
is a Hegelian age possible for it? It might appear as if Hegel’s thought is positively suited for this 
relation, for in one expression of an element of his thought that is, in truth, as we’ll see, “of the 
first importance in appreciating his philosophical advance over Kant”124 and Fichte, Hegel 
writes,  
 
Not only must philosophy be in agreement with our empirical knowledge of Nature, but 
the origin and formation of the Philosophy of Nature presupposes and is conditioned by 
empirical physics.
125
 
 
Brandom, taking Sellars’ attempt to move “analytic philosophy from its humean phase 
into a kantian one”126 to be in the bag, goes in for this appearance, and in his own goal to “make 
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 “In a Kantian spirit, we can refuse to accept that the structure of the realm of freedom can be naturalized in the 
sense of the first approach – that is, insist that Sellars’s contrast is well taken – but disown a commitment to 
supernaturalism by holding that what the modern scientific revolution yielded was clarity about the realm of law, 
and that is not the same as clarity about nature” (McDowell, 2009b: 261). 
123
 Cf. McDowell’s comment against Davidson, which counts too against Brandom’s ascription of the normative to 
the “deontological”, 2009a: 213: “I think making sense of people is a case of finding out how things are”.  
124
 Brandom (talking about something else), “Mediating the Immediate” p.4 (ch.4 of A Spirit of Trust, forthcoming). 
We’ll need to see what Kant’s conception of nature is before the nature of Hegel’s advance on it, through the 
moment of his thinking referred to here, can be explicated.  
125
 Hegel, 1830: 6. In all quotes, italics indicates emphasis in the original, emboldened emphasis is my own. 
Hegel’s words here speak especially to Fichte’s claims in the First Introduction (Fichte, 1982: 27): Hegel’s “not 
only” clause picks up Fichte’s pronouncement, “A philosophy whose results do not agree with experience is surely 
false, for it has not fulfilled its promise to deduce the entirely of experience and to explain it on the basis of the 
necessary action of the intellect.” His saying ‘not only that but also this’ (“the Philosophy of Nature presupposes…”) 
represents his divergence from Fichte the meaning of which we’re setting to investigate, so that we can determine 
whether or not Hegel’s meaning here coheres with what is perhaps essential to analytic philosophy.   
126
 Brandom, 2000: 32. 
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possible a further transition from a kantian to a hegelian approach to thought and action”127 has 
no trouble explicating Quinean and Hegelian philosophy in the same breath.  
Now Quinean naturalism is, of course, a radical endorsement of the priority of natural 
science to philosophy on the question of the being of nature; it is the paradigmatic analytic 
naturalism. To combine Hegel with an uncriticized Quine, however, is surely a “false synthetic 
union”.128 How thoroughly distinguished Quinean naturalism is from a comprehension of 
nature’s being true to the thought of Kant and Hegel is made clear by McDowell in Part I of his 
“Afterword” to Mind and World.129  
To place this lesson, we shall now begin our presentation of the essential differences 
between the systems of Hume, Kant and Hegel. Beginning with the essential difference between 
Hume and Kant will allow us to recognize the sense in which analytic philosophy may well be 
essentially Humean. In using the terms ‘essentially’ and ‘essential differences’ here we mean to 
indicate the worry that analytic philosophy grounds itself in a conception of thinking that was 
positively and self-consciously affirmed by Hume, but that it was Kant’s self-conscious and 
unique philosophical purpose to completely overcome. McDowell’s criticism of Quine, we’ll 
show, authentically tracks Kant’s relation to Hume here, and unambiguously ‘relegates’ Quine to 
the Humean stage – should there be others – of analytic philosophy.130 We shall buttress our 
worry about analytic philosophy being essentially Humean by showing how analytic Kants 
(Allison and (much less so, but still) Longuenesse) and analytic Hegels (Pippin, Brandom, 
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 Brandom, 2000: 32-3.  
128
 Hegel, 1840: 280.  
129
 McDowell, 1996: 129-35, some of which will be cited below.  
130
 I place scare quotes on ‘relegate’ because this is of course in itself no slight to the committed Humean Quine: “on 
the doctrinal side, I do not see that we are farther along today than where Hume left us. The Humean predicament is 
the human predicament.” (Quine, 1960: 72; cf. 74, 76). .  
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Redding, et al. ‘non-metaphysical’ Hegels) all fail to break free from the Humean conception of 
what thinking is. 
As we move on to the essential difference between Kant’s and Hegel’s systems, we’ll be 
entering (or proposing, at least), new territory for (modern) philosophy. Hegel saw, with 
Schelling’s help, that the new standpoint philosophy had achieved for itself demanded 
conceiving the corrected transcendental philosophy of Kant and Fichte as “one, and only one of 
the two integrating sciences of philosophy”.131 Correspondingly, I’ll be arguing that McDowell’s 
releasing (analytic?) philosophy from its near-essential-to-it conceding of what nature is to the 
disenchanting natural sciences demands, for the preservation of this standpoint against its 
opponents (inc. Allison, Friedman, Pippin, Brandom… and perhaps analytic philosophy itself), a 
philosophical engagement with the natural sciences analogous to Hegel’s philosophy of 
nature.
132
 We’ll then be in possession of the authentic Hegelian thought behind the quote above 
that we imagined Brandom taking to suggest a coherence of Hegel’s thinking with analytic 
philosophy’s conception of its relation to natural science. Though such a suggestion will, of 
course, be thoroughly destroyed, in connection with the resolution of the “central contradiction” 
mentioned in opening, I’ll go on to suggest ways in which a beast such as a philosophy of nature 
might yet be amenable to analytic philosophy - though the owl, of course, flies only at dusk.  
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 Hegel, 1801: 162.  
132
 Friedman has already suggested McDowell’s commitment to a Schellingian philosophy of nature. That this 
appears as a reduction ad absurdum against McDowell reveals what’s discernible anyway, Friedman’s 
unquestioning commitment to a Humean conception of nature.  
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3.2 HUME’S ATHEISTIC NATURALISM 
The essence of Hume’s powerful thinking that so deeply influenced Kant133 begins with Hume’s 
thought that the only law thought (reason) has to work with a priori is that through which it 
determines things conceivable or inconceivable, for with only itself to work with, thought can 
only determine what is possible for it, i.e. what is possible and impossible for it to conceive. The 
law through which thought through itself distinguishes what is conceivable from what is not is 
called, alternately, the law of contradiction, of agreement, or of identity. It’s merely the law 
through which thought determines what is and isn’t possible for it. If we can continue conceiving 
the subject of a proposition as that subject whilst denying of it the predicate, then both the 
proposed proposition and its contrary are conceivable. The proposition is then synthetic (for 
Hume a “matter of fact”134), and this its very syntheticity, by Hume’s quite plausible line of 
thought, indicates that any attempt to affirm such a proposition a priori (i.e. from what is 
possible for thought) must of necessity “be entirely arbitrary”.135 For each and every proposition 
determinable by the one and only simple law of thought itself as synthetic, then, the only possible 
rational ground for affirming such a connection over its contrary could be experience. 
Let us imagine now that Hume thought for the whole set of Kant’s categories what he 
thought for the concept of cause:
136
 that it is impossible to think about the world, that which by 
Hume’s thinking is absolutely other than thought, without them;137 that they are, as Kant calls 
                                                 
133
 See the Prolegomena, Kant, 1783: 257: “since the origin of metaphysics so far as we know its history, nothing 
has ever happened which could have been more decisive to its fate than the attack made upon it by David Hume.”  
134
 Hume, 1748: 15. 
135
 Hume, 1748: 18. 
136
 “All reasonings concerning matter of fact seem to be founded on the relation of Cause and Effect. By means of 
that relation alone we can go beyond the evidence of our memory and senses.” (Hume, 1748: 16).  
137
 Kant imagines a similar generalization at Kant, 1783: 310.  
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them, “subjective conditions of thinking”.138 It’ll be important to keep in mind the fact that, for 
Hume, that which he affirms as the necessary conditions of the possibility of thought about the 
world – cause and, by our imagined extension, all the categories – do not pertain to thought as 
such. As we’ve explained, only the (variously named) law of conceivability pertains for Hume to 
thought as such. Although the concept of cause is absolutely necessary to move beyond that 
which is immediately sensed or remembered, i.e. is absolutely necessary to thinking about the 
world, each thing is conceivable independently of its causal relations, thus the connection 
thought in it is not a connection pertaining to thought as such.
139
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 A89/B122; cf. A125.  
139
 I’ve here stressed the importance of Hume’s claim that this is not a connection pertaining to thought for the sake 
of the contrast to be drawn between the essences of Humean, Kantian and Hegelian philosophy. Here’s a quick 
preview. Kant, we’ll see, redeems the objective validity of the necessity thought in the connections he agrees with 
Hume are synthetic, i.e. Kant explains why the presented world must of necessity be in agreement with these 
synthetic thought-connections necessary for thinking of the world. (We’ll see how.) This redeemed comprehension 
of why the world presented to us is in agreement with thought’s necessity – the redeemed objective validity of the 
subjective conditions of thinking – marks a significant break from the absolute heterogeneity crucial to Hume of that 
which pertains to thought as such and is thereby analytic (Hume’s “Relations of Ideas” (Hume, 1748: 15)) and that 
which pertains to the world as such. 
 This significant break, however, doesn’t complete itself in a view that sees the a priori synthetic unity of 
the form of thought and the form of the world effected by Kant in the Deduction as pertaining to thought as such and 
thereby essential to it. (See what Hegel says about the term “synthetic unity” at Hegel, 1802: 70-1.) Transcendental 
logic, the pure thinking of objects, requires for Kant something other than thought for the possibility of its affirming 
a priori its connections for all objects. The principles are thus synthetic a priori judgments for Kant, i.e. affirm 
connections that go beyond thought as such (are not analytic), because the pure intuitions through which alone these 
judgments are possible are not thoughts, not part of reason. Their unity is the unity of thought (B162-4), but the 
forms of intuition that ‘realize’ (B187) thought’s unity pertain to our sensible nature, and are contingencies thereof.   
As we progress to the essential difference between the Kantian and Hegelian systems, we’ll learn how and why Kant 
cannot allow his identity of the form of thought (category) with the unity of the form of intuition to become an 
identity of the category and the form of intuition that itself receives a manifold.  Beck and Fichte affirmed the latter 
as necessary for making sense of Kant, for the denial of the latter claim coinciding with the former implies that the 
object from which the form of intuition receives its manifold is a thing in itself, an affirmation they knew to 
contradict the system. (See my “The Critique’s Contradiction as the Key to Post-Kantianism”.) Through an 
examination of Kant’s repudiation of Beck and Fichte and of Hegel’s endorsement of the latter’s “more consistent 
development” of transcendental idealism against Kant (Hegel, 1812/16: 27), we’ll make explicit the evolution of the 
above Kantian thought into Hegel’s claim that “what with him is transcendental logic”, i.e. a logic needing 
something other than thought to go beyond itself and being thereby synthetic, comes with Hegel to pertain to 
“thought as such” (Hegel, 1812/16: 62; cf. p.63). We’ll then be able to comprehend how Hegel is signaling the 
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This externality of the connection thought in the concept of cause to thought as such is 
the very thing that’s expressed in saying that the connection thought through this concept is 
synthetic. When conjoined with his observation into the syntheticity of the propositions that 
require affirming should it be possible to learn from experience (see a few pages below), Hume’s 
simple yet powerful observation of the paragraph above lays to waste, to both Hume and Kant’s 
thinking, the very idea that we humans even possess such a thing as a faculty of understanding in 
the way in which the rationalists conceived it.
140
 Such a faculty would be capable of arriving at 
the truth, the agreement of would-be cognitions with that which they claim to be of (“an object 
corresponding to and therefore also distinct from the cognition”141), and the rationalists are at 
one in affirming our ability to know through this faculty its ability to arrive at the truth. They all 
affirm, as Kant will again in response to Hume, that we can know a priori that the subjective 
conditions of thought have objective validity. 
                                                                                                                                                             
essential difference between the Hegelian and Kantian systems when he counters Kant’s thought that his a priori 
judgments affirming the coincidence of the form of thought and the form of the world are synthetic: 
“How are synthetic judgments a priori possible? This problem expresses nothing else but the Idea that 
subject and predicate of the synthetic judgment are identical in the a priori way. That is to say, these heterogeneous 
elements, the subject which is the particular and in the form of being, and the predicate which is the universal and in 
the form of thought, are at the same time absolutely identical.” (Hegel, 1802: 69; cf. 72, 75-6, and 1812/16: 560: 
“through this identity of content [between cause and effect], this causality is an analytic proposition.”) 
 In the paragraph before this quote Hegel writes, “How are synthetic judgments a priori possible? Kant 
reproaches Hume for thinking of this task of philosophy with far too little definiteness and universality. This is 
exactly what happened to Kant himself.” By Hegel’s lights, then, when Kant affirms that “the problem upon which 
all depends” and with which “metaphysics stands or falls” (Kant, 1783: 276) asks after a synthetic connection, one 
not intrinsic to “thought as such” (Hegel, 1812/16: 62-3), he displays his residually Humean understanding of 
thought. (cf. Hegel’s association of Kant and Locke at Hegel, 1802: 68-9.) In comprehending Hegelian philosophy, 
then, i.e. its conception of what thinking is, we must comprehend how it distinguishes itself from Hume and Kant 
together by denying their claim that the form of thought’s a priori identity with the form of the world doesn’t 
pertain to thought as such.  
140
 The essence of Kantianism, we’ll see, is to redeem the thought that we possess an understanding: he thinks 
Hume’s critique lays to waste existent (rationalist) explanations of the possibility of this. 
141
 CPR, A104.  
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Descartes’ proof of the existence of a non-deceiving God in the Third Meditation 
precedes and grounds his proof that thought is in agreement with the world. This, Leibniz’s 
philosophy, and the first proposition of Spinoza’s Ethics all show that the rationalist or 
metaphysical tradition is at one in deriving our knowledge of our capacity for truth from that 
which they all affirm as necessarily preceding it: knowledge of God.
142
 Descartes’ Cogito is akin 
to God’s knowledge of all things in that in both cases the object known is not external to but 
rather identical with the subject knowing it. It’s important for Descartes that my Idea of an 
intellect for whom all its objects are, like my knowledge of my own existence, not external to 
this intellect’s knowing of them, precedes my understanding of myself as a being that, as finite, 
hopes to know things that are external to it. The following observation was important for 
Spinoza who, like Hegel (we’ll be investigating how), places God at the beginning of his system.  
 
And I must not think that… my perception of the infinite is arrived at not by means of a 
true idea but merely by negating the finite. On the contrary, I clearly understand that there is 
more reality in an infinite substance than in a finite one, and hence that my perception of the 
infinite, that is God, is in some way prior to my perception of the finite, that is myself. For how 
could I understand that I doubted or desired – that is, that I lacked something – and that I was not 
wholly perfect, unless there were in me some idea of a more perfect being which enabled me to 
recognize my own defects by comparison.
143
 
  
The rationalists’ shared conception of the human understanding as a faculty cognizably 
capable of hitting upon the truth about nature, of knowing its would-be cognitions of nature to be 
in agreement with nature as it is outside of our thinking about it, is in all three cases grounded on 
the thought that the relation of man’s thinking to nature, which here focuses on this concern with 
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 See Descartes’ “Synopsis” of the meditations: “the certainty even of geometrical demonstrations depends on the 
knowledge of God.” (Descartes, 1641: 75) 
143
 Descartes, 1641: 93-4. Cf. Spinoza, Ethics, II Prop 10, Schol: some are in error because “they believed that the 
divine nature, which they should have contemplated before all else (because it is prior both in knowledge and in 
nature) is last in the order of knowledge and in nature”. 
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the agreement between the posits of our thought and the thing in itself, is only explicable through 
a prior account of man’s relation to God. Now for Descartes and Leibniz, this God is a being 
other than nature, the cause of nature standing outside it, whilst for Spinoza this God is nature 
which, rather than causing something other than itself, is merely “cause of itself”.144 This 
difference, we’ll see, will be crucial for grasping the essential difference between Kantian and 
Hegelian philosophies, and for articulating the possibility of an authentic Hegelian age of 
analytic philosophy: the crucial-to-Hegel sections of the Critique of Judgment (Kant, 1790a: 
§§69-78) reveal how important the idea of a God distinct from and causing nature is to Kant; it is 
here that we find the radically anti-naturalistic thrust of his “critique [of] knowledge to make 
room for faith” (Bxxx). Hegel critiques faith to make room for knowledge in Faith and 
Knowledge and after through a defense of Spinozistic naturalism against Kant’s anti-naturalism. 
In the fact that Hegel’s Spinozism is a naturalism lies the possibility of a Hegelian analytic 
philosophy. The very fact that Hegel defends Spinoza against Kant, whose critique of Hume he 
of course endorses, suggests what shall be expounded: how radically we must break from our 
conceding-nature-to-the-natural-sciences Humean naturalism to achieve a properly Hegelian 
naturalism.   
Descartes’ thinking about the relation of man’s thinking to nature takes on a certain form 
owing to his thinking a God separated from nature as the author of both this nature and man’s 
rational faculties (his intellect and will). It affects his supposedly “pure” philosophical researches 
by enticing him to continuing assuming (or dogmatically affirming, perhaps), even whilst 
radically doubting, the finite mind as a substance - something capable of activity through itself. 
                                                 
144
 Ethics, Book I, D1. See Hegel’s discussion of this definition in Hegel, 1840: 258. 
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Descartes’ radical doubt is asymmetrical, and thereby incomplete, in the following way. 
He doubts whether my representations of external objects are in fact, as I take them to be, caused 
by external objects: I think this because they appear independently of my will, but there may be 
(the reason for doubt) an unknown faculty within me producing these representations, similarly 
to the case of dreaming. Thus the fact is doubted, and as mentioned above only redeemed 
through the Idea of an infinite intellect for whom these same objects are not, as is the case with 
my intellect, external to it. Descartes doesn’t doubt, however, whether my freedom to affirm or 
deny propositions isn’t likewise mere appearance. While he does wonder whether there isn’t a 
cause inside me producing my representations of external objects, he doesn’t wonder whether 
there’s a cause outside me producing my representations of internal objects: he doesn’t doubt the 
reality of his “faculty of choice or freedom of the will”, the freedom to choose (e.g. to follow 
reason or not), and to affirm or deny.
145
  
Just as God stands sovereign over and separate from his creation (nature), so Descartes 
assumes man’s mind (intellect, will), authored by this same God, as something standing over and 
thereby separated from this nature. On behalf of seeking a more naturalistic conception of our 
mindedness, both Hume and Spinoza deny the actuality of that which Descartes, even when 
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 Like Descartes, Kant and Hegel affirm that the freedom to choose this or that is a low grade of freedom, and that 
we are freest in doing the one thing reason determines us to do. This ought not lead us, however (as Dennett is led 
by Luther’s “I could do no other” in Dennett, 1984), to think that the freedom to be found in performing the unique 
action reason prescribes isn’t impossible if we concede nature to be none other than the order of mechanically 
determining causes. We certainly shouldn’t think that Kant and Hegel think freedom is possible if we make this 
concession, and thereby deny ourselves the ability to do otherwise. (See that Brandom (e.g. Brandom, 2009: ch.2.) 
and Pippin (Pippin, 2008: 38) do.) In Hegel’s affirmation of the coincidence in nature of mechanical and teleological 
causes, there is indeed an overcoming of Fichte’s opposition of transcendental idealism and scientific materialism 
(see next note). What is not contained therein – what there would have to be if Pippin and Brandom were right - is 
Hegel’s complete rejection of Fichte’s claim that determinism leads to the annihilation of the I / the normative. As 
we’ll see below, however, the Humean annihilation of the I, so explicit also in Quine, has a positive moment and 
motivation which our philosophy will preserve. Hegel’s philosophy, I claim in the next section, accommodates this 
positive sense for the annihilation of the I better than Hume’s philosophy itself. This is all, of course, in the service 
of proving the possibility and necessity of a Hegelian age of a near-essentially Humean analytic philosophy.  
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doubting radically, doesn’t bring into doubt: the activity of the I .146 They both deny the 
distinction between intellect, that which produces beliefs, and will. They both deny that the finite 
mind is a substance.
147
 They both affirm the mind in its thinking to be thoroughly determined by 
nature.  
There is an important base of agreement here, in that both responses affirm, contra 
Descartes, the necessity of explicating thinking nature through its community with, rather than 
through its supposed distinction from, the order of nature. Despite these agreements, there is a 
radical difference between these naturalisms, and it is crucial to our project to take note of them. 
Hume opposed Descartes from the standpoint of an atheistic naturalism, whilst Spinoza does so 
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 Fichte writes, “the system of idealism begins by presupposing the activity of the representing subject; whereas 
dogmatism considers the behavior of this same subject to be passive” (Fichte, 1992: 93). In affirming the freedom or 
activity of the I as his first principle, i.e. something presupposed rather than explained, Fichte’s philosophy is akin to 
Descartes: “Descartes… put forward a similar proposition” to the Wissenschaftslehre’s “absolutely basic principle 
of all knowledge” (Fichte, 1982: 100). Starting from the thought that freedom is impossible if my representations are 
caused by objects outside of me (things in themselves), Fichte aims to justify freedom by deducing from it 
(justifying) our representations of things, justifying and explaining also the fact that we posit “a thing that would 
exist even if I did not entertain a representation of it” (Fichte, 1992: 87). The latter is “the opposite” (Fichte, 1992: 
106) of what’s affirmed from idealism’s transcendental point of view (the non-independence of the represented 
object), though the two statements do not contradict each other due to the different standpoints from which they are 
made (the object’s externality is a necessary posit from the practical point of view). Unlike Descartes’ assumption 
of freedom, then, Fichte’s whole philosophy is concerned with opposing the determinist philosophy that opposes 
their similar first principles. The determinist claims that sensible representations are only possibly explicable 
through the affirmation of affection by a thing in itself, and Fichte, taking this to make freedom impossible, 
undermines this undermining of freedom indirectly, by explaining the same thing (the necessity of our positing our 
sensible representations as in relation to an object existing independently of us) through freedom itself. (Thus by 
Fichte’s lights Descartes’ own sixth meditation undermines their shared assumption of an active (free) I.) As Hegel 
explains in the Difference essay and Faith and Knowledge , however, Fichte doesn’t oppose dogmatism (= 
materialism, determinism) upon the method Hegel recommends at 1812/16: 580: “the true system cannot have the 
relation to it of being merely opposed to it… On the contrary, the true system as the higher, must contain the 
subordinate system within itself” . (This picks up on Hegel’s critique of Fichte in the Difference essay; see esp. 
1801: 115, where one finds the clue to the Master / Slave dialectic in the Phenomenology.) Hegel is discussing his 
Science of Logic Book II absorbing of (the determinist) Spinoza here, and indeed, Schelling and Hegel’s equipoising 
of transcendental idealism with the Spinoza-inspired philosophy of nature sublates Spinoza’s critique of Descartes 
for German Idealism. 
147
 Hume, 1748: 135. Curley, 1994: xix. 
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from the standpoint of a theistic naturalism.
148
 This is important for how Hegel will defend 
Spinoza’s conception of nature against Kant’s. An appreciation of the radical difference between 
Hume’s atheistic and Spinoza’s theistic naturalism, then, will be essential to making explicit the 
essential differences between Humean, Kantian, and Hegelian philosophies – an explicitness not 
to be found, to my mind, in Brandom’s so-called Hegelianism and its simple coherence with 
Quineanism.
149
  
Spinozism affirms and purports to explain the necessity of the world’s existence, the 
necessity of it and all its parts existing exactly as they do, and thus (what follows will be 
particularly important points of contrast) the necessity of the human intellect both being as it is 
and thinking what it will think. As (with Hegel, perhaps) the rationalist par excellence, he 
attributes to thought (the intellect) the power of knowing, which for Spinoza is comprehending 
(through thought itself) the necessity of,
150
 why there’s anything, rather than nothing at all.151 
What excited Schelling and Hegel so about Spinoza’s positing of nature itself as also the infinite 
intellect is the way this puts rational or knowing thinking, thinking that grasps necessity, back 
into nature.
152
 Spinoza’s great achievement, to their thinking, is his explaining the rationalist 
conception of thought’s (the understanding’s) ability to know things in themselves 
naturalistically.   
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 As Curley notes (Curley, 1994: xxi, n.8), “Spinoza deeply resented” the charge of atheism that of course, like 
Fichte, dogged his life (see Fichte’s response in his Fichte, 2005: 69). Hegel defends Spinoza against Jacobi’s 
charge of atheism at Hegel 1840: 280-2.  
149
 We shall limit our concern with Spinoza to that which is required to make comprehensible the character of the 
Hegelian naturalism that arises through Hegel’s use of Spinoza against Kant’s anti-naturalism.   
150
 ‘Knowledge is knowledge of causes’, says Spinoza, and as Kant (contra Hume) affirms, “The meaning of the 
concept of cause is, if a thing be posited, something else also must necessarily be posited” (A92/B122-3; Kant, 
1783: 257 (discussing Hume)). 
151
 See Brandom, 1994: xxi. Curley points out (Curley, 1994: xix) that Spinoza “will have none of Descartes’ claim 
that the coherence of God’s preordination and human freedom surpasses the human understanding.”  
152
 Spinoza, letter 32: “But as far as the human mind is concerned, I think it is a part of Nature too. For I maintain 
that there is also in Nature an infinite power of thinking.”  
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In complete contrast to this, Hume’s atheistic naturalism seeks to destroy this rationalist 
conception of thought (the understanding; the intellect) that Spinoza sought to preserve and 
explain naturalistically. Thus the necessity of thought’s agreement with the world that achieves 
its peak in Spinoza and his German Idealist successors, is laid to utter destruction by Hume. It’s 
to this destruction, Hume’s argument for radical skepticism, to which we now turn.  
Recall the observation above that thought’s only law concerns only what’s conceivable 
for it, the law of identity. Hume conjoins with this the further observation that the propositions 
that would ground our claim to know are synthetic. The connections between the particular 
causal judgments, ‘my eating the bread is the cause of the nourishment of my body’, ‘the first 
billiard ball’s motion is lawfully connected with the second’s’, and “the sun warms the stone”,153 
are synthetic. But further, the thought of causation is itself synthetic. Crucial to both Kant’s life-
long struggle with Hume’s thought and to Hegel’s response to Hume-Kant154 is the idea that 
grounds the thought that the concept ‘cause’ expresses a synthetic connection (one not pertaining 
to thought as such): that the cause and the effect are different things.  
 
The mind can never possibly find the effect in the supposed cause, by the most accurate 
scrutiny and examination. For the effect is totally different from the cause, and consequently 
can never be discovered in it. … In a word, then, every effect is a distinct event from its cause.   
      (Hume, 1748: 19) 
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 The first and second examples are from Hume, 1748: §4, the third from Kant, 1783: 41n.12, 44n.15.  
154
 See n.22 above. A crucial quote guiding our understanding of Hegel’s response to Kant-Hume on causality is 
Hegel, 1802: 90, where Hegel affirms as truth what Kant in Kant, 1790a: §§69-80, whilst affirming the necessity of 
his thinking it, denied the objective reality of. He “recognized that in and for itself it may be possible that the 
mechanism of nature, the relation of causality, is at one with nature’s teleological technique. This is not to say that 
nature is determined by an Idea opposite to it, but rather that what from the mechanistic point of view appears as 
absolutely sundered, one term as cause the other as effect in an empirical nexus of necessity, absolutely coheres 
within an original primordial identity.” 
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Since the only law thought can from itself affirm of things is that they not take predicates 
contradicting the very thought of those things, the syntheticity involved in thinking a thing as a 
cause or an effect of something else immediately implies for Hume that the thought of things as 
connected in this way could only arise from experience. The connection’s syntheticity implies 
that, as far as thought is concerned, the denial of the connection is just as probable as its 
affirmation. In 1766, Kant fully accepted Hume’s ascription of the origin of cause to experience.  
 
It is impossible for reason ever to understand how something can be a cause, or have a 
force; such relations can only be derived from experience. For our rule of reason only governs 
the drawing of comparisons in respect of identity and contradiction. If something is a cause, then 
something is posited by something else; there is not, however, any connection between the two 
things here which is based on agreement. Similarly, if I refuse to regard that same something as a 
cause [i.e. if I go to conceive the denial of the thought of causation itself], no contradiction will 
ever arise, for there is no contradiction in supposing that, if something is posited, something else 
is cancelled. It follows from this that if the fundamental concepts of things as causes, of powers 
and of actions are not derived from experience, then they are wholly arbitrary, and they admit of 
neither proof nor refutation.  
                     - “Dreams of a Spirit Seer,” in Allison et al., 2002: 356 (2:370). 
 
Though it doesn’t pertain to thought as such, Hume does affirm, we saw above, that the 
concept of cause and effect is necessary for the possibility of thinking about the world, and we 
imagined him affirming this for all Kant’s categories. If we concede (as even the critical Kant 
does, but Hegel doesn’t) that these subjective conditions of thinking a world are connections not 
pertaining to thought as such (are synthetic), and we further concede (as the pre-critical, but not 
the critical Kant does) the inference from the syntheticity of these connections to their only 
possible origin being experience, then Hume is home free in his destruction of the very idea of a 
human understanding. 
Hume affirms the necessity of my positing or expecting of this piece of bread that eating 
it will result in nourishment. If I expect this because I understand (know) that the eating of the 
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bread will be conjoined with this synthetically (non-derivable-from-thought) combined predicate 
I attach it to in my expectation, then it must be possible to supply a reason or ground for my 
thinking this. I must be able to give a ground or reason for the claim that my posit is in 
agreement with what will happen in the world (is true). This question concerning a ground or 
reason, the question quid juris?, is to be thoroughly distinguished – as it is not by Quine, among 
other moderns, as McDowell’s critique reveals155 - from an explanation of the fact of my having 
this expectation that answers the question ‘why do I think this?’ otherwise than by ascribing it to 
my understanding. We’ll meet Hume’s understanding-free answer to quid facti? soon below, 
after we’ve sketched his understanding-destroying argument that no answer to quid juris? is 
possible.
156
  
If I really know the synthetic connection expressed in the posit that this bread eating will 
cause my nourishment, if this positing is really to be an activity of an understanding rather than, 
as Hume will contend, my mind’s being passively determined by non-rational natural forces to 
                                                 
155
 See McDowell, 1996: 133. Quine in the main “rejects questions about the warrant for world views altogether” 
(McDowell, 2009b: 131), i.e. self-consciously abandons quid juris?, though not with complete consistency, as his 
talk of facing “the tribunal of experience” reveals.   
156
 Stroud asks how Kant’s transcendental idealist explanation of the possibility of a human understanding capable 
of truth through the claim that the phenomenal world “is somehow ‘constituted’ by the possibility of our thought and 
experience of it… differs, for example, from Hume’s view that we simply cannot avoid believing that every event 
has a cause, and cannot help acting for all the world as if it were true, but that it is not really true of the world as it is 
independently of us” (“Kantian Argument, Conceptual Capacities, and Invulnerability”, pp. 159-60; Quoted in 
McDowell, 2009b: 226). The difference will be made quite plain through our essential difference between Humean 
and Kantian philosophy. This modern failure to distinguish quid facti? from quid juris? is of a piece with the 
confusion over freedom noted above. Reason, should it exist, impels us theoretically towards one answer, just as it 
impels us towards one action practically: ‘there’s nothing else to think’ just as ‘I could do no other’. We can’t 
ascribe thought so led to an understanding or reason, however, if we don’t affirm the actual possibility of thinking 
otherwise, analogous to my claim for the practical case above. Hume understood this, which is why his affirmation 
of the passivity of belief, his claim that we are determined to think what we do by the circumstances, is part of his 
self-conscious destruction of the very idea of an understanding as thought by everyone before him. (Cf. the title of 
§9 of the Enquiry, “on the Reason of Animals”.) Against what Brandom thinks, I affirm (I believe on behalf of 
German Idealism) that one can’t possibly be responsible for what one thinks if it’s not (actually, physically, or 
metaphysically) possible to have thought or acted otherwise than as one does – if there aren’t branching histories.  
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expect such a thing, then I must have a reason for thinking that this synthetic connection will 
hold of this pending event.  
On the conceded premises, however, no such ground is possible. The connection between 
bread and nourishment is synthetic, which means that no a priori reason, ground, or justification 
is possible. The would-be reason for my expectation would then be my past experience of this 
synthetic connection. The problem, however, is that I only have a reason for affirming the 
expectation (this bread here will nourish), and I only have a reason for projecting the synthetic 
connections experienced in the past into the future in general, if I have a reason for affirming 
that the future will resemble the past. With the premises conceded, Hume proves the 
impossibility of there being a reason for this proposition.  
“These two propositions are far from being the same, I have found that such an object 
has always been attended with such an effect, and I forsee, that other objects which are, in 
appearance, similar, will be attended with similar effects.” The propositions are not identical, 
thus there is an inference from one to the other. What proposition or thought grounds this 
inference? Clearly, “the future will resemble the past”. Now: Quid juris this thought? With what 
right do I lay down this thought through which I posit the “has always been” synthetic 
connections as “will be” synthetic connections in the future? The thought the justification for 
which we’re here asking after grounds the very idea that I’m learning from experience, that I’m 
gaining knowledge about the world from it. But now, it is conceivable that the future will be 
entire anew; that all objects will tomorrow abandon all their (inc. causal) properties and enter 
into new synthetic connections.
157
 This follows simply from their being synthetic (not derivable 
                                                 
157
 “Since it implies no contradiction, that the course of nature may change, and that an object, seemingly like those 
we have experienced, may be attended with different or contrary effects” (this, and the paragraph’s other two quotes, 
from Hume, 1748: 22).  
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from the law of conceivability; outside thought) connections. Thought or reason is thus of itself 
powerless to distinguish “the future will resemble the past” from its contrary, and thus cannot of 
itself affirm the truth of either proposition. Reason, then, cannot justify the claim that would 
ground the rationality of, that would justify the thought that I am learning from, that would 
legitimize the common sense idea that an understanding benefits from, experience. But if reason 
(thought from itself) cannot justify or ground the proposition that itself grounds the rationality of, 
the idea that I’m learning from experience - if indeed the connection is synthetic (outside 
thought’s insight into itself) - then its only possible ground or reason could be experience. The 
only possible ground of the proposition that itself grounds the empirical, then, is empirical.  
 
That there is no argument of this kind must appear… [for] all our experimental 
[empirical] conclusions proceed upon the supposition, that the future will be conformable to the 
past. To endeavor, therefore, the proof of this last proposition by probable arguments, or 
arguments regarding existence, must be evidently going in a circle, and taking that for granted, 
which is the very point in question.         (Hume, 1848: 22-3) 
  
Hegel, the arch-rationalist, will preserve this radical anti-rationalism and synthesize it 
with its opposite through the following interpretation of the preceding argument: thought here 
has insight into the necessity of the fact that thought has absolutely no insight into that which is 
other than thought.
158
  
If the subjective conditions of the possibility of thinking the world are indeed, as Hume 
stresses and Kant concedes,
159
 external to thought as such (Hume and Kant agree they’re 
                                                 
158
 Compare Fichte, 1994: 48 and 195; Hegel, 1807: §233: “Reason is the certainty of consciousness that it is all 
reality”, etc. We suggest how Hegel completes Hume’s project in the next section.  
159
 And of course also stresses (see Kant, 1783: 257-61) and, we’ll see, forcefully adheres to: he sees the syntheticity 
of the connection slighted by Beck and Fichte, and thereby rejects them (see esp. the Dec 11 1797 letter to Tieftrunk 
(himself very Beckian-Fichtean: see Zweig, 1999: 531), Zweig, 1999: 536-9, especially 537. His affirmation of the 
syntheticity of the connections is, indeed, tied in with his denial of intellectual intuition. 
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synthetic connections), then by Hume’s argument they are thereby non-rational. They have no 
grounding in reason or thought. Hume’s naturalistic purpose in demonstrating the falsity of the 
claim these necessary conditions of thinking a world make to objective validity or truth
160
 is the 
annihilation of the separation between our thinking processes and the natural world. The thought 
of this separation that he seeks to annihilate owes its origin, as we said above, to the thought of a 
non-natural nature-authoring God authoring the human mind as this special ‘truth-and-freedom-
from-the-causal-order capable’ faculty. That the human understanding of the rationalists (the 
locus of thinking) is authored by God prevents comprehension of what Hume’s atheism – like 
ours (see below) - demands: its authorship by nature. This mode of thinking Hume opposes is of 
course most explicit in Descartes. Hume’s purpose in destroying the rationalist idea that thought 
itself authors or grounds the thoughts through which it must think a world is for the sake of 
affirming that it is the natural world which authors and, we’ll see, causes (but importantly for 
Hume, does not ground) the forms of thought through which we must think the world. His 
purpose, affirmed again with gusto in our own time (though somewhat less coherently: see 
below) by Quine, is to affirm that thought about the natural order is in no way outside this 
natural order.
161
  
The point of Hume’s destruction of the rationalist conception of the understanding, of his 
destruction of the possibility of an answer to the quid juris? question asked of the necessary 
conditions of the possibility of thinking a world, can be put this way: there is no normativity to 
thought. It is a necessary condition of the possibility of thought being normative that one could 
fail to conform to the norms to which thinking according to these norms ought to conform. This 
                                                 
160
 See Engstrom, “Kant on Truth, Judgment, and Objective Validity” (unpublished manuscript) for the affirmation 
that Kant equates objective validity and truth.   
161
 It’s important that Hume would have none of Quine’s talk of “man’s conceptual sovereignty”, which it was to 
Hume’s purpose to destroy.  
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stands opposed to Hume’s view, whereby, instead of a thought being a rational response to a 
rational norm - an action “the I or he or it that thinks”162 could fail to perform - thought is 
something that just happens in nature through the same law of mechanical causality articulating 
the rest of its products.
163
 If thought, knowing, intentionality, etc. are normative, then they are a 
function of the activity of the subject thinking, knowing, intending. Thus Hume’s anti-skeptical 
opponents all affirm the activity of thinking: we saw above Descartes’ unquestioned assumption 
of the activity of the mind (his assumption that the finite mind is a substance, a being capable of 
activity); likewise with Kant and, with much more explicit focus, Fichte, in explaining once 
again against Hume’s critique the possibility of a human understanding, activity is again 
affirmed as the essence of (as essential to) thinking.
164
 Hume’s critique on the very idea of 
                                                 
162
 CPR, A346, B404, and the title of a Sellars essay.  
163
 See notes 29 and 42 above. Thus McDowell sees that Quine’s “brutely causal linkages” (McDowell, 1996: 133) 
between experiences and the acceptance of statements can’t count as a rational action on the part of the subject 
accepting the statements, for, since brutely causal, the subject suffered the acceptance of the belief, rather than 
actively assented to it. In accordance with his Humeanism (see Quine, 1969: 72, quoted above), my coming to 
believe x is for Quine something that just happens, in accordance with the mechanically causal chain of nature; 
normativity (the freedom of thought [thought]) thereby drops out. McDowell’s criticism of Davidson’s conception of 
the world’s impact on the senses as “brutely causal” (McDowell, 2009b: 125, 134, 139) makes a different, though 
related point, which we’ll examine below. Rorty too affirms that “the world may cause us to be justified in believing 
a sentence true” (Rorty, 1989: 5), and his endorsement of “the Mendelian, mechanistic, account of natural selection” 
for its “let[ting] us see the mind as something which just happened” (16) is another expression of his deterministic, 
normativity-or-activity-of-thought / freedom destroying logos we’ll take issue with below. Brandom asks, “What 
else must be added to responsive classification to get to an activity recognizable as the application of concepts? … a 
normative dimension is required, which can underwrite a distinction between correct and incorrect applications of 
concepts” (Brandom, 1004: 87; cf. McDowell, 1996: x-xi). Brandom, however, contra Hegel at Hegel, 1802: 90, lets 
nature be “the causal order of nonnormative facts” (Brandom, 1994: 626). Contra Brandom, we shall find Kant and 
(also following Fichte: see the quote in the note below) Hegel both affirming the “activity… required... [to] 
underwrite a distinction between correct and incorrect application of concepts” to be impossible and a notion 
without truth if nature is, as it is with Brandom, conceived as a realm of determining causes merely mechanical.  
164
 A77/B103: “By synthesis in the most general sense, however, I understand the action of putting different 
representations together…”; as a conclusion at A120 the argument for which we’ll see below: “There is thus an 
active faculty of the synthesis of this manifold in us…”; B129-30: “the combination  of a manifold in general can 
never come to us through the senses… [but] is an act of the spontaneity of the power of representation, and, since 
one must call the latter understanding, in distinction from sensibility, all combination… is an action of the 
understanding, which we would designate with the general title synthesis…”. We already quoted above the 
formulation of Fichte’s making the strength of the affirmation of activity most plain, Fichte, 1992: 93: “the system 
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normativity, of an understanding, of thought, of a self or I, affirms against this the passivity of 
belief. In destroying the categories’165 claim to objective validity, he removes them from their 
ascription to thought as such (the rationalist’s standing-over-nature mind) and places them 
instead in the world as such. Thinking the world is hereby removed from the active 
understanding and ascribed to our sensibility, and is thereby a thoroughly passive affair.   
 
The difference between fiction and belief lies in some sentiment or feeling, which is 
annexed to the latter, not to the former, and which depends not on the will, nor can be 
commanded at pleasure. It must be excited by nature, like all other sentiments; and must arise 
from the particular situation, in which the mind is placed at any particular juncture [i.e. 
thinking otherwise is impossible, thus the normativity the rationalists claim for thought is 
impossible]. Whenever any object is presented to the memory or senses, it immediately, by the 
force of custom [thus not mediated by (normative) thought, the condition of rationality, as the 
rationalist affirm] carries the imagination to conceive that object, which is usually conjoined to 
it; and this conception is attended with a feeling or sentiment, different from the loose reveries of 
the fancy. In this consists the whole nature of belief. For as there is no matter of fact which we 
believe so firmly, that we cannot conceive the contrary, there would be no difference between 
the conception assented to, and that which is rejected, were it not for some sentiment, which 
distinguishes the one from the other.      (Hume, 1748: 31)  
 
The last point here can be put thus: since the conditions of thinking a world are synthetic, 
their ascription to the understanding rather than sensibility is impossible.  
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
of idealism begins by presupposing the activity of the representing subject; whereas dogmatism considers the 
behavior of the same subject to be passive.” The breadth of the dogmatist target is in turn made plain when we learn 
that what constitutes idealism is the claim that all “representations that are accompanied by a feeling of necessity are 
products of the activity of the I” (Fichte, 1992: 97). Though he’s critical of Fichte’s talk of ‘production’ here (Hegel, 
1802: 75, 92-3), Fichte’s philosophy is according to Hegel, recall, the principle of Kant’s Deduction “extracted in a 
purer, stricter form” (Hegel, 1801: 79).  
165
 What we’ve been calling, “the subjective conditions of thinking a world”. 
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3.3 HEGEL’S COMPLETION OF HUME’S PROJECT 
Hume’s purpose is a full-blooded affirmation of the natural worldliness of human thinking. His 
annihilation of the rationalist idea of the I as standing over nature is, however, incomplete. The 
worldliness or naturalness of human thought is not full-blooded enough, for there remains in 
Hume the separation between thought as such (the a priori, conceivability), and the natural 
world as such. Hume successfully corrects the rationalists by removing human thought about the 
world (cause, et. al.) from the separate-from-nature thought as such and placing it rather in the 
natural world as such,
166
 but he retains the distinction between thought as such and the natural 
world. The German Idealism project of displaying the original unity of the a priori and the a 
posteriori, of transcendental and empirical consciousness, aims to undercut this distinction, and 
thus put thought as such back into the world.
167
  
Hegel will in an important sense complete the annihilation of the I’s separation from 
nature Hume aimed for by removing the distinction between thought as such and nature as 
such.
168
 Doing so is what he intends when he signals, as he furthers-through-critique Fichte’s 
                                                 
166
 Thus making human mentality explicable upon the same principles (habituation) as a dog’s salivating; a victory 
for empirical psychology, which is not the only conceivable logos of the psyche.  
167
 Fichte, 1982: 26: “For a completed idealism the a priori and the a posteriori are not two different things, but are 
one and the same thing, simply looked at from two different sides, and they can be distinguished from each other 
only in terms of the different means one employs in order to arrive at each… Anyone who is of a different opinion 
does not know what he is talking about.” Spinoza’s error is said to be that “he separates pure and empirical 
consciousness… what right did he have to go beyond the pure consciousness given in empirical consciousness?” 
(Fichte, 1982: 100). Hegel’s chapter on Fichte in the Difference essay presents a better way of achieving the aim of 
Fichte’s philosophy, “to suspend the apparent opposition of transcendental and empirical consciousness” (Hegel, 
1801: 120; cf.121, 129, 157, 163). Cf. Hegel, 1802: 78, “As a result the a priori intellect becomes, at least in 
principle, a posteriori as well… Thus the formal concept of Reason is obtained; Reason has to be a priori and a 
posteriori”, p.80, “this Idea of an intellect that is a posteriori or intuitive”, etc..  
168
 The clear distinguishing of Humean from Hegelian naturalism is, of course, our overarching concern, and we 
speak to it in a preliminary way in the ‘second choice’ below. Hegel will reveal the nature from which our 
separation is annihilated to be quite different from how Hume (and Quine) conceived it. It will be – the concept 
needed to bring analytic philosophy peace (compare McDowell, 2009b: 131-3) - a thoroughly normative nature. 
 105 
project, that “philosophy is to suspend pure consciousness as concept”,169 for what is suspended 
here is the residually rationalist thought appearing in Kant and Fichte that “pure consciousness” 
pertains or belongs to a human subject originally opposed to nature itself.
170
 The reason why he 
affirms the impossibility of philosophy sans the philosophy of nature
171
 is that he affirms with 
Hume the thorough annihilation of the thought of the I’s original separation from nature, yet 
affirms also (against Hume) the freedom or normativity of thought. To affirm the latter un-
Humean moment whilst preserving the Humean annihilation demands expanding or re-
conceiving – it’s an important part of the claim that this is a necessary reconceiving – our 
concept of nature. With his dual affirmation of our full-blooded freedom of thought and our 
thorough naturalness he sees the clear consequence that philosophy’s topic, normative thought as 
such, is impossible without some comprehension of how nature herself makes the freedom from 
herself which is thinking possible.
172
  
Kant’s Deduction restores the possibility of truth (equivalently: a human understanding) 
contra Hume’s destruction of the same. Hegel’s ‘thought’, like Kant’s but unlike Hume’s, is 
impossible without truth (agreement of cognition with its object).
173
 With the completion of the 
project of destroying the rationalist (Cartesian-Leibnizian) idea that our truth-and-activity 
                                                                                                                                                             
Though clearly distinguished from Humean naturalism, we show here its compatibility with the noble Humean 
impulse, and completion thereof. 
169
 Hegel, 1801: 120. After distinguishing Kantianism from Humeanism, we’ll be examining in more detail Hegel’s 
relation to Fichte in our distinguishing Hegelianism from Kantianism. The opening moves of Hegel’s “Exposition of 
Fichte’s System” in Hegel, 1801 (119-154), to which this text belongs, will there be of concern, so we’ll redeem this 
“is what Hegel intends” claim then.  
170
 Hegel’s sublation of rationalism, much more radical than his sublation of Hume, will appear soon.  
171
 See, for example, Hegel, 1801: 128-30, 139, 151, 155-6f. 
172
 In our phrasing “freedom from herself” lies the key to our preservation or sublation of ‘BP Hegel’ – the Hegel of 
Brandom and Pippin who affirms that nature has nothing to do with thinking, normativity, human nature (Brandom, 
2000: 35; Pippin, 2008: 65).  
173
 Hegel, 1812/16: 593: “When Kant… comes to discuss the old and famous question: what is truth? he first of all 
presents to the reader as a triviality the explanation of the term as the agreement of cognition with its object – a 
definition of great, indeed of supreme value.”  
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capable minds are given by a non-identical-with-Nature God rather than arising through nature, 
however – a project according to which, we’ll see, Kant’s anti-naturalism in an important sense 
takes a backward step vis-à-vis Hume
174
 – it becomes incumbent upon philosophy to explain 
how true thinking or knowing, and how the freedom conditional for (better: constitutive of) 
thought, can arise naturalistically. It’s (also) on behalf of a Hume-like destruction of rationalism, 
then, that Hegel writes, with the first words of “The Philosophy of Spirit” fresh upon the heels of 
the just-completed “Philosophy of Nature”, “Spirit has for us nature as its presupposition, of 
which it is the truth”.175 “For us”, but not for the authored-by-a-non-natural-God rationalists. The 
origin of truth-possessing human mindedness (spirit) is thoroughly natural.  
Recall now that philosophy is, for Hegel, a “System of Science”.176 The PS “is nothing 
other than the deduction” of “the Concept of pure science” which the SL presupposes,177 and the 
Encyclopedia sets the paradigm for philosophical science by placing or ordering all the 
particular sciences.
178
 The goal for philosophy-and-science together is to understand who we 
                                                 
174
 Kant preserves – or begins the project of preserving (we are of the mind that Hegel ‘completed’ something that 
Kant did indeed leave in need of completion) – truth, thought and freedom against Hume (a much greater forward 
step), and preserves Humean humanism against the rationalists’ grounding of knowledge through God’s authoring 
our faculty of thought. Our discussion will reveal how he does neither adequately, however, and how Hegel’s 
argument for the existence of man simultaneously solves these equations. By Kant’s anti-naturalism and Hegel’s 
naturalistic retort to it, we refer to Kant’s arguments against Spinoza in Kant, 1790b, especially §§72-3, responded 
to at Hegel, 1802: especially 90-1. 
175
 Hegel, 1817/27: §299, p. 200. We’ll see how unlike Hume Hegel’s Hume-like destruction of rationalism is in the 
‘second choice’ below.  
176
 The working title of the Phenomenology was “System of Science: Part One, Science of the Experience of 
Consciousness”, and the mature philosophy as a whole sought to articulate precisely a System of Science. 
177
 Hegel, 1812/16: 49. 
178
 Cf. Rorty, 1989: 4: our discipline’s self-understanding “owes its existence to attempts by the German idealists to 
put the sciences in their place”. There is (some) truth too in his further description, which we’ll make secular and 
plain: “Hegel wanted to think of natural science as a description of spirit not yet fully conscious of its own spiritual 
nature” (ibid).  
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thinking or, as Brandom says, “normative creatures” are and where we came from: to arrive at “a 
correct understanding of the place of mind in nature”.179 
Now the key to grasping the thorough naturalness of the normative knowing of nature is 
the following: instead of beginning, as even Kant and Fichte do, with a conception of the object 
of knowledge as nature merely known, begin instead with a conception of Nature that’s inclusive 
of its being known by human beings.
180
 The natural sciences as a whole are to be rethought 
through this new standpoint: its target isn’t, as it has thus far been, nature independent of its 
knowers, but Nature inclusive of its knowers. Now, if we really are, as we purport to be, atheists, 
we’ll concede that Nature is the true object (the Object) for science, and that nature is the false 
object. If the concession be made, and Nature be taken up by natural science as its Object, then it 
becomes incumbent upon each natural science to place itself within the project of trying to 
explain how this Nature a part of which it’s concerned with makes the normative (freedom-
involving) thinking and knowing of itself possible.
181
  
Such a conception of Nature is what Hegel recommends when he writes,  
                                                 
179
 Sellars, 1967: ix. Cf. Davidson’s talk of the “picture of mind and its place in nature” in “The Myth of the 
Subjective”, in Davidson, 2001b: 161.  
180
 We capitalize ‘Nature’ here to indicate the sublation of Spinoza’s. Letter 32 again: “But as far as the human mind 
is concerned, I think it is a part of Nature too. For I maintain that there is also in Nature an infinite power of 
thinking.”  See here Hegel’s response at Hegel, 1801: 92-3 (see too n.55) to the line in Haller’s poem “Human 
Virtues”: “To Nature’s heart there penetrates no mere created mind.” Hegel equates empiricism with the attitude 
towards Nature here expressed: “Taking its stand upon the proverb that no created spirit penetrates to Nature’s 
inwardness, empiricism gives up hope of creating spirit and the inwardness itself, and bringing its dead to life as 
Nature.” The proverb appears again at Hegel, 1802: 176, as Hegel criticizes Fichte’s “utterly vulgar view of nature” 
revealed by the I of his Vocation of Man’s being “horrified, filled with loathing and sadness, at the thought that he is 
one with the universe, that eternal nature acts in him”.  
For clarity, we capitalize ‘Object’ and ‘Nature’ in what follows to indicate the new inclusive-of-the-
knowers Object / Nature we recommend natural science take up, and with ‘object’ and ‘nature’ designate its present 
‘independent of the subject’ subject matter. This explanation must be kept in mind whenever you come across a 
capitalized ‘Nature’, though not every occurrence of ‘nature’ has been written explicitly with the contrast in mind.   
181
 I’ll suggest, as an example of a possible application in the sciences of such clarity onto the Object of science, that 
the wearied debate amongst cosmologists concerning “the Anthropic Principle” could be aided thereby.   
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How are synthetic judgments a priori possible? This problem expresses nothing else but 
the Idea that subject and predicate of the synthetic judgment are identical in the a priori way. 
That is to say, these heterogeneous elements, the subject which is the particular and in the form 
of being, and the predicate which is the universal and in the form of thought, are at the same time 
absolutely identical.”182 
 
Kant’s “a priori” anticipation by thought of nature’s form, the possibility of which Hegel, 
in calling it “the authentic Idea of Reason”183 of course endorses, appears in Kant as “pure 
concept”, the opposition of which to empirical consciousness Hegel with Fichte seeks to 
suspend. (Hegel’s central critique of Kant and Fichte, we’ll see, takes them to task for thinking 
the relation between pure consciousness and nature as a causal one.
184) The claim of Hegel’s to a 
better way to achieve Fichte’s sought after suspension or identity is his recommendation to start 
with a knowers-of-it-inclusive conception of Nature, rather than with the independent-of-its-
knowers nature, as specified above. This is an important element of what he means when he 
writes in the Difference essay, contra Fichte (p.121), 
 
The identity of pure and empirical consciousness is not an abstraction from their original 
opposition. On the contrary, their opposition is an abstraction from their original identity.
185
  
 
This reconceived starting point motivates Hegel’s critique of Kant on the analytic / 
synthetic distinction. In affirming the syntheticity of the connections through which alone a 
world is possibly thought, Kant shares with Hume the starting point that affirms the separation 
between thought as such and nature: the subject is originally distinguished from the object. 
                                                 
182
 Hegel, 1802: 69; Hume, as noted, is mentioned earlier this page. We later find the same thought expressed in the 
Preface to the Phenomenology, §17. 
183
 Ibid.  
184
 See Hegel, 1802: 75, 92-3, 167-8, 171, 176, ; DS 115, 129, 132. We’ll revisit the thoughts presented here and 
examine this critique of Hegel’s when making clear the essential distinction between Hegelianism and Kantianism.  
185
 Compare Fichte’s thought at Fichte, 1982: 60-1 but also 33, 35, 42, 60-1, 135, 268, and Fichte, 1988: 322f.. 
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Hegel completes Hume’s annihilation of the separation of the I or thinking from nature as such, 
and this finds expression in his saying that the thought of nature as such in Kant’s a priori 
anticipation of it is absolutely identical with that which it is – or should be - of: Nature as 
such.
186
 The point Hegel takes from Kant’s “problem upon which all depends” and with which 
“metaphysics stands or falls”187 is that our true thinking and knowing of nature, the truth of 
which Kant redeems in his solution thereof, is a true thinking and knowing of nature that 
belongs, not to a “thought as such” separate from nature, the object of knowledge, but rather to 
nature as such. Our starting point for philosophy should be one that affirms our true thinking and 
knowing of nature as part of nature herself, or: nature is to be posited as Nature.  
The identification is possible simply by seeing nature as such as what it is in truth: Nature 
as such. Clarity on the point allows affirmation of the truism that Nature is thinking itself. Just as 
Hume corrected the rationalists by moving thought about the world from thought as such (the 
separated-from-nature subject) to the world as such, Hegel completes this Humean project by 
removing thought as such, this residual separation of the subject from nature that persists in 
Hume,
188
 from this residually separated subject and placing it again in the world or Nature as 
such.  
                                                 
186
 As the explication continues, the sense of the “of” here will change, from the idea that it’s the finite I thinking of 
a nature it stands over (the annihilation’s target), to the idea that the thinking of nature is “of nature” in that it is 
nature itself that is, through us, as it were, doing the thinking. We’ll work to make this sound less mystical than the 
‘I’m separate from nature’ thinking that judges it mystical. Again with Spinoza we “maintain that there is also in 
Nature an infinite power of thinking” (Letter 29); cf. Ethics, IIP11Cor: “When we say that the human mind 
perceives this or that, we are saying nothing but that God [Nature] … has this or that idea; … Here, no doubt, my 
readers will come to a halt, and think of many things which will give them pause. For this reason I ask them to 
continue on with me slowly, step and step, and to make no judgment on these matters until they have through them 
all.” Cf. Hegel, 1840: 272. We’ll soon see how differently than Spinoza Hegel thinks these propositions.  
187
 Kant, 1783: 276.  
188
 It more than ‘persists’ in Kant. As we shall see in moving from the essence of the Kantian to that of the Hegelian 
philosophy, Kant positively seeks to reaffirm our separation from nature: the radically anti-naturalist streak in Kant 
we’ve hinted at, targeted in Hegel’s talk of  “the mishandling that [nature] suffered in Kant’s and Fichte’s systems” 
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Hegel’s reminder on the true concept of Nature finds expression in the SL’s beginning 
with quality over quantity.
189
 The conception of nature as purely quantitative represents an 
abstraction from the thinking subject’s embeddedness in Nature. This abstraction appears to get 
us closer to the truth when we posit nature as nature, but when we see that nature is Nature, we 
see that this abstraction itself is a Natural event, and ought not to be separated from the object 
we study.
190
 Thus does reflection become a moment of the True.    
3.4 HUMEANISM ODER HEGEL? 
Analytic philosophy is essentially Humean in this respect: it is inalienably atheistic. We affirm 
with Rorty that our atheism demands a naturalistic comprehension of what thinking is. It is given 
by our atheism that the rationalist conception of man’s thinking as Given by a non-natural God, 
this conception of man’s place in the world as separate from and standing over nature, is in all its 
residual philosophical incarnations to be expunged.
191
 Now Hegel’s critique of Kant on 
syntheticity, we suggested above, completes Hume’s atheism-inspired desire to annihilate the 
finite human subject’s separation from nature, so that even thought as such doesn’t serve to 
distinguish the human subject from nature.  
                                                                                                                                                             
(Hegel, 1801: 83; cf. 177; Hegel, 1802: 93, 95) and to be corrected by “Reason recasting itself into nature” (1801: 
83), i.e. – he means here more than this, but this too - by Reason (mankind’s thinking and knowing) being affirmed 
again as part of Nature, and belonging thereto.  
189
 See 1812/16: 79.  
190
 Hegel is inspired here, I suggest, by Goethe’s critique of Newton in the former’s Theory of Colors. The Science 
of Logic and the Philosophy of Nature contain their own extensive criticisms of Newton.   
191
 We shall soon find Rorty’s conception of nature to be a quite horrible incarnation of that which he sought to 
destroy, the idea of a God-given world standing over man, and in the way of his freedom.  
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With this completion, however, we are faced with a choice. Humeanism and the 
Hegelianism I’m sketching are different naturalistic choices to be taken upon the shared 
acceptance of the death of God, and the shared impulse deriving from this to destroy the 
philosophical remnants of theistic rationalism and account for the phenomenon of human 
thinking naturalistically. The difference between these two choices we seek to make quite plain. 
In this section we’ll begin our attempt “to bring ‘analytic philosophy’ to self-consciousness”192 
of the fact that that it has in the main unconsciously chosen the Humean path that annihilates 
thought (the normative conception of thought; equivalently, reason), along with the (shared by 
both choices) annihilation of the human subject’s separation from nature. This choice, I’ll seek to 
show, is unconsciously taken even by those who explicitly affirm themselves to be taking a 
Kantian (e.g. Davidson, Allison, Longuenesse) or a Hegelian path affirming the normativity of 
thought (Brandom and Pippin; Rorty will be present too).  
In the “Second Introduction to the Wissenschaftslehre”, a document crucial to Hegel, 
Fichte expresses his claim that he alone has, and all the so-called Kantians have not, understood 
Kant, through the claim that, “unlike Kant and the Wissenschaftslehre, [they] do not presuppose 
that the I is prior to the manifold of representation”.193 Their failure to affirm this priority is of a 
piece with their positing the origin of knowledge in an affection by an object outside 
consciousness (a thing in itself). They thereby posit the world, i.e. the world of mechanically 
                                                 
192
 Rorty, 1981: 172, though our inspiration here is McDowell: see 1996: xiii: “consider a stage at which reflection is 
subject to such a pair of pressures [the demands for normativity, and hence freedom, and for naturalness, and hence 
law-governed natural determination], but not self-consciously enough for it to be clear that what they generate is an 
antinomy. With an inexplicit awareness of the tension…”, and xvi: “Suppose we are inexplicitly aware that our 
thinking is subject to both these forces; that makes it intelligible that we should find thought’s being about the 
empirical world philosophically problematic.” Cf. McDowell, 2009b: 130’s talk of the “person [who] is thereby en 
route, as it were, to a frame of mind in which it is a mystery how thought bears on the world at all”.  
193
 Fichte, 1982: 73; Fichte, 1994: 88 (I, 503). Beck is excepted at p.53. Cf. Fichte, 1982: 42, 49-50, 96, 117-8, 125, 
147. 
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operating causes, to be in place prior to the rational activity human subjects through their 
thinking participate in. Besides alienating our thinking from nature, this thought renders 
impossible, he argues, that very activity, and hence annihilates all human activity and thought.
194
 
This consequence can only be avoided, he claims, by affirming the activity of the human 
understanding to be prior to and make possible the very presentation of nature to the senses, and 
he affirms this to be the lesson of Kant’s Analytic.195  
This Fichtean priority claim constitutes a reading of Kant’s Transcendental Deduction. Its 
import for now is the following: all the modern authors mentioned two paragraphs above affirm 
the presentation of nature as occurring prior to the activity of thought. This itself is to remain 
Humean, and to fail to rise to Kantianism. Sometimes more, sometimes less explicitly, they all 
posit nature (the object) as an order of merely mechanically determining causes, and posit the 
activity of thinking subsequently to this prior positing. In all positing the would-be activity of 
thinking as posterior to their positing of a thereby thought- and (thereby) freedom-free nature, 
they one and all stand opposed to the Kantian-Fichtean priority of “the I, or he, or it that thinks” 
to the presentation of nature, or alternatively to the presentation of nature’s order of 
mechanically determining causes. They also thereby stand opposed to Hegel who, as we’ve seen, 
affirms as actual truth the idea  
 
                                                 
194
 Fichte’s conversion to Transcendental Idealism came with his conversion from determinism through his reading 
Kant’s second Critique. (See Fichte, 1988: 323.)  
195
 The priority gestured at here is the thought the possibility of which Hume “could not explain” (B127), the so-
called Kantians couldn’t fathom, our Hume-tied analytic Kants Allison and Longuenesse, we’ll show, have failed to 
rise themselves to, and that even Kant couldn’t consistently adhere to, as Hegel (but not Fichte) comes to appreciate 
and understand the reasons for: according to Hegel Kant contradicts this “prior” with a “posterior” deriving from a 
thing in itself: see Fichte, 1982: 74-8; Hegel, 1807: §238; Hegel, 1812/16: 62, 593, etc.. (It is of course Fichte’s and 
Beck’s denial of the thing in itself that distinguishes their interpretations. Hegel calls this “Transcendental idealism 
in its more consistent development” (Hegel, 1812/16: 47).)  
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that the mechanism of nature, the relation of causality, is at one with nature’s teleological 
technique. This is not to say that nature is determined by an Idea opposite to it, but rather that 
what from the mechanistic point of view appears as absolutely sundered, one term as cause and 
the other as effect in an empirical nexus of necessity, absolutely coheres within an original 
primordial identity.                         (Hegel, 1802: 90) 
 
In a moment, then, we’ll display how analytic philosophy has, despite its rhetoric of a 
“Kantian” and a “Hegelian” age,196 and despite the odd genuine surge in that direction (e.g. 
Davidson), failed to extract itself from the powerful logos of Hume’s thinking that issues as its 
verdict the annihilation of the concept of thought. First, however, a word is in order about what 
has forced the hand of the analytic thinker into this Humean rather than the Hegelian fork on the 
atheistic road. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                 
196
 The phrases were originally used by Rorty (Sellars, 19947 Preface), by our lights a committed Humean, and 
adopted by Brandom (Brandom, 2000: 32-3). 
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3.5 “A MISCONCEPTION OF THE INTELLECTUAL OBLIGATIONS OF 
NATURALISM”,197 OR…? 
McDowell opens the final ¶10 of his remarkable “Scheme-Content Dualism and Empiricism” 
thus,  
 
I suggested that with the modern achievement of clarity about a distinctive sort of 
understanding – now available to be cited as the defining aim of a distinctive intellectual 
endeavor, the natural sciences – there comes an appreciation of how special, by comparison, is 
the sort of understanding that involves placing things in rational relations to one another. The 
sense of specialness is expressed in a genre of philosophical questions that we can sum up, 
exploiting the connection between reason and freedom, like this: how is freedom related to the 
natural world? This wording points to familiar questions about action and responsibility as 
paradigms of the sort of thing I mean. But the problems posed by the tendency towards a dualism 
of scheme and content belong in this genre of philosophy too. Underlying the dualism of 
scheme and content is a dualism of freedom – the freedom of reason – and nature. 
             (McDowell, 2009b: 131-2)   
 
“Now “dualism”, as a term of philosophical criticism”, he’d earlier explained, “implies 
more than mere duality. In a dualism… the two putative determinants of significance are initially 
separated so far from each other that it becomes a problem how they can come together in the 
interaction that is supposed to yield significance.”198 In ways reminiscent of Hegel’s criticism of 
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 McDowell, 2009b: 133. 
198
 McDowell, 2009b: 116. Compare Brandom, 1994: 614f. What follows on this page alone (McDowell, 2009b: 
116; see also pp.125-6, 128, 131-3) distinguishes McDowell from the just mentioned slew of analytic authors in that 
he does appreciate and affirm not only the Kant-Fichte priority, but the Hegelian equipoise of the thought, for his 
thought here could be summarized, ‘thought (the conceptual) in inconceivable qua thought (the conceptual) 
otherwise than through its original union with the content of thought.’ This is (and this is a good thing) Absolute 
Idealism in common sense’s clothing: see how his “It is not a routine idea… and it is not obvious why” (116) 
express the Absolute Idealist starting point. The term “equipoise” is McDowell’s, and the thought behind it guides 
his reading of Hegel. See McDowell, 2009a: 71-2, 75, 94, 102, 150-3, 161. The clearest expression of the thought in 
play is to be found, perhaps, in “Conceptual Capacities in Perception”, see especially McDowell, 2009b: 143.  
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Fichte,
199
 McDowell’s purpose, we’ll see, is to show that Davidson has assumed or commenced 
his philosophizing from the assumption of the absolute distinction between thought or freedom, 
“organized by a ‘constitutive ideal of rationality’”200 on the one side, and nature on the other, and 
has in doing so contradicted “a condition for it to be intelligible that thoughts are otherwise than 
empty”.201 Thus the deeper “dualism of freedom… and nature” renders Davidson’s account of 
thinking impossible too.  
We can express McDowell’s point that Davidson himself is subject to the dualism of 
thought / reason / freedom and nature thus: Davidson still traffics in an essentially Humean 
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 Hegel, 1801: 119-21, 129.  
200
 McDowell, 2009b: 132. Davidson’s conception of thought is (whereas its predecessor, Quine’s, is definitely not) 
our normative conception of thought impossible without genuine freedom. Though our notion of thought is affirmed 
with Davidson’s coherentism, the conceiving of its possibility is still precluded by the assumed original distinction 
and attendant Humeanism (as we explain in a moment, following McDowell), and thoroughly destroyed by the 
same, as we explain in the next section. Now what we simply call “thought” appears in McDowell’s paper 
sometimes as “world views” (see his gloss on the term at p. 124, “…a world view (or theories, or beliefs)”, though 
also merely as “thought”, as for example when he urges against Davidson “the idea that thought can be intelligibly 
non-empty only by virtue of answerability to experience” (128).  It is crucial to comprehending McDowell’s 
Hegelian correction of Davidson’s “quasi-Kantian picture” (132), and to seeing how he thereby redeems the 
(thoroughly transformed) Quinean / empiricist thought that the world itself through its impacting our senses grounds 
all thinking about it, however, to notice his affirming the following difference as he sets up his alternate account of 
the scheme-content (thought / object of thought) distinction: Davidson equates world view with scheme, thereby 
placing both on the side of the subject posterior to the interaction with the world whereby content for thought is 
attained. As McDowell points out (119-20, cf. 123), this leads him into a misreading of Quine: it impels him to miss 
the possible motivation for empiricism McDowell seeks to redeem. (This misreading will be important in the next 
section.) For McDowell, world view (our ‘thought’) is not posterior to the interaction between subjective and 
objective. Rather, “World view or theory would be the result of the supposed interaction between the two sides of 
the dualism” (119); “we have something with a “built-in ontology and theory of the world” only after content has 
made its contribution” (120);“If the other party to the dualism is already a world view, before it comes into relation 
with sensory intake, then it cannot owe its being a world view (at all) to an interaction with sensory intake” (126). 
Here, we have the origin of thought not, as with Hume, in nature, but in the origin of nature; we explain this 
difference in the next section. (It marks McDowell’s affirmation of the Kant-Fichte priority mentioned above.) 
Expressed in these texts is the conviction that thought (world view), to be answerable to world, “something that is 
surely required if the activity is to be recognizable as thinking as all” (McDowell, 2009b: 243), must find its origin 
in the world’s impressing itself upon the subject. Yet “Davidson is immune to any anxiety about how it is possible 
that there are world views [thoughts] at all” (126; not in a good way, McDowell explains). Davidson assumes 
thought as Given.  I’ll be suggesting below that McDowell’s world view is what I’ve been calling “Nature”: 
McDowell’s “world view” is the world’s view.  
201
 McDowell, 2009b: 125.  
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conception of nature whose logos leads to the annihilation of thought. Davidson conceives the 
natural world, including “the naturalness of… an impact on the senses”202 as an order of causes 
merely mechanical. The force of “merely mechanical” here is this: the causal nexus between 
naturally related entities, including thereby the causal nexus between external objects and our 
senses, is conceived to be thoroughly without reason or purpose - less explicitly, “outside the 
sphere of concepts / the space of reasons”, an order of “synthetic” (non-thoughtlike, i.e. non-
purposeful, non- or irrational) connections. Davidson is essentially at one with Rorty in positing 
nature as an order of “blind, contingent, mechanical forces”.203 
Since Davidson assumes that the natural world must be like this (bereft of rationality), he 
infers from his true insight against Quine that only an item already in the space of reasons can 
ground another, to his coherentism / rejection of empiricism, his pronouncement that “nothing 
can be a reason for holding a belief except another belief”.204 His assumption of a reason- or 
thought-free nature prevents him from considering the possibility McDowell has been urging 
since Mind and World, the thought that this natural event of an object impressing itself upon me 
might also be a rational happening, i.e. an occurrence in the order wherein items constitute 
reasons for other items.  
Now it’s been a cardinal goal of McDowell’s philosophy “to bring “analytic philosophy” 
to self-consciousness”205 concerning the contradiction between, in our terms, (1) its commitment 
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 McDowell, 2009b: 128. 
203
 Rorty, 1989: 17. Cf. McDowell, 2009b: 258 & n.3, 263, n.10. The important senses in which Davidson is very 
much not at one with Rorty, and the sense in which he does, contra Quine’s explicit Humeanism, effect a genuine 
surge towards Kantianism, shall appear below.  
204
 “A Coherence Theory of Truth and Knowledge”, p. 141.  
205
 Rorty, 1989: 172. See McDowell, 1996: xiii: “consider a stage at which reflection is subject to such a pair of 
pressures [the demands for normativity, and hence freedom, and for naturalness, and hence law-governed natural 
determination], but not self-consciously enough for it to be clear that what they generate is an antinomy. With an 
inexplicit awareness of the tension…”, and xvi: “Suppose we are inexplicitly aware that our thinking is subject to 
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to taking the Humean annihilation-of-thought fork upon the annihilation of the separation of the I 
from nature given by our atheism, and (2) its desire to preserve the normativity (inc. thereby the 
activity) of thought. In opposition to the anti-representationalist “romanticism” of Rorty and 
Brandom that affirms that “there isn’t a relation of responsibility of human beings to anything 
non-human”206 on the one side, and to Davidson’s coherentism rejecting a grounding relation of 
sense experience to belief on the other, he has under the banner of “a minimal empiricism”207 / “a 
conception of experience as taking in the world”208 sought to extricate us from this Humean 
logos of annihilation in which these other philosophers, with their analytic conception of nature, 
have been ensnared,
209
 by redeeming the idea that the origin of thinking is to be once again 
found in the world, i.e. to find again thought’s origination in “the way the world puts its mark on 
                                                                                                                                                             
both these forces; that makes it intelligible that we should find thought’s being about the empirical world 
philosophically problematic.” Cf. McDowell, 2009b: 130’s talk of the “person [who] is thereby en route, as it were, 
to a frame of mind in which it is a mystery how thought bears on the world at all”.  
206
 Rorty to Davidson in conversation (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=y6DtYC9N8RM, at 61 minutes.) The 
scare-quotes are to indicate that I find little “romantic” in Rorty’s conception of “this so-called man and his 
humanity” (Hegel, 1802: 65), and I’m quite confident the romantics would feel the same way. The McDowellian-
Hegelian concept of the human being as the mode of Nature “special” (as McDowell urges, with Davidson and 
Sellars, as against Rorty, at McDowell, 2009a: 207f., cf. our opening quote from McDowell, 2009b: 132 above) in 
its being the only mode thereof that thinks and knows Nature and nature, will be thoroughly consistent with the true 
reading of Rorty’s words (as McDowell suggests of his “naturalized platonism” at 1996: 92), for this will come with 
the Hegelian (and true romantic) understanding of “human”, not Rorty’s Humean-Darwinian conception which, 
we’ll see, very much traffics in thought’s annihilation. It will turn out that a proper appreciation of what it is to be 
human – a proper appreciation of what thinking is – will very much demand responsibility to the world itself – 
exactly what Rorty seeks to deny. We’ll make note here of the fact that Davidson resists Rorty’s above-quoted 
words articulating his so-called romantic pragmatist conception of human nature with the words, “it seems to me 
that we ought also accept some kind of obligation… to the environment”.  
207
 McDowell, 1996:  xi.  
208
 McDowell, 2009b: 243.  
209
 See McDowell, 2009b: 130’s discussion of “the conception of nature whose finished product, in this context, is 
the idea that experiences are ‘intuitions without concepts’”, i.e. that thought is not rationally connected to the world, 
rendering it un- “intelligible that thoughts are otherwise than empty” (p.125; cf. 121, 124, 126, 128-33), i.e. that the 
comprehensibility of thought “goes missing” (126), i.e., that thought is annihilated. “Thought’s hold on the world is 
coming into question” (130). Cf. McDowell, 2009b: 259: “With the new [analytic] conception of nature, the 
knowing subject threatens to withdraw from the natural world.” The thought expressed in quotation marks on the 
first full paragraph of p.128, the temptation to which it is McDowell’s purpose to save us from, expresses a 
commitment shared by Brandom, Davidson, and Rorty.  
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us”.210 This suggested minimal “transcendental empiricism”211 is designed to avoid the failures 
he’s revealed his predecessors’ and contemporaries’ views to come to when the question is put to 
them concerning “the capacity of our mental activity [our thinking in general] to be about reality 
at all”.212 
Davidson writes of “Quine’s naturalized epistemology” that “it is based on the empiricist 
premise that what we mean and what we think is conceptually (and not merely causally) founded 
on the testimony of the senses”.213 The only motivation he can fathom for having my belief being 
conceptually (rationally) grounded on my impression is the desire for the justification of 
thoughts we already possess. His appreciation of the sui generis nature of the space of reasons, 
however, rightly impels him to affirm that only something thoughtlike, something rational, could 
ground (give a reason for) the believing mind to believe something. Instead of affirming upon 
this insight the option McDowell urges of positing this natural mechanically causal transaction 
involving our sensibility as also a rational relation, however, Davidson rejects the idea that the 
natural-causal relation involving my sensibility is epistemologically significant at all. As is 
familiar, he posits this mechanically causal transaction that is my sense experience as causing 
my belief,
214
 but rejects the idea that it grounds my belief: “the thesis that the deliverances of the 
senses are epistemologically significant”,215 i.e. enjoy a place in the order of grounding, is 
discarded as “the last vestige of empiricism.”216   
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 McDowell, 2009b: 124.  
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 See, e.g. “Sellars’ Transcendental Empiricism”.  
212
 McDowell, 2009b: 243.  
213
 “Afterthoughts”, p.136, quoted at McDowell, 2009b: 120.  
214
 See e.g. “Mental Events”, p.247, “a ship approaching must have caused him to come to believe”, cf. p. 254; “A 
Coherence Theory of Truth and Knowledge”, p.157.  
215
 McDowell, 2009b: 118. 
216
 McDowell, 2009b: 118.  
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Scheme-content dualisms seek to ground thought on something outside of thought, 
something non-thoughtlike. Quine’s empiricism is subject to the dualism because it conceives 
sense experiences as non-thoughtlike: his experiences are not, like McDowell’s, appearings, but 
“intuitions without concepts”.217 The only motivation Davidson can see for Quine’s desire to 
ground thought on sense experience is to justify beliefs already possessed. As McDowell points 
out, however, this doesn’t fit Quine’s thinking (123; more on this in the next section). Quine’s is, 
in the main, a “naturalism that cheerfully casts experiences as ‘intuitions without concepts’, and 
rejects questions about the warrant for world views altogether, in favor of questions about their 
causation.”218 Quine’s sense experiences, since posited as outside the rational relations 
constituting his conceptual scheme (his thinking), are thereby rendered mute, i.e. it is 
“incoherent”219 to posit them, qua “intuitions without concepts”, as justifying given beliefs.220 
Davidson’s “curiously muted objection”221 (his charge that Quine’s picture, rather than being 
incoherent, merely “leaves him open to sceptical attack”),222 along with the failure of fit of 
Davidson’s posited ‘anti-skeptical’ motivation for Quine’s empiricism and its character as 
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 See McDowell, 2009b: 115, 121, 125 (quoted below). “The conception of nature that I have depicted as 
underlying the idea that the world’s impacts on us are “intuitions without concepts”” (130) is of course the analytic 
naturalism that is McDowell’s and my target. To say that occurrences within this nature, including my natural 
sensible self’s being impacted upon by external objects, are “without concepts” is to affirm this nature to be non- or 
irrational, to posit its connectings as non-thoughtlike or “synthetic”. It’s the sources of this positing of nature that 
we’re exploring.  
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 McDowell, 2009b: 131. 
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 McDowell, 2009b: 117, 120, 123, 125, 127. 
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 In the next paragraph we’ll see McDowell redeem the nobler empiricist impulse behind Quine’s thinking: the 
thought that thinking (belief) is only possible at all as what it must be to be thought or belief, answerable to the 
world, through its commerce with it in sense experience. But McDowell still affirms of course that its incoherent to 
think that that impulse could be satisfied through blind intuitions. It’s through this that we affirm McDowell’s 
‘Quine-Hegel’ synthesis to possess what we found Brandom’s lacking: the moment of principle-destroying 
criticism.  
221
 McDowell, 2009b: 121, 122. 
222
 “Afterthoughts”, p.136, quoted at McDowell, 2009b: 120. “The materials for the claim of incoherence”, 
McDowell points out on p.121, “come directly from Davidson himself.”  
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cheerfully eschewing questions of justification, signals the fact that Davidson has misidentified 
the noetic pressure impelling the most famous case of it (Quine) into the scheme-content 
dualism.  
It is not, as Davidson suggests, a desire to ground beliefs already possessed that impels 
Quine to the dualism, but “an interest in the conditions of its being intelligible that we have a 
world view (or theories, or beliefs) at all.”223 Now McDowell does, of course, affirm the 
Sellarsian thought that only something within the space of reasons (something thoughtlike) is 
able to ground or justify a thought or belief, but he rejects the Davidsonian incarnation of this 
thought, “nothing can be a reason for holding a belief except another belief”, by redeeming the 
virtue of the just-quoted real “interest” motivating Quine’s empiricism, the motivation for which 
Davidson misses. Beliefs may justify other beliefs, but how are beliefs (thoughts) about the 
world possible at all? “It does not help to say that impacts from the world cause beliefs… These 
beliefs would be just more elements of world views. The question we have allowed to arise is 
how there can be anything of that kind, if not because some things of that kind are answerable to 
a tribunal constituted by experience”.224 Davidson has assumed our possession of a world view 
or stock of beliefs, and in denying the rationality of the world’s impact on our senses has 
precluded the possibility of tracing these beliefs about the world back to the world itself (“if not 
because”). He has affirmed subjectivity (the possession of thoughts, beliefs, world views) to be 
in place prior to its union with the object; he has assumed the subjective (thought, belief) to be 
originally opposed to the objective (nature). This makes answerability to the object, to the world 
itself, impossible. McDowell’s correction of Davidson is like Hegel’s correction of Kant and 
Fichte: both affirm the subjective’s (thought’s, belief’s) origin to be found in its original union 
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 McDowell, 2009b: 124. Compare 125-6, 128.  
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 McDowell, 2009b: 125. The text immediately preceding this appears in the next standalone quote below.  
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with the objective: thought’s origin (actual, i.e. normative thought’s, unlike Quine’s) is to again 
be found in our sensible nature’s transaction with the rest of nature’s being, i.e. in nature’s 
impact on our (within nature) senses. This view, which posits as its opponent the view that nature 
is merely an order of “blind, contingent, mechanical forces”,225 is, we can see, the first serious 
step of analytic philosophy towards winning for itself the Hegelian notion of nature (Nature) 
expressed at FK, p.90, and quoted above. McDowell writes,  
 
It is a Kantian idea that responsiveness to reason is a kind of freedom… But 
if…responsiveness to reason does not extend as far as answerability to impacts the world makes 
on us, then it becomes a live question how, in exercising such a freedom, we could be adopting 
commitments as to how things are in the world. If “man’s conceptual sovereignty” has no limits 
set by the facts themselves, it becomes unrecognizable as what it is meant to be, the power to 
make up our minds about how things are. And it is open to question whether we enable ourselves 
to see “man’s conceptual sovereignty” as constrained in the right way if – like Davidson when he 
rejects empiricism – we say that impacts from the world exert a causal influence on how the 
sovereign power is exercised, but deny that they set rational constraints. If we say that, we 
preclude ourselves from pointing to rational answerability to the world’s impact on our senses as 
the way in which employments of concepts are ultimately rationally answerable to the world 
itself, and then it becomes mysterious how these exploitations of freedom can be otherwise than 
empty.
226
  
 
This familiar rehash has been for the sake of examining McDowell’s own diagnosis of 
the source of the dualism “deeper”227 than the one Davidson finds behind “what is unsatisfactory 
about modern philosophy”.228 This deeper dualism, the “dualism of freedom – the freedom of 
reason – and nature” has, we’ve seen, ensnared and shipwrecked Davidson’s account of thinking 
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 McDowell, 2009b: 124-5. Compare 134: “With this conception, we can hold that operations of our sensibility 
exert a rational influence on our formation of belief”, p.139: “My objection to Davidson’s picture is not that it takes 
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too. By correctly diagnosing the error in his thinking, one of the clearest around, McDowell 
suggests, we’ll arrive at a deeper appreciation of the problems controlling analytic philosophy’s 
thinking in general.  
Davidson has the insight against Quine that only a rational or thought-like item could 
possibly ground a belief. But why, McDowell asks, doesn’t he consider the possibility that the 
impression on my senses might itself be rational (conceptual) as well as causal – that experience 
might yet be in the space of reasons? Why is he impelled to give up the thought that the 
grounding of thought about the world is to be found in the world itself? 
In his search after the origin of the scheme-content dualism, the diagnostic question 
Davidson asks is “why is it tempting to suppose that the deliverances of the senses would have to 
constitute a tribunal for our world views to face?”229 McDowell answers in a way that affirms 
this ‘temptation’ to be well motivated: because “empiricism, in the non-pallid sense,230 captures 
a condition for it be intelligible that thoughts are otherwise than empty.”231 With the “deeper” 
anxiety discovered to be, not ‘how are beliefs justified?’ but rather “How are world views 
possible?”,232 i.e., not how is thought justified, but how is thought even possible, the diagnostic 
question becomes “why is it difficult to see how the deliverances of the senses could constitute a 
tribunal for world views to face? Why is it tempting to suppose that the world’s impacts on us 
would have to be “intuitions without concepts”?”233 
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McDowell’s answer, as will again be familiar and as is presented in our opening quote 
from ¶10, is that “with the intellectual development that we can sum up as the rise of modern 
science”234 came the pressure to infer that anything posited as “natural” thereby falls under the 
province of “the natural sciences… an understanding of phenomena as interrelated perhaps 
causally, but certainly (this becomes a tempting gloss on what it is to see phenomena as causally 
interrelated) within a framework of laws of nature”.235 McDowell affirms the duality – we don’t 
(yet) say dualism– of things or items falling under the natural scientific province of natural law, 
and things falling within the space of reasons. According to his diagnosis, we falsely infer, ‘if 
natural, then falling under natural law’, from which follows the inference McDowell endorses, ‘if 
falling under natural law, then not in the space of freedom (/reasons / concepts / thoughts)’. Since 
our being sensibly affected by external objects is an occurrence in nature, we think, ‘since sense 
experience is a natural event, it falls under the realm of natural law, and thereby (by the duality 
McDowell endorses) not in the space of reasons.’ Thereby are we led, cognizant of the sui 
generis nature of the space of reasons, to affirm “nothing can be a reason for holding a belief 
except another belief”, expunge sense experience’s seemingly necessary role in grounding our 
thinking the world, and remain forever subjects separated from our object (nature).
236
 But  
 
we do not need to accept that when we see something as a happening in nature – as the 
world’s making its mark on a sentient creature would indeed be – we are eo ipso placing it in the 
sort of frame that is characteristic of the natural sciences… We need not accept… that 
phenomena are conceived in terms of their place in nature only when they are conceived in terms 
of their place in the framework of natural law.
237
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According to McDowell, then, dissolving analytic philosophy’s master anxiety demands 
taking aim at “the conception of nature that I have depicted as underlying the idea that the 
world’s impacts on us are ‘intuitions without concepts’”,238 at the conception of  nature that 
compels us to say that “reason is set over against the senses”,239 for this is a “conception of 
nature whose finished product, in this context, is the idea that experiences are ‘intuitions 
without concepts’”: it a conception of nature whereby the possibility of finding thought’s 
grounding in the world is precluded. We must take aim at analytic or Humean naturalism to 
prevent the annihilation of thought and redeem its possibility. McDowell closes his paper thus: 
 
The question ‘How are world views possible?’ is a form of the question ‘How is freedom 
possible?’ But here Davidson’s way… does not help… [he] does not undermine the thought that 
the world’s impacts on us are ‘intuitions without concepts.’ This is a thought Davidson accepts. 
And it is a thought that, I have claimed, leaves the freedom of ‘conceptual sovereignty’ a 
mystery. … if we are to defuse the anxiety while respecting this quite different attraction for 
empiricism [its unique ability– sans appeal to God’s authorship of my faculties - to answer the 
question, ‘how is thought about the world possible at all?’], something Davidson does not give 
us reason not to want to do, we need to find a way to resist the idea that the impacts of the world 
on our senses are ‘intuitions without concepts’. And for that reason we need a more radical 
counter to the underlying dualism of reason and nature than the one Davidson supplies. On 
this view, the sources of what is unsatisfactory about modern philosophy include something that 
lies deeper than the interiorizing conception of subjectivity pointed to by Davidson. A more 
fundamental source is a misconception of the intellectual obligations of naturalism, to 
which Davidson himself – in his willingness to accept that the deliverances of the senses are 
‘intuitions without concepts’ – seems to be subject.240 
 
But the real source, I suggest, is deeper still. The more fundamental source is a 
misconception of the intellectual obligations, not of naturalism, but of atheism.  
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The religious world view affirms a non-natural God to have made the world. Nature is 
posited as authored by a rational mind, and is thereby thought of as having been made rational. 
This mode of life and thought finds philosophical expression in the Cartesian idea that the God 
who authored my intellect also made nature, ensuring that the thoughts I cannot help but affirm 
according to the former (my clear and distinct ideas) are known – through the proof of God’s 
existence – to be in agreement with (to correspond to) this hereby-posited-as-rational nature.241  
Now the next shape taken by the dialectical world-spirit was the Humean incarnation of 
naturalism grounded on Hume’s atheistic opposition to the religious world view. Because this 
naturalism took shape in opposition to rationalism - in opposition, that is, to a form of life and 
thought whose positing of a transcendent God was intimately interwoven with its positing of 
nature as rational or thought-like – the nature that appears in this naturalism is posited as 
irrational.  
Hume’s role in the argument for the existence of man is to destroy God and affirm nature 
by winning human thinking from the thought of it as being God-Given and for the 
comprehension of it as arising through nature. We’ve seen how he does this: Hume affirms with 
Descartes (say)
242
 that I cannot but think the world otherwise than through the causal relation. 
For Descartes, the truth of this thought necessary for thinking the world is grounded in the third 
Meditation’s proof of the existence of God: Descartes infers ‘ God created us  our necessary 
thought is true’. For the sake of affirming the naturalness of man’s thinking and with this 
destroying the self-deluded conception man has of his own thinking as expressed in its highest 
                                                 
241
 For the present version of our story, we must ignore the sense in which Descartes himself is a religious 
revolutionary. We trace the argument for the existence of man from the Cartesian coordinate, though its origin is 
indeed more distant.  
242
 In the Meditations Descartes assumes causation, e.g. God must be the cause of my idea of God; external objects 
must cause my representations of them. (Hume denies both; on the latter see Hume, 1739: 2n1; 1748: 10n.9.) He at 
least would say, I claim, what I here put in his mouth.  
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form in Descartes’ meditations, Hume launches his skeptical attack: ‘our necessary thought does 
not possess truth  God did not create us’.243  
Now, what form does this atheism-inspired skeptical attack on truth take? Hume points 
out: what is thought in the thought of the causal relation, ‘something, A, posits something else, 
B’ cannot be grounded on thought: it is synthetic, for its contrary is conceivable. Since synthetic, 
its ground must be experience.  
Now this is the fork at which Kant – and McDowell with him - diverges from Hume. 
Hume needs to destroy truth for our thought to destroy God and thereby affirm man’s 
naturalness. With his skeptical argument that we’ve rehearsed, therefore, he destroys the idea 
that thought has insight into the synthetic connections nature presents us with. The verdict of his 
destruction of quid juris? for cause and (we imagined) the other categories through which nature 
is presented to us can be put thus: we know with certainty that the forms of being through which 
nature presents itself to us (e.g. causal connection) are (not only synthetic) but positively non- or 
irrational. He takes himself to have demonstrated (and 1766 Kant agrees) that thought (reason) 
has insight into the necessity of the fact that thought has no insight into the why of (the reason 
for) the forms of nature’s presentation (e.g. as causally connected). Intuitions are known to be 
– necessarily, is the claim - without concepts. 
Kant, however, in the argument we will rehearse, will redeem the thought-like nature of 
the unity of the forms through which nature presents itself to us (the unity of space and time, 
posited as identical with the categories),
244
 will thereby redeem thought’s insight into why nature 
presents itself to us according to the forms through which we must think it, and will thereby 
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redeem against Hume’s critique the understanding’s claim to truth. His argument for the 
objective validity of the subjective conditions of the possibility of thinking a world will entitle 
him, like McDowell, to “equate the form of the world and the form of thought”.245 Reason would 
then again have insight into the form of the connections nature presents us with. Otherwise put: 
nature would again be posited as rational. The sensible presentation of nature to us – intuitions – 
could again be with concepts.   
But now, is Kant on board with the atheism essential to analytic philosophy? There is 
indeed in Kant’s redemption of truth for the human understanding a crucial redemption for the 
place of man’s thinking in nature, and we’ll explore thoroughly his role in the argument for the 
existence of man elsewhere. That said, we must answer: not at all. As Kant, 1790a: §§69-80 and 
other texts reveal, Kant’s limitation of knowledge to the transcendentally ideal, his denial of our 
knowledge of the thing in itself, which he does posit as existing, is indeed quite importantly a 
“critique [of] knowledge to make room for faith” (Bxxx).246 And are things any better for the 
atheistic analytic philosopher when he finds in Hegel’s texts his “ever-renewed insistence that he 
means to reinstate metaphysics as knowledge of God”?247 This is the question the forthcoming 
Argument for the Existence of Man will be concerned with answering. We mention it now to 
indicate the pressure on the analytic philosopher to remain Humean. 
 The path that Hume takes at this fork with Kant is the path that analytic 
philosophy has taken, and the reason for its resistance to McDowell’s call to abandon the 
conception of sense experience as yielding “intuitions without concepts”, is the same as 
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Hume’s reason for taking the skeptical prong of this fork: it thinks that, if nature is posited 
as rational, God is redeemed.  
Consider, for example, Rorty’s reaffirmation of bald naturalism in his brief response to 
Mind and World in his 1998 “McDowell, Davidson, and Spontaneity”.248 There’s no explicit talk 
of God here, to be sure, but the anti-theological impulse behind Rorty’s opposition to the 
correspondence theory of truth is of course quite explicit. Rorty writes,  
 
As McDowell reads him, Davidson thinks ‘that we cannot understand the idea of 
spontaneity naturalistically.’ (p.72) As I read him, Davidson thinks that we can understand 
everything naturalistically, and has no use whatever for a notion like ‘the spontaneity of the 
understanding’.                 (Rorty, 1998: 389) 
  
Why does Rorty, who seeks to deflate the importance of scientific understanding in our 
culture, remain steadfast in his affirmation that human thinking falls under scientific natural law? 
What grounds his resistance to McDowell’s urging that “we do not need to accept that when we 
see something as a happening in nature… we are eo ipso placing it in the sort of frame that is 
characteristic of the natural sciences”?249 What sacred truth does he feel is threatened by 
McDowell’s reaffirmation against analytic philosophy’s Humeanism of the Kantian thought 
“spontaneity is what is not governed by [natural] laws”?250 Why is he impelled to characterize 
this as “a hangover of an early, pre-Darwinian epoch in the history of philosophy – the epoch of 
Kant”?251 The easier answer cites his connecting Kantianism with a theological hangover, but 
there’s a deeper reason for Rorty’s recoil against the fundamental thought of McDowell’s 
philosophy.  
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McDowell places the origin of thinking, the origin of rationality itself, back into nature. 
Rorty, however, thinks that with the death of God, rationality (language, truth) is won for man.
252
  
Saying that truth and thought originate in nature is precisely the correspondence theory hangover 
of theology Rorty sees in the way of his romantic humanism. If nature is posited, as it was with 
the God-loving rationalists, as once again rational – if our sensible transaction with the world is 
posited as anything other than merely mechanically causal, as anything other than intuitions 
without concepts – then, Rorty’s thought runs, man loses ground to God; the hoped for romantic 
notion of man is lost with this redemption of “an early, pre-Darwinian epoch in the history of 
philosophy”. ‘What,’ he thinks, ‘is an affirmation of the rationality of nature, if not a humanism-
retarding theology-redeeming re-affirmation of faith? With McDowell,’ we can imagine Rorty 
worrying on his deathbed,  
 
“Philosophy has made itself the handmaiden of faith once more.”253 
 
With McDowell’s discovery of the higher Davidson-ensnaring dualism of freedom and 
nature, “the diagnostic question that the dualism raises is this: why is it difficult to see how the 
deliverances of the senses could constitute a tribunal for our world views to face? Why is it 
tempting to suppose that the world’s impacts on us would have to be “intuitions without 
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concepts?”254 McDowell answers, ‘because of our commitment to science’. But what’s behind 
our commitment to science? What does science stand opposed to? Religion, which derived from 
its God a rational nature. What does McDowell urge upon us? A rational nature. How can we 
remain committed to the scientific world view, take leave of that through which its victory was 
won (nature’s being posited, contra religion, as irrational, as with Hume and the Humean 
Darwin), and affirm in its stead the very thesis of our opponents that it pertains to our very 
essence to oppose?  
 
How can we remain atheists, and yet follow McDowell into his new, rational nature?  
 
The answer to this question is to be found here: in Hegel’s argument for the existence of 
man.  
3.6 ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY AND THE HUMEAN LOGOS OF ANNIHILATION 
In Hegel’s 1802: 69 affirmation of the identity of Kant’s a priori anticipation of nature and being 
itself, in this claim to the analyticity of what Kant affirmed to be synthetic, we suggested, Hegel 
completes the logos of Hume’s noble rationalism-destroying atheistic annihilation of man’s 
separation from nature. Since it arises through his completion of Kant’s redemption against 
Hume of the notions of truth and activity for the human understanding, however, Hegel’s 
annihilation of this separation doesn’t, a la Hume, destroy the essence of man (his thinking) for 
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nature, but rather redeems this essence, man’s thinking, for Nature. Whilst preserving Hume’s 
commitment to atheism,
255
 Hegel redeems man’s normative thinking as a moment of Nature: 
implicit in Nature’s original being is its thought or understanding of itself, and this implicit 
thinking or understanding of itself is made explicit in man’s philosophical and scientific 
knowledge of Nature. The norms to which thinking answers are, we find Kant teaching Hegel, 
implicit in Nature’s very possibility, and when human thinking ‘answers to the world’, this 
ground of Nature finds itself. (This is an analysis of the proposition: truth is possible.) The 
essence of man is this: Nature’s knowing of itself.  
We promised an account of how analytic philosophy has, in the main unconsciously, 
chosen the Humean prong of the atheistic fork that annihilates man’s separation from nature – 
the prong that annihilates thinking itself along with the separation. Before beginning on the 
details, here’s a breathless summary of how the dialectic of the (actual) Humean, Kantian, and 
Hegelian ages of philosophy gets replayed by analytic philosophy itself: 
Hume annihilated the separation of man’s thinking from nature, but annihilated thinking 
in affirming this naturalism. Kant redeemed thinking, but as his commitment to the outside-
nature thing in itself shows (inc. the thinking mind in itself), only managed to do so by beginning 
from the absolute opposition of thinking and the world, thus thinking remains separate from the 
world, and naturalism (the thought that thought is natural) is negated.
256
 Hegel negates the 
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negation, preserving both the original Humean negation and Kant’s negation of it. How? By 
affirming Nature: all acts of thinking are Natural (preserves Hume), yet they are acts (preserves 
Kant). How is the synthesis possible? In one way only: the substance thinking in the free acts 
of man’s thinking – is Nature.257 In man’s thinking Nature finds her freedom (her knowledge of 
herself, her self-consciousness).  
Quine annihilates man’s separation from nature, but annihilates thinking in affirming his 
naturalism. Davidson, through the “constitutive ideal of rationality”, redeems thinking, but as 
shown by his commitment to the idea that we possess beliefs independently of their grounding in 
sense experience with the world, he only manages to do so by beginning from the absolute 
opposition of thinking and the world. Since knowledge is precluded from being grounded in the 
world, thinking remains absolutely separate from the world, is thus not of the world, and 
naturalism goes missing.
258
 McDowell negates the negation, preserving both the original 
Quinean negation and Davidson’s negation of it. How? By redeeming empiricism against 
Davidson’s critique, thinking’s origin is once again worldly, and naturalism is preserved. 
Davidson’s negation of Quine was based on the sui generis nature of the space of reasons. 
McDowell preserves this by positing the preserving-of-Quine grounding-of-thought sense 
experience itself within the space of reasons. The transaction with my body in nature is posited 
here for the first time in analytic philosophy as rational (conceptual).
259
 Thinking - its origin, 
anyway – is put once again into nature. With regard to Hegel’s 1802: 69 / 1807: §17 expressed 
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procedure of positing nature as Nature, “it is evident, of course, that the two procedures are the 
same”.260 Of McDowell, Hegel writes,  
 
He has raised the necessary supreme Idea of a sensuous intellect [a conceptual sense 
experience] to reality.
261
  
 
Less breathlessly, now. We begin with Quine. We applaud the impulse to annihilate 
man’s separation from nature (“the world”) behind Quine’s naturalized epistemology. “We can 
investigate the world, and man as a part of it”.262 Now Quine is, we noted, a committed 
Humean.
263
 Hume, we’ve explained, was thoroughly self-conscious about the fact that his logos 
annihilates the normative notion of thought. According to this notion, thought is free. Thought, 
‘rational responsiveness’ or what have you cannot be conceived as normative if the possibility of 
failing to conform to its norms is not accounted for. “Philosophy must give the separation into 
the subject and object its due”.264 Hume would be at peace, I suggest, with the characterizing of 
his philosophy as annihilating thought, especially if we affirm, as we do here, its essence to be 
normative. ‘Yes, it’s my point that we don’t have thought in that sense’, he’d say. ‘Our thinking 
is as much nature’s plaything as particles, planets and billiard balls’.   
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 Now Quine’s philosophy likewise annihilates thought, though in his case only partially 
self-consciously, and partially not so. His critique of analyticity suggests that the connection that 
was to be secured for thought as standing over the world cannot be so secured – that the world 
can refute it as well as any held synthetic belief. This is so because man’s thinking is a moment 
of the world itself.
265
 Likewise is his self-consciousness of his commitment to the Humean logos 
of annihilation explicit in the fact that his is, in the main, “a naturalism that cheerfully casts 
experience as “intuitions without concepts”, and rejects questions about the warrant for world 
views altogether, in favor of questions about their causation”,266 for here the passivity of belief, 
so crucial to Hume’s destruction of the rationalist idea of the finite thinking mind as an active 
substance, the destruction of which in turn serves to destroy the notion of normative thought, 
seems to be positively reaffirmed once more.   
This self-consciousness, however, is far from total. When we sketched Hume’s logos 
above, we noted that, although he succeeds against the rationalists in removing thought about the 
world as such (cause, et al.) from thought as such, where they place it, to the natural world as 
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such, this annihilation of the separation between the subject and the object is incomplete, for a 
priori conceivability remains cordoned off from nature. (Hegel’s 1802: 69 positing of Kant’s 
synthetic a priori truths as the identity of thought and being, we said, completes the quashing.) 
Now Quine’s critique of analyticity may in certain ways further the annihilation of the 
distinction, but that he too, like Hume, fails to properly put thinking as such back in nature, is 
most glaringly evident in his distinguishing our conceptual sovereignty from that received 
through sense-experience – in his failing to reduce / naturalize the conceptual so much that my 
sensible commerce with objects could also be seen as conceptual, and his trafficking instead in a 
scheme-content dualism. Against his aim to put our thinking back into nature, his positing 
conceptual thought as subsequent to our natural transactions with the world serves rather 
precisely to isolate our thinking from the world. The “freedom” supposedly pertaining to “man’s 
conceptual sovereignty” is, since the conceptual is what the natural is not, a freedom floating 
free of nature. Such posited sovereignty also stands opposed to Hume’s pronouncement that only 
“some sentiment”,267 something sensible, could impel us to belief. Hume’s prong here is, and 
Quine’s is not, consistent with their shared Absolute. Quine’s talk of man’s conceptual 
sovereignty is an impossible attempt to affirm the activity of thinking when the possibility of this 
has been long foreclosed by the nature of the positing of “the world” which has “man as a part”. 
This positing which, it should be pointed out, is a positing of man’s (would-be, at least) 
understanding, doesn’t posit man as a proper moment of this world. This world is posited as 
object, not subject-object. And the consequence of this positing, which ensnares Rorty, 
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Davidson,
268
 Brandom, Pippin, and Allison, can be nothing other the annihilation of the 
subjective, of all possibly true (normative) thinking. Hume knew this, and he delighted in the fact 
that his positing the Absolute as mere object (nature) thoroughly annihilated the ground upon 
which God and his wretched creature ‘the rational animal’ did walk. He smiled with glee as he 
drew the consequence that nothing recognizable as (normative) thought emerged from his 
system. ‘There’s just nature, kids, and it ain’t normative’. Quine’s inconsistent Humeanism in 
this last regard is displayed in his talk of “the tribunal of experience”. As McDowell has ably 
demonstrated, experiences conceived as a non-conceptual “stimulation of… sensory 
receptors”,269 are mute, and a tribunal not.270  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
268
 It ensnares Davidson, though there are significant advances to be found in his positing of an absolute subject 
alongside an absolute object. He makes a partial (“Actions, Reasons, and Causes”), but not a sufficient (McDowell’s 
Mind and World and “Scheme Content Dualism and Empiricism” critique) break from mechanism.  
269
 Quine, 1969: 75. 
270
 Quine’s “conception of experience makes no room for experience to stand in rational relations to beliefs”; “The 
only connection he countenances between experience and the acceptance of statements is a brutely causal linkage 
that subjects are conditioned into”; “if experience plays only a causal role in the formation of a world-view, not a 
justificatory role, then it does not serve as evidence at all”. First two quotes from McDowell, 1996: 133, the last 
from p.134. See also “Scheme Content Dualism and Empiricism”. 
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